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DESTRUCTION OF THE ASSAULT FORCES OF IMPERIALISM

(In Honor of the 30th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War)

Mar SU A. Grechko

Thirty years ago, on a Sunday morning, 22 June 1941, a several-million-man Nazi Germany army invaded Soviet territory. Nazi Germany, treacherously violating a nonaggression pact, launched a criminal war against the world's first socialist country. The war forced upon the Soviet Union by German fascism was the most difficult and cruel of all wars ever experienced by our homeland. It was the biggest military conflict between socialism and the assault forces of imperialism. For almost 4 years the Soviet people and its Armed Forces waged a continuous, intense armed struggle. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, they defended against reactionary forces the most progressive system, the most democratic form of government, the most advanced culture. The war against fascism decided the fate not only of our state but of the peoples of all Europe and the entire world as well.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War vividly demonstrated the great vital force of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the indestructibility of the Soviet social and governmental system, its advantages over capitalism, friendship and solidarity of the peoples of the socialist homeland. The victorious outcome of the war demonstrated beyond any doubt the superiority of Soviet over bourgeois military organization, the superiority of Soviet art of war over that of the armies of the imperialist nations.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War constitutes our revolutionary and national achievement. "The fruits of this great victory," stated L. I. Brezhnev from the speaker's platform at the 24th CPSU Congress, "still live in the international realities of today. The Soviet people sacredly cherishes all that which was achieved at such a heavy price." The heroic deed accomplished by our people will inspire coming generations in the struggle for a brighter future for mankind.

The past war was a stern test for our people and the Soviet Armed Forces. At the same time its historic lessons serve as an ominous warning to the present leaders of the military-political imperialist blocs, who are making plans for a new aggressive war.

Soviet Effort to Achieve Collective Security. Preparations to Resist Fascist Aggression

International imperialism planned long and painstakingly for its second military campaign against socialism. At the beginning of the thirties dangerous foci of war erupted in various parts of the world, with two opposing imperialist groups arising: a German-Italian-Japanese, and an Anglo-French-American. Each of these groups sought a solution through war to the conflicts which were tearing imperialism to pieces. The monopolists hoped through military force on the one hand to put an end to economic instability and the growing revolutionary manifestations of the masses at home, and on the other hand -- to redivide markets and spheres of influence, to enslave other nations, and to crush the revolutionary and national liberation movement, which was growing throughout the world. Sharp conflicts disunited the rival groups, but they were also united by an anti-Sovietism. Viciously hostile to the country where socialism had been victorious, ruling circles in the United States, England, Germany, Japan, France, and Italy took measures to destroy the Soviet Union. Both imperialist groups endeavored through elimination of the socialist state to surmount the general crisis of capitalism and to restore its past undisputed world supremacy. It was planned to achieve these objectives with various methods.

Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were planning to destroy the Soviet Union primarily with their own forces and those of their satellites, by means of an armed attack. Militarist Japan also was counting on vigorous actions by its army and navy. Anglo-American imperialism intended to achieve the same objective chiefly through the efforts of others: by encouraging Hitler's eastward aggression and Japanese northward aggression, against the USSR. Therefore the governments of the United States, England and France offered the nations of the fascist bloc all-out military and economic aid, implementing the "Munich policy." treacherously handing entire countries over to the usurpers, calculating that they would initiate a war against the Soviet Union.

The growing threat of a second world war demanded of the Communist Party and the entire Soviet people effective measures in the area of foreign policy, strengthening of the nation's defense capability and preparation of the Armed Forces to resist possible aggression.

During these years the Soviet Union was waging a persistent and consistent struggle to keep the peace, and to establish a reliable system of collective security against the imperialist aggressors. Suffice it to recall Soviet proposals to define aggression (1933), for an Eastern Pact (1933-1935), the persistent peace campaign waged by Soviet representatives to the League of Nations, particularly in connection

with Japanese aggression in China, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, and German-Italian intervention in Spain. The Soviet government sharply condemned the "Munich deal" between the Western powers and displayed steadfast readiness to defend Czechoslovakia's freedom and independence in 1938.

The 18th Party Congress, held in March 1939, clearly and precisely formulated the Soviet Union's foreign policy tasks. The Party Central Committee Report emphasized:

"1. We stand for peace and a strengthening of commercial relations with all nations; we now advocate and shall continue to advocate this policy as long as these nations maintain equal relations with the Soviet Union, as long as they do not endeavor to violate our country's interests.

"2. We stand in favor of peaceful, close and good-neighbor relations with all countries sharing a common border with the USSR; we now stand and shall continue to stand on this position, as long as these nations maintain such relations with the Soviet Union, as long as they do not attempt to violate, directly or indirectly, the interests of the integrity and inviolability of the boundaries of the Soviet state.

"3. We stand for the support of peoples which have become the victims of aggression and which are fighting for the independence of their homeland..."¹

This was a comprehensible, clear and firm position by the Soviet Union, which won the approval and support of the toilers. But the vigorous peace-loving initiative on the part of the Communist Party and Soviet government came into inalterable conflict with the negative position adopted by the United States, England and France. The British and French governments stubbornly rejected Soviet proposals calling for a mutual assistance agreement between the USSR, Great Britain and France. They broke off Anglo-French-Soviet military talks, in this way demonstrating their intentions to encourage Nazi Germany to attack the USSR. Like steps were taken in Asia, simultaneously with attempts to construct a united anti-Soviet front in Europe. The clearest sign of this in Asia was an endeavor to encourage anti-Soviet aggressive tendencies on the part of the Japanese militarists.

U.S. ruling circles pursued an anti-Soviet policy in those years. While hiding behind a law of "neutrality" and a slogan of "non-intervention," the United States in fact was encouraging the aggressors in every way. American imperialism had far-reaching aims: to do nothing to hinder Japan from embroiling itself in a war with China or to hinder

Germany from becoming enmired in European affairs, to permit these countries to sink deeper into the morass of war, to encourage them to attack the Soviet Union, in the course of which the belligerents would exhaust one another and, when they would become sufficiently weakened, to step onto the scene with fresh forces and dictate its terms to the weakened warring nations.

The Communist Party and Soviet government were aware of the danger of war and persistent attempts by the imperialist forces to establish a united anti-Soviet front. In order to prevent this, the Soviet Union was compelled to accept Germany's proposal, signing on 23 August 1939 a Soviet-German nonaggression treaty. Endeavoring to prevent a unification of imperialist forces against the USSR in the East as well, on 13 April 1941 the Soviet government signed a treaty of neutrality with Japan.

The historic significance of the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty consisted in the fact that it frustrated the imperialists' plans and under the conditions of the soon-erupted World War II allowed us to gain time in order to strengthen our nation's defense. The signing of the treaty of neutrality with Japan reduced for the Soviet Union the threat of war on two fronts and strengthened the security of its far-eastern borders. On the eve of and at the outset of World War II our foreign policy prevented our socialist state from being subjected to an attack by unified imperialist forces and foiled the schemes of world imperialism. World War II began with a clash between two competing imperialist groups. It was initiated by Nazi Germany with an attack on Poland on 1 September 1939. In 1940 Nazi Germany seized Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and shattered France. Thus the war arose within the capitalist system and constituted a continuation of the politics of the two imperialist groups, their struggle for markets, sources of raw materials and areas for capital investment. The war was unjust and imperialistic in origin.

The Soviet Union stated its attitude toward this imperialist, unjust war, fathered by the monopolists of the principal capitalist nations. At the same time the Communist Party noted the development of liberation tendencies among the masses of those nations which had become the victims of aggression. A manifestation of these tendencies was resistance to the occupation forces on the part of Czechoslovak patriots, heroic resistance to the Nazi invaders on the part of the Polish toilers, and a full-scale resistance movement in Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, and a selfless struggle against the aggressor by the Greek, Albanian, and Yugoslav peoples. All these factors accelerated the transition of World War II into an anti-fascist, just war.

The principal and decisive factor in transformation of World War II into an anti-fascist war of liberation was entry into the war by the Soviet Union which, in response to the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany, commenced the Great Patriotic War. The struggle by the Soviet people against Nazi aggression in defense of the socialist homeland received the support of freedom-loving peoples and merged with the struggle being waged by all anti-fascist, liberation forces.

Encountering the threat of loss of their country's national independence and sovereignty, British ruling circles were compelled to shift to resistance against fascist aggression, in the face of stubborn resistance on the part of domestic reactionary, pro-fascist elements.

An increasing threat of attack on the USSR obliged the Soviet people to make an all-out effort to strengthen the nation's defensive might. The party and government devoted constant attention to increasing defense production. In the Third Five-Year Plan large allocations were designated for defense industry growth. The aircraft industry and tank industry developed particularly rapidly: by the summer of 1941 their production capacity was almost 50 percent greater than that of Germany's aircraft and tank plants.² Steps were taken to improve and expand transportation, while state and mobilization reserves were accumulated. Within a period of only 18 months (up to the attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany) the total value of state material reserves almost doubled, totaling 7.6 billion rubles.

This was evidence of the wise leadership of the Communist Party, a high level of political awareness and productive labor activity on the part of Soviet citizens, who were willing to accept any and all hardships for the sake of ensuring the invincible might of our socialist homeland. This was a practical realization of the behests of V. I. Lenin, who stated at the 11th Party Congress: "We must indeed be on our guard, and we must make certain heavy sacrifices for the benefit of the Red Army... We are faced by the entire bourgeois world, which is seeking only ways to strangle us" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 45, page 112).

The Communist Party set about to build up and ready the Soviet Armed Forces on the basis of the country's growing economy, the moral-political unity of the Soviet people, and in conformity with the demands of modern warfare. In September 1939 a new Law on Universal Military Obligation was passed, which established a uniform system of army and navy personnel recruitment. At the end of 1940 the Central Committee examined problems connected with further increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces. In February 1941 the Party Central Committee and government ratified a plan which called for large-scale mobilization

measures. That spring the People's Commissariat of Defense drew up a new plan for defense of the Soviet borders. A reorganization was effected of local war mobilization bodies, which were now capable in case of war of quickly mobilizing into the armed forces the requisite quantity of manpower and resources. The mass military patriotic organization, Osoaviakhim, stepped up its activities. By the beginning of 1941 it had a total membership of 13 million.

The Soviet Armed Forces grew rapidly in numbers; equipment improved, as did organizational structure. By mid-1941 the army and navy totaled more than 5 million men. Combat units were engaged in intensive combat training. Officers and men learned combat skills. Soviet military doctrine proceeded from the position that a war unleashed against the USSR by the imperialists would be savage in nature, would inevitably be of a long, drawn-out character, and its outcome would be predetermined by the availability of requisite manpower and resources on the part of the belligerents and the ability of the state to utilize these resources efficiently. The war would demand mobilization of the efforts of the entire people, the entire country, creation in advance of a strong home front, thorough preparation of the economy and civilian population for struggle against a powerful and experienced aggressor.

Thanks to titanic organizational work by the Communist Party and an enormous effort by the entire nation, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet state possessed great military strength. Growth in the Soviet Union's economic and military strength, leadership by the Communist Party, a social and moral-political unity among the people, and Soviet patriotism are factors which were to ensure victory for the homeland of socialism in case of an armed clash with imperialism.

The Magnificent Feat of the Soviet Armed Forces

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union exceeded all past wars in scale, involvement of the masses, quantity of combat equipment and arms involved, intensity and savagery. In this difficult war the Soviet people and its Armed Forces successfully defended our homeland's freedom and independence and won great historic victories, exerting enormous influence on the progressive development of socialism, activation of the revolutionary struggle of the toilers of the capitalist nations, and expansion of the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and subject nations.

This was a struggle to the death. In arranging for an attack on the Soviet Union, international imperialism intended to destroy the world's first socialist state. For Nazi Germany the war against the USSR was of a clearly-marked predatory, annihilative character.

The leaders of Nazi Germany openly spoke of "war of annihilation."³ This nature of the war against the Soviet Union was dictated by the political and ideological principles of fascism, which was in total conformity with the class interests of the German monopolists and predetermined the criminal methods employed in initiating and conducting the war. Treacherously violating the nonaggression pact, Nazi Germany thrust the entire might of its war machine against the Soviet Union in a sneak attack. With hypocritical insolence the leaders of the Third Reich declared that Germany was waging a preventive war. This was a manifest lie. Numerous documents and facts attest that Nazi Germany had prepared long and carefully for the attack on the USSR in a political and military respect, with all the artifice of which the German general staff was capable.

The war unleashed by German fascism against the USSR decided the question of the life or death of the Soviet state, of whether the Soviet people was to be free or enslaved. Therefore the Soviet people rose up as one, under the leadership of the Communist Party, and waged the Great Patriotic War for the honor, freedom and national independence of their socialist homeland.

In connection with the initiated invasion of our country by the Nazi German troops, the party Central Committee and Soviet government immediately took the necessary steps to organize resistance against the foe. In the morning of 22 June the Party Central Committee Politburo drafted and approved an appeal to the Soviet people, which called upon them to close ranks around the party, to strengthen discipline and organization as never before, to display a spirit of self-sacrifice and to meet all the needs of the Red Army and Navy, in order to gain victory over the aggressor. The appeal ended with the words: "Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory shall be ours." That same day a decision was made to declare martial law in all frontier Soviet republics and in several interior oblasts of the RSFSR. Armed Forces mobilization was announced in the 14 military districts. The basic program document specifying reorganization of the nation's affairs in conformity with the demands of war was the 29 June 1941 directive issued by the Communist Party Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars USSR. "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" was the main thrust of the directive. The Communist Party transformed the nation into a unified military camp.

At dawn on 22 June the first to meet the enemy invasion thrust were Soviet border guards, rifle divisions, military units in fortified regions, our glorious airmen and navymen, offering the foe stubborn resistance on land, on the sea and in the air. They wrote the first page of the chronicle of unfading glory and heroism of Soviet citizens

in the Great Patriotic War. On that memorable morning savage fighting was engaged in all sectors of the enormous Soviet-German Front. The initial phase of the war was not favorable to the Soviet troops. The powerful, carefully-prepared initial thrust by the Nazi hordes was delivered at a moment when our troops were not yet combat ready and had not completed strategic deployment. Possessing a decisive numerical superiority along the axes of their main thrusts, the Nazi troops succeeded in penetrating deep into Soviet territory. Soviet troops in the border districts, who were hit by the sneak attack, were dispersed along a 3000 km front and to a depth of more than 400 km. In spite of courageous, heroic resistance, they were forced to withdraw eastward, fighting as they went. By mid-July the enemy had advanced as much as 600 km on some axes, reaching the Western Dvina and Dnieper.

What is the explanation for our lack of success in the initial phase of the war? The causes lie in both objective and subjective factors. The aggressor possessed temporary advantages: militarization of the German economy, Germany's long preparations for this aggressive war, experience in military operations in the West, a superiority in modern arms and troops on selected main-thrust axes, and advance troop concentrations in the border areas. Nazi Germany was backed up by the military and economic resources of almost all of Western Europe. As there was no threat presented by the Anglo-French armed forces, Hitler was able to throw against the USSR the main forces of his colossal war machine, armed with the most modern combat equipment and weapons of the day. These forces operated on the basis of the "blitzkrieg" strategy, which aimed at soundly defeating the Soviet Union in a single swift military operation. The Germans made use of the advantages of a sneak attack, whereby a militarized state, such as Nazi Germany was, enjoyed certain temporary advantages.

A negative role was also played by miscalculations in estimating the possible time of a Nazi German invasion of the USSR and related omissions in preparations to repulse the aggressor's initial thrust. Therefore the attack by Hitler's army took the Soviet troops in the frontier areas by surprise, which placed them in an extremely difficult situation for the conduct of initial operations and compelled them to engage in piecemeal fashion without the requisite air and artillery support.

Speaking of the element of surprise and its effect on the initial operations of the war, we should emphasize that this influence should not be viewed as something irreversible, fatal. Surprise can be prevented or reduced to a minimum by promptly bringing troops into a state of combat readiness. This is particularly important today. Today advance deployment of troops and their total combat readiness are of enormous importance. The nature of modern warfare is such that the time available

to deliver a response blow is measured not in days or hours but in minutes.

As is well known, the German Command, counting on the element of surprise, intended in its first operations to defeat the main forces of the Soviet Army in the Baltic, Belorussia, and the Western Ukraine, to clear from the way all obstacles between the German forces and Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and the Donbass. By mid-July, however, the factor of surprise began to lose its importance. The rate of advance of the German forces had diminished fivefold in comparison with the first days of the war. The enemy was taking heavy losses in men and equipment. The commitment of strategic reserves and stubborn Soviet resistance slowed the enemy's advance on the Velikaya and Western Dvina rivers, in the Orsha and Mogilev areas, and on the approaches to Kiev. In the initial operations the Nazi German Command took ground, but failed to reach its principal objective as specified in Plan Barbarossa -- to destroy the main forces of the Soviet Army in the border regions, to the west of the Dvina and Dnieper. Our troops did take heavy losses, but in 22 days of fighting the Germans themselves lost approximately 100,000 killed and wounded, more than half of the tanks they possessed at the beginning of the war, as well as a great many aircraft. Regardless of a significant lack of success by the Soviet Army in the initial operations, the overall course of the war up to that point indicated that the Nazi "blitzkrieg" adventure was doomed to failure. The German troops could look forward to a savage, bloody struggle, which beginning in mid-July flared up with new intensity on all the major axes of the Soviet-German Front.

Decisive events took place on the central, Moscow axis. The German command was counting on a swift victory over the Soviets at Smolensk, followed by a swift advance on and capture of Moscow. But their attempts were unsuccessful. At the cost of an enormous effort the Germans succeeded in capturing Smolensk on 15 July, but their further advance was halted by stubborn defense and counterattacks by Soviet troops at Yartsevo, Yel'nya, and Roslavl'. On 30 July Hitler was forced to issue a directive to Army Group Center to shift to defense along the entire central sector of the Soviet-German Front.

The battle of Smolensk was the major event of the first month of the war. During the course of this battle Soviet troops frustrated Hitler's plan to advance without halt on Moscow, thus dealing a serious blow to the Nazi doctrine of "blitzkrieg" war. The chronicle of this battle contains the deeds of thousands of Soviet fighting men. The Soviet guard, the flower of the Soviet Army, was born here in the crucible of battle. A new and fearsome weapon, rocket-launched artillery, was used for the first time in this battle.

The stalling of the enemy offensive on the principal, Moscow axis constituted a major strategic success for the Soviet Army, backed up by the stubborn defense of the hero cities of Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad, and others. As a result the German offensive developed differently than had been planned by Hitler's strategists. The pace of the enemy advance slowed to an even greater extent, and German casualties skyrocketed. By the end of the third month of the war the Nazi German army had lost more than half a million officers and men.

During the course of the summer campaign of 1941 our troops were compelled to drink from the bitter cup of retreat. But these temporary setbacks did not break the will of the Soviet people, instead ranking them even more solidly around the Communist Party and toughening their will to win. Soviet enlisted men, officers and general officers displayed examples of courage, heroism and fighting ability never before seen in the history of war. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War has gone down in the history of our nation not only as a period of temporary setbacks on the front but also as a great feat of arms performed by thousands upon thousands of the finest sons and daughters of the Soviet people. These deeds will never fade in our nation's memory.

Vigorous actions by our troops on the front, all-out assistance by the home front, and the steadfastness of the hero cities created the conditions for the final and ultimate failure of Hitler's plan of "blitzkrieg" war. In spite of temporary advantages, Nazi Germany failed to reach its main objective -- to shatter the will of the Soviet people to fight. Our country succeeded in winning the necessary time to reorganize the economy, to ready additional, massive reserves. The aggressor was now faced with the unhappy prospect of a war of attrition. The war against the Soviet Union, contrary to the calculations of the leaders of the Third Reich, did not last 3 to 4 months but almost 4 years. During these years the Soviet Armed Forces conducted dozens of major strategic operations, many of which went down in history as battles hallmarking stages on the way to the final victory of Soviet arms.

The first of these events was the Battle of Moscow. Setting for himself the objective "of capturing before the onset of winter the entire complex of enemy economic and transportation centers in the Moscow area,"⁴ Hitler planned to complete his "blitzkrieg" war with a single blow to our country's heart. Enormous forces were assigned to this mission -- more than two fifths of all the troops, three fourths of the tanks, almost one half of the artillery pieces and machineguns, and approximately one third of the aircraft operating on the Soviet-German Front. "On that site where Moscow stands today," declared Hitler,

"there will be formed an enormous lake, which will hide forever from the civilized world the capital of the Russian people." But the conqueror had sadly miscalculated. Not the triumph of victory but rather the disgrace of defeat awaited Hitler's army at Moscow. Repulsing the German advance on the capital, our troops shifted to a counteroffensive, followed by a general offensive. The strategic initiative shifted to the Soviet command.

The defeat of the German armies at Moscow constituted an important turning point in the war, which was of great historic significance in the initiated massive struggle of peoples against fascism. The plan of "blitzkrieg" war had been put to rest for good. The fascist legend of the "invincibility" of the German Wehrmacht had been exposed to the world as false. The defeat of the Germans at Moscow frustrated schemes calling for Japan to enter the war against the USSR and had a sobering effect on aggressive elements in Turkey. Our victory greatly enhanced the international prestige of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, a fact which helped strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition and boosted the resistance movement in the German-occupied nations.

In the Battle of Moscow the Soviet Union acquired initial experience in conducting large-scale offensive operations; the mass heroism and eminent fighting spirit of the Soviet soldier was vividly manifested in this battle. The Soviet people appraised this feat of arms on its merits. More than 100 fighting men were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Many units and large units received the guards appellation. More than 500,000 men were awarded the For Defense of Moscow medal.

The defeat at Moscow created confusion in the Nazi camp, but evidently it failed to cool their ardor to conquer. In January 1942 Hitler assured the Japanese ambassador: "The Soviets will be defeated next summer." Undertaking in the summer of that year an offensive in the South, the Nazi German command stated for itself the objective of "utterly destroying those forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and depriving them of as many important military and economic centers as possible."⁵ On the Stalingrad and Caucasian axes the Germans employed massive forces, linking execution of the mission of seizing Stalingrad and the Caucasus with the aim of final victory.

The Battle of Stalingrad was in scale and intensity one of the biggest campaigns of the Great Patriotic War. In the course of continuous engagements running for 6 and a half months, the Soviet troops killed approximately 1.5 million enemy officers and men -- more than one fourth of the troops on the Soviet-German Front. The debacle of the German armies at the gates of Stalingrad was cause for a national mourning in

Germany, while the enslaved peoples of Europe received renewed hope of liberation.

The victory at Stalingrad was a major military and political event in the struggle of peoples against German fascism and Japanese militarism. It constituted a major turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole. After Stalingrad the offensive might of the Soviet Army steadily grew, while the German Army was no longer capable of recovering from the crushing defeat. The strategic initiative was now firmly established in the hands of the Soviet High Command. The general strategic offensive initiated by the Soviet Armed Forces signaled the beginning of a massive sweeping of the German invaders from the occupied territory of our great homeland.

At the Battle of Stalingrad the Soviet Army demonstrated outstanding examples of military art in the area of strategy, minor strategy and tactics. It constituted a great school of victory. This battle also initiated a new and important chapter in the chronicle of the heroism and glory of the Soviet Armed Forces. The homeland highly praised the deed of its sons. More than 700,000 men were awarded the For Defense of Stalingrad medal, instituted at the end of 1942.

The Battle of the Caucasus was of great political and strategic importance. In bitter defensive and offensive engagements the Soviet Army frustrated Hitler's plans to seize the rich grain-producing regions of the Northern Caucasus, sources of oil and other strategic raw materials, defended the territorial integrity and national independence of the peoples of the Caucasus. Our victory in the Caucasus blocked the advance of German imperialism on the nations of the Near and Middle East, thus aiding their peoples in the struggle for national independence.

The Battle of the Caucasus constituted a remarkable example of patriotism, mass heroism and combat excellence on the part of the Soviet fighting men. All branches and arms, guerrilla fighters and heroes of the underground struggle made their contribution to the cause of defeating the Nazi German invaders in the Caucasus. The homeland justly rewarded their deeds. Approximately 600,000 participants in this campaign were awarded the For Defense of the Caucasus medal.

The catastrophic rout of the German armies at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus generated fear and confusion in the enemy camp and accelerated the Axis collapse. But the German leaders still refused to be realistic in their estimates of the situation, entertaining the hope of altering the course of the war in their favor. An attempt to recoup for the defeat at Stalingrad in a strategic offensive undertaken in July 1943 on the Kursk salient produced for Hitler nothing but the defeat of his finest troops. In 50 days of fighting the

Germans lost more than half a million officers and men. Irreparable losses were also suffered in tanks and aircraft. Nazi Germany was no longer able to restore the former strength of its tank troops and air power.

The Battle of Kursk, as the Battle of Stalingrad, was a magnificent battle of the Great Patriotic War. It demonstrated to the world the Soviet Union's ability to defeat Nazi Germany and its allies with the Soviet Union's own resources. After taking this defeat, the Nazi German leaders were forced to shift to defense along the entire front. From this day forward the conditions of warfare were dictated by the Soviet High Command. In the Battle of Kursk and in the gigantic strategic offensive in the summer and fall of 1943, the Soviet Army shattered 118 enemy divisions, killed almost 1.5 million German officers and men, and placed Nazi Germany before a military disaster.

The crisis within the Axis bloc became aggravated as a result of the serious defeat sustained by Nazi Germany on the Soviet-German Front in the winter and fall campaigns of 1943: Italy withdrew from the war; Japan decided once and for all not to enter the war against the USSR; Germany's satellites -- Romania, Hungary, and Finland -- displayed an increasing desire to withdraw from the war. National fronts of struggle against fascism were established in all the German-enslaved nations. *All these events signaled culmination of a major turning point in World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.*

The Soviet Armed Forces fought dozens of magnificent battles on the great and glorious road to final victory following the Battle of Kursk. The victorious feats of the Soviet troops in the Battle of the Dnieper, in the fighting in the Right-Bank Ukraine, in the Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Belgrade, Budapest, Vistula-Oder, East Prussian, Vienna, Berlin and Prague strategic operations permanently entered military history as examples of outstanding military skill, valor and heroism.

The outstanding victories of the Soviet Armed Forces played a particular role in the historical fate of the peoples of Central and South-eastern Europe, as well as a number of nations in Asia. Soundly defeating Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union liberated the peoples of these countries from fascist enslavement and physical annihilation, eliminating a serious threat to the development of world culture and civilization.

At the same time the defeat of Nazi Germany signified that international imperialist reaction was now deprived of its most powerful bulwark -- fascism, a regime of unbridled political terror. The peace-loving peoples of the world received the opportunity to expand the revolutionary, democratic and national liberation movement.

The Soviet Union, true to the principles of proletarian internationalism, liberating the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, gave them great assistance, including arms deliveries. As of 1 May 1945 the central agencies of the People's Commissariat of Defense USSR alone had delivered to the armed forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary approximately 670,000 rifles and submachine guns, 16,502 artillery pieces and mortars, 884 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1376 airplanes, 12,397 trucks, and much additional military equipment. The Normandy-Neman French Air Regiment received more than 100 aircraft. The Albanian National Liberation Army received 350 guns and mortars, approximately 1000 machineguns, and more than 15,000 rifles and carbines.

Thanks to this assistance the national liberation troops of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria fought valiantly side by side with the Soviet Army against a common foe. The Yugoslavian People's Liberation Army fought stubbornly against the occupation forces throughout the entire war. A contribution to the defeat of fascism was also made by the members of the Resistance Movement, the participants in the Slovak National Uprising, and uprisings in Prague, Warsaw, Bulgaria, and Romania.

More than 7 million Soviet fighting men took part in operations to liberate other countries. For more than a year they waged savage battles with the enemy on the territory of these countries. In liberating the brother peoples, our fighting men displayed mass heroism and self-sacrifice. The Soviet troops sustained heavy losses in these operations. Casualties sustained by Soviet large units and units in the liberation of Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia totaled approximately 787,000 killed and 1,826,000 wounded.

Carrying out a liberating mission abroad, the Soviet Armed Forces created favorable conditions for the peoples of these countries to effect profound revolutionary transformations. Actions by the Soviet Army merged with a popular struggle against fascism and imperialism, for democracy and socialism, as a result of which reactionary regimes toppled and popular democratic forces took over power, subsequently guiding the development of their countries along the path of socialism.

The war against Nazi Germany ended where it began -- in Berlin. It was entirely fitting that the Red Banner of the Soviet Union was placed by a Soviet soldier above the Reichstag in May 1945. It symbolized the victory of enlightenment, peace and progress over the dark, sinister forces of war and reaction. The devastating flame of war in Europe had been ignited by imperialist forces and extinguished by the Soviet soldier.

The Soviet People -- Principal Creator of Victory

The events of the last war are steadily receding into the past, but the lessons of the war still occupy the center of the present-day political and ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. History demonstrates incontrovertibly that whenever imperialism compels the Soviet people to take up arms, the aggressors suffer inevitable defeat. This is the truth of history, but the ideologues of imperialism are attempting to falsify history in order to obscure this truth.

After World War II a vast army of bourgeois philosophers, economists, diplomats, sociologists and historians vigorously set about to distort the causes and character of the war, to exaggerate the contribution of certain countries toward the defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, to conceal the sources of the victory by the Soviet Union, to distort the Communist Party's leadership role as organizer and inspirer of our victory, to slander the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, and to revise the results and lessons of the war.

The history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, as the history of World War II as a whole, is an arena of savage struggle between the Communist and bourgeois ideologies. Bourgeois military historiography, falsifying the events of the last war, pursues definite political aims: to justify ideologically the aggressive policies of imperialism and preparations for a new war against the USSR and the other socialist nations, to undermine the efforts of peoples struggling for peace, to slow the world revolutionary and national liberation movement, and to weaken the socialist commonwealth of nations.

In recent years there has been taking place a particularly intensified effort in the West to propagandize the thesis of the "principal author of victory" in World War II, a role they wish to assign to the American Armed Forces. We appreciate and recognize the contribution of the American people toward victory over a common enemy, but we most vigorously reject attempts by American politicians and ideologues to belittle the Soviet Union's leading role in achieving victory over fascism. History attests that the principal author of victory was the Soviet people, our glorious Armed Forces.

As is well known, the Soviet Armed Forces were the first of the Allied armies of the anti-Hitler coalition to receive the main thrust of the Axis war machine in 1941. The American government did not declare war on Japan and Germany until December 1941. Consequently for a period of 6 months the Soviet Army stood alone against the Nazi Wehrmacht.

The role of the Soviet Union as main anti-fascist force was dictated by the political objectives of defeat of the Nazi German Army, liberation of German-seized Soviet territory, and assistance to peoples suffering under the yoke of a fascist regime.

In consonance with the political aims of the Great Patriotic War were the forms and methods of waging it, the resolute, consistently offensive character of Soviet military strategy. The Soviet Army and Navy, beginning on 22 June 1941, conducted full-scale operations against the main forces of the Nazi German army and the forces of Germany's allies. American troops engaged initially in secondary, peripheral theaters of war, and with a far from full-force effort.

In this connection it is appropriate to cite some statistics on operations conducted on the Soviet-German front and in those theaters where American troops were engaged. For example, at the moment of the shift to a counteroffensive at Stalingrad in November 1942, the Soviet troops were faced by an opposing force of 1,011,000 men; in July 1943 the enemy had a force of 900,000 men on the Kursk salient; in the summer of 1944 the Germans had 808,000 men in Belorussia, and in April 1945 we faced 1,000,000 German fighting men at Berlin. A Soviet force of equal size was involved in defeating them. According to the claims of American authors themselves, the biggest U.S. military operation in the Pacific Theater, the capture of Okinawa in the spring of 1945, involved the participation of 548,000 officers and men.⁶ Although the United States mobilized an enormous army (according to the 1970 edition of the Encyclopedia Americana, the armed forces totaled 16.3 million men), only a small part of this manpower ever saw combat. For example, out of 89 deployed American divisions, only 7 were in England in 1943, and 34 in Western Europe in September 1944. By the end of the final campaign of 1945, active American troops in Europe totaled slightly more than 2 million men.

Nor are statistics on the duration of combat operations on the various fronts of World War II in favor of these bourgeois falsifiers of history. As is well known, the Soviet-German Front existed for a period of 1418 days; active combat operations on this front were waged a total of 1320 days and nights. The longest string of U.S. operations was the American-Japanese Front, which ran 1367 days, but active combat operations were conducted a total of only 573 days. Nor was the intensity of fighting equal. The war cost Nazi Germany more than 13 million dead, wounded and captured, 10 million of these on the Soviet-German Front. The Soviet Army captured, destroyed and decimated more than 506 German divisions and 100 German satellite divisions. All other countries in the anti-Hitler coalition had to their credit only 176 divisions. The Soviet Union waged a savage, bloody war for almost 4

years against the main forces of Nazi Germany and its satellites, with a total loss of 20 million Soviet lives. The United States, as American historian MacDonald states, lost a total of 407,000 men killed and dead from other causes in all theaters during World War II, including approximately 200,000 in the war against Germany.⁷

Equally implausible are bourgeois propaganda stories about the so-called American "victory arsenal." During World War II the United States possessed rather substantial material and financial resources for the conduct of war. According to official American figures, during the 6 years U.S. industry produced 275,000 airplanes, 360,000 guns and mortars and 86,000 tanks.⁸ But only a small part of this great quantity of arms was used in the war against Nazi Germany. For example, in 1943 there were only 30 U.S. Air Force combat groups in Europe, although at that time the United States had more than 300 combat groups, that is only one tenth of U.S. combat air power was operating in the main theater of war at the time decisive battles were taking place in that theater.

Nor are references to American lend-lease any help to bourgeois falsifiers of history. The Soviet Union and other countries did receive material and technical assistance, but lend-lease assistance comprised a small quantity in comparison to Soviet war production: 13 percent in aircraft and 7 percent in tanks.⁹ This American equipment of course could not exert appreciable influence on the course and outcome of Soviet Army strategic operations which decided victory and defeat in war.

The real arsenal of victory, as everybody knows, was created by the talent and labor of the Soviet people. Between 1 July 1941 and 30 June 1945 the Soviet Union produced 12 million rifles and carbines, more than 6 million submachine guns, approximately 1 million light and heavy machineguns, approximately 450,000 artillery pieces (75 mm and larger) and mortars, more than 95,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 108,000 combat aircraft. It was this "arsenal" which helped gain our historic victory.

One's attention is drawn by persistent attempts by imperialist ideologues to instill in the people of the capitalist countries the false idea of the alleged "accidental nature" of the victory by the Soviet Armed Forces in the last war. Today there are numerous investigators in the imperialist camp who even present in their works on military history "evidence" in favor of their totally false thesis.

Wherein, in their opinion, consisted the "military luck" of the Soviet Army? In the fact that Hitler was a "military leader without ability." They blame him for the defeat of the Nazi German army at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and all other battles on the Eastern Front. They depict

the German generals as men without will, blindly carrying out the orders of the Führer. Documents and facts, however, attest that the German generals drew up the plans of aggression together with Hitler, attempted to carry out these plans jointly with Hitler, and these generals were defeated together with their Führer. The Nazi German ruling elite and the German generals comprised a unified whole.

Distorting the true causes of the defeat of Hitler's Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German Front, bourgeois historians advance to the forefront adverse weather conditions -- severe winters, spring and fall muds, as well as the great expanses, distances, etc. Of course freezing weather or slush, mountainous or flat terrain affect the character of combat operations. But war is a two-way process. At Moscow in November 1941, for example, the freezing weather plagued Soviet and German soldier alike. He who was better trained, more skilled in combat, stronger in spirit, braver and more courageous was able to stand up to the hardships. The Soviet fighting men possessed these qualities. They were equally successful in mauling the enemy in blizzard and downpour, winter and summer, day and night, on the ground and in the air, on the flatlands and in the mountains. The Soviet regiments carried their battle standards with honor from the gates of Moscow and Stalingrad to Berlin. Accomplishing a historic feat, the Soviet Army demonstrated unsurpassed fighting ability to the entire world.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic war was logical. It was dictated by continuously-operating factors. They included primarily the socialist economic system, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society, socialist patriotism, friendship of peoples and their solidarity with the Communist Party. The road to victory in the Great Patriotic war was objectively paved by the entire course of building socialism in the USSR -- the nation's industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution, and affirmation of the socialist brotherhood of the peoples of our homeland.

The war was won by the Soviet Armed Forces, armed with the sophisticated military equipment and weapons produced by the world's most advanced military science. The creative, innovative character of Soviet military science and art of war made it possible to seek and find methods and forms of conducting military operations which corresponded to the conditions of the prevailing military-political situation and the nation's economic potential, and ensured accomplishment of the strategic missions defined by the Central Committee and Armed Forces Supreme Command at the various stages of the war.

During the course of the war the Soviet Armed Forces employed strategic defense whenever necessary. The principal type of Soviet combat operation was the *strategic offensive*, executed in the form of sequential or simultaneous strategic offensive operations. Our command cadres were experts at discerning the axes of main thrusts, the massing of men and firepower on these axes, the creation of offensive and defensive forces, and their skillful utilization in operations.

Soviet military art brilliantly solved the problem of the efficient utilization of our troops' fire and offensive capabilities, which was expressed in the skilled organization and execution of the artillery and air offensive, by the skilled employment of tank armies, tank and mechanized corps.

On the whole Soviet military art during the Great Patriotic War achieved a high level of development, greatly surpassing the level achieved by the capitalist nations. Persuasive evidence of this is the bankruptcy of the Nazi German offensive doctrine at Moscow, Stalingrad, in the Caucasus and at Kursk, as well as the total failure of Hitler's defensive strategy on the Dnieper, Vistula, and Oder.

The Soviet Army was greatly assisted by guerrilla units acting in close coordination with regular troops. Incomplete statistics indicate that approximately 6200 guerrilla detachments and groups, involving more than 1,300,000 patriots, were active on enemy-occupied Soviet territory. They mounted continuous attacks and raids behind enemy lines.

The main author of victory in World War II was the Soviet people, the Soviet fighting man. The Communist Party was the guiding and directing force in the struggle by the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders. The Communist Party defined the political war objectives and mobilized the people for resolute resistance to the enemy. The party organized our nation's war production, supplied the army and navy with weapons and combat equipment, and supervised the conduct of the war. The party pursued a vigorous and effective foreign policy and ideological effort among the masses. The finest representatives of the party could always be found among the front ranks on the battlefield.

Victory was not easy. The war claimed millions of Soviet lives, leaving a tragic mark on almost every family. The Germans reduced to rubble thousands of Soviet cities, towns and villages. No nation in history had been delivered so much damage and destruction.

We cannot and shall not fail to offer prompt, vigorous and effective rebuff to any and all ideological sabotage on the part of imperialism, including treacherous attacks on the historical truth about our victory

in the Great Patriotic War. It is our duty to carry to hundreds of millions of people the truth about socialist society, about the Soviet soldier and his great historic mission as defender of the peace and security of peoples. The multivolume Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945 godov (History of World War II, 1939-1945), which is presently being readied for publication in the Soviet Union, will significantly aid in meeting these tasks.

Everything Which Has Been Created by the People Is Reliably Defended

The 24th CPSU Congress particularly stressed that we are living in a complex international situation. Although the forces of aggression and militarism have been pressed hard, they have not been disarmed. Consistently pursuing a policy of peace and friendship among peoples, the Soviet Union will continue to wage a resolute struggle against imperialism and will continue to offer a solid rebuff to aggressor schemes and sabotage.

Everything the Soviet people has gained and built must be adequately defended. "Strengthening the Soviet state," emphasized the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, "means strengthening its Armed Forces, and comprehensively improving the defense capability of our homeland. As long as we live in a troubled world, this task will be one of our most important ones!"

The Communist Party, carrying out the will of the people, tirelessly works to strengthen our nation's defense. Problems of military organizational development constantly occupy the attention focus of the party and its Central Committee. Thanks to this fact, the strength and combat efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces have grown immeasurably since the war. Today the army and navy have advanced far beyond the level they had achieved by the end of the Great Patriotic War. They are qualitatively new Armed Forces, which possess excellent combat capability. Their might lies in advanced, sophisticated weapons and combat equipment of all types and kinds.

Execution of the magnificent plans for further development of our nation's economy as specified at the 24th CPSU Congress will create favorable conditions for further growth in the defensive might of the USSR, for achieving new success in equipping the Armed Forces with sophisticated hardware. In this connection military science is faced with tasks connected with determining the most efficient ways of utilizing today's military branches and arms. Maximum success in achieving these aims can be attained by observing the Leninist principle of combining past military experience and know-how with a thorough study of the present-day problems of military affairs.

The high level of development of the Armed Forces and the art of their utilization today does not minimize the importance of past experience, particularly experience gained in the Great Patriotic War. The task is essentially that of approaching its utilization in an innovative and scientific manner. The experience and know-how gained from the war are extremely diversified. Each aspect of this experience possesses enormous cognitive and indoctrinal significance. Therefore when appealing to it we must not only have a knowledge of these historical events proper but must have a thorough understanding of the method of approach to solving problems which arise in a given situation. It is important to penetrate into the creative laboratory of control and supervision of engagements, battles and operations, to comprehend the essence of this direction and control, to elucidate why things were done one way and not another, and to derive maximum benefit for the purpose of solving present-day problems.

Expansion of the military-scientific research effort on long-range problems of military theory, Armed Forces organizational development, morale-political and psychological troop training, as well as elaboration of scientific predictions in the area of military affairs will ensure further substantial increase in the combat strength of the Armed Forces and the level of their sophistication of hardware.

The strength of the army and navy does not lie solely in powerful combat equipment and advanced methods of employing it. Their strength is comprised chiefly of the people in whose hands these weapons are wielded. Today's Soviet fighting men are a new generation, the sons and grandsons of those who selflessly defended our homeland during the Great Patriotic War. They have inherited from the older generation outstanding moral-fighting qualities, total dedication to the Soviet homeland and the Communist Party, and have a consummate mastery of the powerful weapons with which they are entrusted.

At the 24th CPSU Congress L. I. Brezhnev had warm words to say about our combat veterans, those officers and enlisted men who defended our homeland's freedom during the Great Patriotic War. "Following the colossal effort of the war years," he stated, "the veterans of combat again took to the front -- this time the labor front. Many of our comrades from the front are no longer with us. But millions are still on the line. Some are still serving in the army, while others are giving of their knowledge and labor to the homeland in industry and construction, on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, at scientific institutes and schools." This tough clan of Communist Party warriors, builders of Communism and defenders of the socialist homeland continues to man the front lines.

A combination of the enthusiasm and energy of the younger-generation officers and enlisted men with the wealth of combat experience of the war veteran officers and general officers creates that strong alloy on the basis of which the troops are trained and indoctrinated. In conformity with the demands of modern warfare, Soviet fighting men are being readied for resolute, swift action to defeat the aggressor.

The Soviet Union threatens no one and has no plans to attack any nation. We do not need anybody else's territory.

Mankind has been spared a world war for more than a quarter of a century now. Our country has made a most substantial contribution to this historic achievement of peoples. The Central Committee CPSU and Soviet government, together with the other brother parties, are doing everything they can to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of Communism, to expose and foil the aggressive actions of the imperialists.

From the speaker's stand at the 24th Congress resounded with particular emphasis CPSU proposals aimed at preserving the peace and at ensuring the security of peoples and social progress. Representatives of progressive elements throughout the world call these proposals a peace program.

Imperialism was the cause of two world wars, which brought incalculable suffering to nations. Today the foreign policy of imperialism is furnishing more and more evidence of the immutability of its reactionary, aggressive nature. Since the war the forces of aggression and militarism have unleashed more than 30 wars and military conflicts of various scale. Imperialism carries within itself the threat of another world war.

Strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and indoctrination of Soviet citizens in a spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism constitutes an essential condition for successful implementation of the program presented by the congress, a program of preserving and consolidating peace, vigorous and resolute crushing of all imperialist aggressor schemes. Our Armed Forces are ready at all times to repulse an enemy attack, from whatever quarter it may come.

FOOTNOTES

1. XVIII s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy partii (bol'shevikov). Stenograficheskiy otchet (Stenographic Record of the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolshevik]), Gospolitizdat, 1939, page 15.

2. Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partiï Sovetskogo Soyuza (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Volume 5, Book 1, Politizdat, 1970, page 119.
3. Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya! Dokumenty i materialy (Top Secret! For Command Only! Documents and Materials), Izd-vo Nauka, 1967, page 180.
4. Ibid., page 273.
5. Ibid., page 380.
6. F. S. Sherman: Amerikanskiye avianostsy v voynе na Tikhom okeane (American Aircraft Carriers in the War in the Pacific), Voyenizdat, 1956, page 269.
7. Ch. B. MacDonald: The Mighty Endeavor, New York, 1969, page 30.
8. American Military History, Washington, 1969, page 547.
9. Kommunist, No 9, 1970, page 98.

INITIAL PERIOD OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION*

Army Gen S. Ivanov, Professor

Soviet Prewar Views on the Initial Period of a War

The Communist Party and the entire Soviet people, carrying out the program of building socialism in this country, have never forgotten Lenin's warning that we are never more than a hair's breadth from enemy attack. Lenin stated that in a future war we shall encounter the unified forces of international imperialism, which possesses a powerful material and technological base for waging war. In order successfully to withstand these forces the socialist state must rely on a highly-developed economy. It is necessary to prepare for war "in a protracted and serious manner, beginning with the country's economic upswing..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 35, page 395).

Following Lenin's behests, the Communist Party industrialized the nation and created a large-scale mechanized agriculture. "...As a result of fulfillment of three five-year plans (1929-1941) the Soviet Union was transformed into a mighty industrial power and achieved total economic independence of the capitalist nations. The defense capability of the Soviet state grew incalculably."¹

During the prewar years the critical nature of the international situation and the increasing threat of imperialist aggression made it necessary to hasten the deployment of a cadre army. Guided by the Leninist thesis that without military science it is impossible to create a combat-capable army, the Communist Party focused great attention on the development of military theory. Soviet military theory took into account the rapidly changing world situation and made scientifically-substantiated predictions on the character of a future war and the methods of waging it. Along with this, our military theory devoted much attention to solving practical problems of preparing the nation to enter a war and the conduct of its initial operations. In the thirties, under the influence of mass motorization and mechanization of armies and improvement of methods of armed forces mobilization, in contrast to the twenties, not only measures to cover strategic deployment were included in the content of the initial period of a war, but also extensive combat operations on land, in the air and on the sea by the invading armies and holding-action armies, mobilized in advance and deployed along the frontiers. It was also assumed that in the course

* Conclusion. The first part of this article by Army Gen S. Ivanov was published in Voyennaya Mysl', No 5, 1971.

of frontier engagements, which would assume a large scale from the very first day of the war, the main forces of the belligerents would complete mobilization and deployment.

These ideas were formulated in a report by the Chief of Staff of the Worker-Peasant Red Army, A. I. Yegorov, to the Republic Revolutionary Military Council and further developed in addresses by M. N. Tukhachevskiy, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, and in articles written by prominent military commanders and military theorists R. P. Eydeman, Ya. Ya. Alkanis, A. N. Lapchinskiy, G. S. Isserson and many others.² All of these persons affirmed that in a future war the aggressor would not wait for completion of mobilization and deployment of his main forces. In the interest of achieving offensive surprise he would attack with those forces which are combat ready at the initiation of hostilities. These forces, in the opinion of A. I. Yegorov, could comprise "invasion groups" -- large motorized and mechanized units operating in conjunction with large masses of cavalry and aircraft. "But," Yegorov noted, "one must bear in mind that invasion groups will be capable of creating only a number of crises, of inflicting a number of defeats on the covering armies, but they will be unable to resolve the question of the outcome of the war or to mete out a decisive defeat... on the main forces. This is the task of the following period of operations, when operational concentration has been completed."³

Similar ideas were expressed by M. N. Tukhachevskiy in an article entitled "The Character of Frontier Operations." The new element in the frontier battle, he wrote, will consist in the fact that forward armies and air power will mount broad offensive operations immediately following the declaration of war or on the first day of mobilization, and that the frontier operation which has been well conducted by a forward army will constitute the best guarantee of prompt concentration of main forces and their commitment in a decisive engagement.

Worthy of attention are views on the initial phase of war as expressed in the writings of Ye. A. Shilovskiy, M. Tikhonov, S. N. Krasil'nikov and others. They noted that operations of the initial phase of a war may be conducted with very large forces and exert great influence on the course and even outcome of the war. For example, Ye. Shilovskiy wrote in one study that new military arms and new hardware comprise such a powerful weapon and can stun the enemy to such a degree at the very outset of a war that "the result of their operations will have a decisive effect on the course of subsequent operations and possibly even on the outcome of the war."⁴

The initiated World War II in Europe essentially confirmed the correctness of the above views on the nature of operations of the initial period of the war and their possible influence on its subsequent course and outcome. But at the same time obsolete views on the scale and methods of combat operations at the beginning of a war had not yet been totally eliminated from Soviet military theory. We must admit that even immediately prior to the Great Patriotic War a number of theoretical articles and training manuals, in which the initial period of a war was characterized as a period of initial active operations by covering armies, air power and naval forces, still assumed a certain interval between the initiation of these operations and initial operations by the main forces of the forward strategic echelon. The possibility of combat deployment at the outbreak of hostilities by the main forces of this echelon was in essence not considered.

As far as this question is concerned, the lesson of Nazi Germany's attack on Poland with armed forces which had been fully mobilized in peacetime had evidently not yet been practically assessed. It was assumed that in a war with other, larger nations possessing equal or even greater potential and manifesting vigilance, the aggressor would not succeed in repeating this variant of strategic deployment and sneak attack. In this connection, speaking about Soviet prewar views on the probable nature of the initial period of the approaching war, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov, who at the outbreak of hostilities was serving as Chief of the General Staff, wrote: "In revising operational plans in the spring of 1941... new methods of waging warfare in the initial period of war were not fully taken into consideration in a practical manner. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that a war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union could initiate on the former pattern: the main forces would engage several days after the initial frontier clashes. Nazi Germany was placed under the same conditions as us in regard to time required to concentrate forces and deploy. In actual fact both forces and conditions were far from equal."⁵ This was evidently one of the reasons why theory did not adequately elaborate methods of repelling an invasion by enemy main forces at the very outbreak of hostilities, and this in turn exerted certain influence on the practical activities of our military leaders.

Characteristic Features of the Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War

Conditions of the Soviet Union's Entry into the War

The situation in which the Soviet Union was compelled to enter into a war with Nazi Germany on 22 June 1941 was determined by a number of economic, military, and external political conditions.

External political conditions. At the time of the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union the international situation was characterized by the fact that our nation was no longer threatened with political isolation. The division of the imperialist nations into two warring camps created the objective preconditions for establishment of an antifascist coalition. But these were merely preconditions; their realization required time. In the prevailing international situation the Soviet Union was compelled to enter into war alone against a most powerful adversary, an adversary which possessed vast material and manpower resources. In addition, while fighting savage battles against a numerically superior adversary, the USSR was compelled to divert considerable manpower to defend its Far Eastern borders, since there was no guarantee that imperialist Japan would not attack us from behind.

Although the neutrality pact signed in April 1941 reduced the threat of Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, it did not completely eliminate it. Soon after the attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka unequivocally stated to the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo that if the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy -- the basis of Japanese foreign policy -- and the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union came into conflict with one another, the latter would be scrapped.⁶ This was no empty threat.

The Japanese militarists, occupying Manchuria and Korea, transformed them into a bridgehead for an attack on the USSR. The Kwangtung Army, numbering almost a million men and stationed in Manchuria and Korea, was being armed with new combat equipment; airfield and road construction was proceeding at a rapid pace, and military supply storage facilities and bases were being built. On 2 July 1941 the Japanese leaders, at a secret meeting in the presence of the emperor, reached an agreement that Japan would take up arms against the USSR at that moment when its situation in the war with Germany became hopeless. It was the stubborn, heroic resistance of the Red Army on the Soviet-German Front as well as the presence of a sufficiently strong Soviet force (up to 40 divisions) on our Far Eastern borders which compelled Japan temporarily to postpone its attack on the Soviet Union.

State of the nation's material base for defense. In the prewar years the Communist Party, Soviet government and our entire people had accomplished an enormous task of creating a material base for national defense, development of a defense industry and the training of strategic reserves. The following tasks were accomplished comparatively rapidly: new plants were built in the eastern regions; a second oil production base was established between the Volga and the Urals; large metallurgical and machine building plants were built in the Urals, beyond Baikal, on the Amur, and in Central Asia. In 1940 the Soviet Union produced 165.9 million tons

of coal, 31.1 million tons of petroleum, 18.3 million tons of steel, 14.9 million tons of pig iron, and 38.3 million tons of commodity grain, which made it possible to establish the requisite reserves and mobilization stockpiles of metals, fuels and foodstuffs.

Carrying out measures to strengthen the nation's defense capability as specified by the 18th Party Congress, the party Central Committee and Soviet government substantially increased military spending, which in 1940 comprised 32.6 percent and in 1941 43.4 percent of the total state budget. In 1939 the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars USSR issued a decree calling for renovation of existing and construction of new aircraft plants, the number of which was to double by the end of 1941. That same year the decision was made to convert over to tank production, in addition to the Leningrad (Kirovsk) and Kharkov plants, the Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk tractor plants. New plants were built and existing ones renovated for the manufacture of small arms, artillery, ammunition and propellants. The defense industry began receiving considerable larger quantities of metals, fuel, electric power and new equipment, and defense plants began receiving additional numbers of highly-skilled workers, technicians, and engineers. In conformity with the State Labor Reserves Law, the industrial cadres training system was expanded, taking into account the fact that the war would inevitably draw off skilled manpower which must be replaced. A total of 717,000 were enrolled in trade schools and factory apprentice schools in the 1940/41 school year. In 1940 alone enterprises and establishments trained 1.9 million new blue-collar and white-collar workers, while more than 1.6 million persons upgraded their job skills.

The Communist Party engaged in an extensive ideological effort to indoctrinate Soviet citizens in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, as well as constant readiness to defend the homeland. Enormous assistance to the party in military-patriotic indoctrination of the masses was provided by the 10-million man army, plus Osoaviakhim, which involved 13 million persons. The military-patriotic theme was widely disseminated in the press, over the radio, in art, in film and on the stage.

Measures conducted by the party for development of the socialist economy were of great significance for strengthening the nation's defensive might. But the defense industry, in spite of its intensive development, nevertheless was unable to keep up with demand in the manufacture of combat equipment, weapons and ammunition for the rapidly growing armed forces. This naturally created serious difficulties in supplying the troops with the latest weapons, vehicles and other military equipment.

Military-strategic conditions. The threat of an imperialist attack on the Soviet Union, which became more acute with the outbreak of World War II in

Europe, demanded the execution of a number of urgent military measures. In September 1939 a law was passed calling for universal military training, a law which bolstered the transition to establishment of a cadre army. In two and a half years 120 new divisions and nine mechanized corps were formed. An additional 20 mechanized corps began forming at the beginning of 1941. Rifle divisions in the frontier districts were brought up to strength with inductees and command personnel activated from reserve status. The troops rapidly mastered operation and utilization of new types of aircraft, tanks, artillery and other hardware. In February 1941 the Soviet government ratified a war contingency armed forces mobilization plan and authorized the holding of summer training camps beginning in June 1941, with a callup of 793,000 men. By 1 June of that year the armed forces had reached a total of 5 million men.

In connection with liberation of the peoples of the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia and Bessarabia by the Red Army, as well as voluntary entry into the Soviet Union by the Baltic republics -- Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, it became necessary to revise plans for defense of our western borders. In the spring of 1941 the General Staff, jointly with the headquarters of the military districts and fleets, drafted a new plan for defense of the Soviet borders and implemented during the final prewar months, on government instructions, large-scale measures to reinforce the troops in the western border districts, which comprise the forward strategic echelon, which would engage at the outbreak of hostilities. The number of troops in these districts was increased by 150 percent.

In mid-June the commanders of the western border districts received the following order: divisions situated at depth were to move closer to the border, while in forward-echelon large units necessary measures were to be taken in order to reduce the time required for them to become combat-ready to 2-9 hours. In the latter half of May, on orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, three combined-arms armies and one rifle corps began moving from interior military districts to a line running along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. These troops were to concentrate in their new areas in the period between 1 June and 3 July and would comprise the Supreme Command Reserve.

All these measures were extremely important for raising the general level of mobilization and operational readiness of our Armed Forces. They did not, however, deal with an extremely important element -- prompt and total combat readiness of the troops of the forward echelons in the border military districts and garrisons of fortified regions, as was demanded by the situation which was developing along our western borders. This is evidently due to the fact that the Soviet government, endeavoring to preserve the peace and live up to the terms of the treaty with Germany, was avoiding the

implementation of such measures in order not to give Hitler a pretext to attack. Evidently proceeding from this was the belief that it would only take a few hours to bring the troops into a state of full combat readiness, as was specified in the plan for defense of the Soviet borders, and only when war became absolutely inevitable. But these calculations proved unrealistic. As a result of this, by the time Nazi Germany launched its attack we were unable to establish appropriate initial forces to repel the offensive-ready enemy or to make them fully combat-ready.

Nazi Germany was in a different situation. During the course of military campaigns in Western Europe in 1940, in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 and in the intervals between these campaigns, Germany carried out all preparatory measures for war against the Soviet Union. The German command fully mobilized and deployed its armed forces, designating for action against the USSR, jointly with Germany's satellites, 181 divisions and 18 brigades, more than 47,000 guns and mortars, more than 4900 aircraft and approximately 2800 tanks, not including light tanks.⁷ In order to achieve victory in a "blitzkrieg" war, Germany massed a maximum quantity of forces for the initial thrust: more than 70 percent of infantry divisions, approximately 90 percent of tank and motorized divisions, and more than 60 percent of combat aircraft. An overwhelming superiority in men and weapons was established in the area of the forthcoming invasion spearhead. By the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler's army had acquired considerable experience in conducting large-scale offensive operations with massive employment of tanks, aircraft and other combat equipment.

Thus unequal conditions of combat between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had been established, as a consequence of which at the outbreak of hostilities our country and its armed forces proved to be in a very difficult situation. The reasons for this unequal situation were thoroughly revealed by the Central Committee CPSU. "The Germans exploited temporary advantages: militarization of the German economy and German life; long preparations for a predatory war and combat experience in the West; superiority in arms and men, concentrated in advance in the border zones. They had at their disposal the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe. Nazi Germany captured in the nations of Europe an entire arsenal of arms, vast stockpiles of metals, strategic raw materials, metallurgical and defense plants. The Soviet Union was compelled to stand alone against a colossal war machine. Another factor was errors in estimating the possible time of attack on us by Nazi Germany and related oversights in preparing to repel initial thrusts."⁸

The extremely disadvantageous conditions for entry by the Soviet Union into the war demanded that the party and government take urgent measures on a nationwide scale in the political, economic and military areas. These conditions predetermined the entire complexity and difficulty of conduct of initial operations.

Characteristic Features of Initial Operations in the Great Patriotic War

From the very outbreak of hostilities, military operations were of an extremely resolute character, distinguished by immensity of scale and savagery of fighting.

According to Directive No 21 (Operation Barbarossa) the immediate objective of initial German operations in the Baltic, Belorussia and the Western Ukraine was to break up the troops in the Soviet border districts into isolated units by means of attack by tank groups and field armies, with air support, on the Dvina, Minsk-Smolensk and Kiev axes, destroying Soviet troops to the west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper, clearing the way for a subsequent unopposed drive on Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donbass.⁹

With the outbreak of hostilities the Soviet command, proceeding on the basis of the situation in the field, endeavored to halt the advance of the enemy's attack forces, to drive them back to their initial position and, under favorable conditions, to conduct military operations on enemy territory. The resolute nature of the stated objectives and the uncompromising, class character of the initiated war dictated from the very outset the extremely vigorous nature of military operations.

The Nazi German army initiated hostilities with surprise attack by forces which were fully ready for an offensive drive. Enemy aircraft attacked 60 airfields and Soviet troops in the border zone (as far as the Western Dvina and Dnieper), simultaneously bombing many Soviet cities -- Kiev, Minsk, Smolensk, Sevastopol', and others. The Soviet troops, subjected to a sneak attack, were compelled to engage under extremely unfavorable conditions. Many units and large units were taken by surprise, as they were conducting summer training at camps, gunnery ranges and training centers. They were compelled to engage unit by unit, without pause for organization or consolidation. In spite of these difficult conditions, our troops offered heroic resistance to the enemy from the very outset.

On the first day of the war fighting raged from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians (along a 1500-kilometer front). On following days the front of the enemy strategic offensive broadened: Germany's satellites committed troops to the offensive. In the first half of July military operations involved a front of 3000 kilometers and depths of 400-600 km on the main axes of advance.

Savage fighting was raging simultaneously along the western borders of the Soviet Union and on the approaches to Smolensk and Kiev. More and more troops were involved in the fighting. On the first day of the war the Nazi German command committed 117 of the 190 divisions designated for war against the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, with the engagement of support-echelon large units and troops of Nazi Germany's satellites, the

number of divisions operating on the front line rose to 166. On the Soviet side, the troops of all western border military districts took part in the initial operations, while at the beginning of July they were joined by strategic reserves brought up from the rear areas. During the first weeks of the war the two sides committed to action more than 300 divisions, thousands of tanks and aircraft, tens of thousands of guns and mortars, and large quantities of other types of combat equipment and weapons.

Initial operations on the Soviet-German Front were conducted in the most diverse forms. During the course of the advance the enemy extensively employed the techniques of spearheads to split the enemy forces and break up the strategic front, close and deep envelopment of Soviet forces, sometimes resulting in their encirclement. In savage fighting the Soviet troops combined defense of occupied positions with withdrawal to intermediate lines of defense. Their defense was distinguished by extreme stubbornness and vigorousness, which were expressed primarily in numerous counterattacks and counterthrusts.

As a rule large tank units took part in these counterthrusts (counter-thrusts by two mechanized corps of the Northwestern Front on 23-26 June at Shyaulyay, by two mechanized corps of the Western Front on 26 June at Grodno, by 5 mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front on 26-29 June near Lutsk, Rovno, and Brody, by two mechanized corps of the Western Front on 6-8 July near Senno, etc). Powerful counterthrusts were also mounted by combined-arms large units (the counterthrusts of the Twenty-First Army of the Western Front on 13 July from Gomel' to Bobruysk, and the subsequent cavalry group breakthrough into an area to the southwest and west of Bobruysk, the counterthrust of the Northwestern Front in the latter half of July near Smolensk, etc).

The role of strategic reserves for stabilizing the enemy-disrupted strategic front on the main axes of advance acquired increasing importance during the course of initial operations. For example, in order to reestablish defense in the central area, penetrated by the enemy on the first days of the war, the Supreme Command transferred 36 divisions to the Western Front from 27 June to 10 July. Encountering stubborn Soviet resistance, the enemy was compelled to disperse the main attack force operating in this area along a vast front from Velikiye Luki to Mozyr'. At this time the commitment of fresh troops succeeded in halting the enemy's drive on a line between the Velikaya and Western Dvina rivers, as well as on the approaches to Kiev. The plan of the German command -- to destroy the main Soviet forces to the west of the Dvina and Dnieper in border battles and to clear the way for an unopposed drive deep into our heartland -- failed. The Soviet Army preserved its main forces intact and was offering increased resistance to the enemy with each passing day. The notorious Operation Barbarossa,

which called for "defeating Soviet Russia by means of a swift military operation," had shown its first major crack.

The Soviet Armed Forces, during the course of heavy defensive fighting in the border zone, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. According to the figures of General Halder, Chief of the German Army General Staff, as of 13 July German losses totaled approximately 100,000 killed, wounded, and missing in action. The enemy suffered even more substantial losses in combat equipment. As of 14 July only 1700 of the 2887 tanks possessed by tank groups at the outbreak of hostilities, or approximately 60 percent of the original total, were still on the line. By 19 July the Germans had lost approximately 1300 combat aircraft. The German army had never sustained such heavy losses in such a short period of time.

Slowing down the enemy drive, the Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses in men and equipment and were unable to achieve their initial objectives -- to repulse the enemy attack and to carry the fighting to enemy territory. Waging stubborn defensive battles against a numerically superior foe, by mid-July our troops had withdrawn to a line Pyarnu-Tartu-Pskov-Drissa-Vitebsk-Mogilev-Zhlobin-Sarny-Novograd-Volynskiy-Kamenets-Podol'skiy and beyond, down the Prut and Danube rivers to the Black Sea. Initial Soviet operations in the border zone ended on this line. The next phase of the summer-fall campaign of 1941 began with the commitment of major strategic reserves in the principal areas of the Soviet-German Front, reserves which had comprised the second strategic echelon.

At this stage the Soviet Supreme Command conducted a number of strategic defensive operations on the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern strategic axes. Although these operations proved unsuccessful, since they had involved preparations under conditions of direct contact with and hostile activity by the enemy, with inadequate manpower and weapons, and resulted in a loss of ground, we nevertheless succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and achieving the main goal -- gaining time to organize resistance.

The losses sustained by the enemy in the initial period of the war and the growing resistance offered by the Soviet troops in the initial defensive operations compelled the Germans at the end of July temporarily to shift to defense on the main, Smolensk-Moscow axis. On 30 July the German Command, in Directive Order No 34, issued the following instructions to Army Group Center: "Shift to the defense, employing the most suitable ground for this purpose."¹⁰

Communist Party Measures to Place the Nation on a War Footing

The enormous danger threatening our country as a result of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany and the unfavorable development of events at the front demanded the adoption of emergency measures to mobilize all this nation's resources. From the very first day of the war the Communist Party took charge of the popular struggle against the Nazi German invaders. The party swiftly implemented a number of emergency political, military and economic measures to place the nation on a war footing, mobilizing the nation's efforts to resist our mortal enemy.

The Party Central Committee, supported by the potential of the Soviet economy and the advantages of the Soviet social and political system, drafted an extensive program for the country's transition from a peacetime to a war footing. A 29 June 1941 directive of the Council of People's Commissars USSR and Central Committee formulated for Party and soviet organizations of the front oblasts the just, liberation aims of the Great Patriotic War and specified the conditions necessary for defeating the enemy. This was a most important political decision, which defined the program of action by the Soviet people in war and the achievement of victory. The party stepped up to a maximum degree the activity of all party, trade union and Komsomol organizations connected with the conduct of an extensive political indoctrination effort with the public at large, with the aim of developing in the public creative initiative and responsibility for accomplishment of tasks connected with supplying the needs of the armies at the front.

One of the first measures in the area of the military was mobilization of persons subject to military service in 14 military districts, which provided the armed forces with 5.3 million men by 1 July. Martial law was declared in the western oblasts. All functions of government authorities pertaining to organization of defense, maintenance of law and order and national security were transferred to the military councils of the fronts, armies and military districts, and in those areas where there were no military councils -- to command entities of large units. All local authorities, establishments and enterprises were required to assist the military command in every way in the organization of defense. Behind enemy lines a partisan movement was organized, including the organization of sabotage, reconnaissance, and other partisan activities.

The structure of state and central military control entities was reorganized, and new military control entities were established. During the war years, the Central Committee, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR and Council of People's Commissars USSR did all work connected with strengthening national defense and supervising military operations through special entities set up at the beginning of the war -- the State Defense Committee and Supreme Command General Headquarters.

During the first days of the war mobilization of the productive capacity of industry, the material resources of agriculture, transportation, construction organizations, finances, the labor force of city and village was effected. Mobilization of the nation's food reserves was also effected, and rationing of supply to the public of manufactured goods and foodstuffs was introduced. On 27 June the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars issued a decree calling for evacuation of the civilian population, industrial enterprises and valuable goods and articles from the zone immediately behind the front to the nation's rear areas.

On 30 June the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars USSR examined and ratified a mobilization economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, which called for concentration of capital expenditure and resources on the construction of defense enterprises on the Volga, in the Urals and in Western Siberia. The development of events on the front, however, indicated that this was not enough. On 4 July the State Defense Committee instructed the commissions under the supervision of the chairman of Gosplan USSR to draft a new military economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the following regions: Volga, Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Implementation of this plan played an enormous role in creating a war industry base in the eastern regions and total regearing of the entire economy to supply the needs of the war effort.

All these decisions and measures specified by the Communist Party were of enormous importance for the conduct of the war. Gosplan, in close co-ordination with the General Staff and the branch people's commissariats, put into operation plans for the mobilization of the nation's manpower, economic and financial resources in order as quickly as possible to supply the army in the field with sufficient quantities of new combat equipment, weapons, munitions, fuel and provisions.

At the beginning of the war our party also carried out extremely important measures in the area of foreign policy. The party Central Committee and the Soviet government, proclaiming the aims and tasks of the war with Nazi Germany as a war of liberation, expressed firm confidence that the Soviet Union would possess as loyal allies in the war effort the peoples of Europe and America, to whom freedom and independence are dear. The anti-fascist liberation war program advanced by the Soviet Union inspired freedom-loving peoples to engage in the struggle against fascism, which constituted the greatest incentive to establish an anti-Hitler coalition. Ruling circles in the Western nations subjected to Nazi aggression were compelled under the pressure of the masses to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union in war against Nazi Germany.

On 12 July 1941, at the proposal of the Soviet government, an Anglo-Soviet agreement calling for joint action in the war against Germany was signed in Moscow. At the end of July Soviet-American talks were held on possible deliveries of strategic raw materials and arms from the United States to the USSR. During this same period the Soviet government reestablished diplomatic relations with the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland in London and signed similar agreements pertaining to mutual pledges in the war against Germany. Thus initial steps were taken in the establishment of an anti-Hitler coalition.

Thus the Soviet Union, which had engaged in war against the bloc of fascist states, was compelled in addition to the conduct of extensive military operations to carry out a large complex of emergency nationwide measures which led to radical changes in the character and content of the nation's entire political, ideological and economic life. We assign all these events as well to the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, the main content of which constituted combat operations from 22 June to mid-July 1941, since important political and economic decisions were made by the party and government under the influence of these operations.¹¹

What indicators (from the standpoint of the course of military operations) enable one to define this time frame of the initial period?

In the first place, the Soviet Command, by engaging the main forces of the frontier military districts and large-scale commitment of strategic reserves, by mid-July 1941 had temporarily stabilized the front on the main strategic axes, a front which had been broken through by the enemy on the first days of the war, and temporarily halted the enemy's advance.

In the second place, the enemy's rate of advance had been sharply reduced by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops (from 30 kilometers per day on the initial days of the war to 6-7 km by mid-July, and to 2-5 km during the subsequent stages of the summer-fall campaign of 1941). In the third place, by mid-July the German command had failed to achieve its immediate objective -- to destroy the main forces of the Soviet army in the frontier zone (to the west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers) and to clear the way for an unhindered drive on the country's major political and industrial centers; there were signs that it would be a long, drawn-out war, which was contrary to the plans of Nazi Germany. The aggregate of these indicators offers a solid foundation for a correct comprehension of the statement in the Central Committee CPSU Theses: "...The initial period of the war demonstrated that the military adventure of the Nazis was doomed to failure."¹² In the subsequent course of the summer-fall campaign of 1941, which developed into an entire system of strategic defensive operations and mounting of strong counterthrusts on the enemy at Rostov and Tikhvin, followed by a Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow, Hitler's plan of

"blitzkrieg" was finally put to rest and the myth of "invincibility" of the German army was proven false, which also signaled the beginning of a radical turnaround in the course of the war.

It is essential to emphasize once again that in the initial period of the war the party and government made all the major decisions in the military, political, economic and diplomatic areas of the affairs of the Soviet state. This constituted initiation of the massive activities by the party Central Committee and Soviet government to create conditions for subsequent defeat of the enemy.

Party and government directives to reorganize the nation's entire economy for the needs of the war effort were not fully implemented until the spring of 1942, since such a reorganization required a colossal effort to move the nation's productive resources great distances from the western regions and to build hundreds of plants at a totally new location. In May-June 1942 the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition was completed with the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty and Soviet-American agreement.

Some Results and Conclusions

We have examined the content of the initial period of the war in the European and Pacific theaters, as well as in the Great Patriotic War. Analysis of these events has demonstrated that the role of the initial period and its influence on the subsequent course of the war grew enormously. At the same time the results of this period were different in the various wars. In the wars between capitalist states aggressive Germany and Japan as a rule achieved their initially-stated objectives.

The initial period in the Great Patriotic War produced a different result. The German command failed to achieve its immediate objectives as specified in Operation Barbarossa. The main forces of the Soviet Army were not destroyed in the initial operations, and the enemy did not receive the opportunity to advance unopposed on the country's major political and economic centers. This was achieved by prompt commitment of strategic reserves, as well as thanks to the heroic and stubborn resistance offered by the Soviet troops, the high degree of patriotism, unprecedented courage and self-sacrifice on the part of the Soviet people, and the great leading and organizing force of the Communist Party. The enemy's advantages dictated by the element of surprise lost the significance they had possessed during the initial days of the war.

An analysis of the events of the initial period in the above-mentioned wars indicates that in spite of their diversity there did exist certain common specific features of a military, political and economic character, which distinguish them from the subsequent stages of the war. In the most general form the initial period of the war constituted a specific time

segment during which the belligerents conducted the initial operations specified by the war plans (offensive and defensive), involving those forces which were combat-ready and deployed at the outbreak of hostilities, in order to achieve initial strategic objectives, a period during which the belligerents openly effected mobilization, undertook domestic measures to place the country on a war footing and engaged in foreign-policy actions in regard to their enemies, allies and neutral nations.

In the area of the military the main content of the initial period of war comprised initial operations with the participation of formations and large units of all services. The attacking nation, which had mobilized and deployed its armed forces prior to the outbreak of hostilities, usually mounted large-scale offensive operations with the immediate objective of destroying the adversary's main forces and creating favorable conditions for a victorious conclusion of the war. The states which were the victims of aggression waged large-scale defensive battles on land, on the sea and in the air with the forces of the forward strategic echelon, under the cover of which mobilization and strategic deployment of the bulk of the armed forces were effected. Simultaneously with the conduct of military operations, measures were taken in the political, economic and diplomatic areas.

In the area of domestic policy, with the outbreak of hostilities the nation's life and affairs were reorganized to a war footing; political mobilization of army and people took place. An important role was played by measures to strengthen the state's internal security, plus the mounting of a large-scale ideological effort with the aim of morale-psychological preparation of the civilian population for the war effort.

In the capitalist nations the reactionary governments, in addition to other domestic governmental measures, intensified repression of progressive elements, particularly Communist parties, while in the aggressive fascist states this was accompanied by frenzied chauvinist propaganda for the sake of camouflaging the criminal war aims.

During this period the Communist Party of the Soviet Union accomplished an immense job of organizing the entire population to resist the enemy in the name of the noble, just aims of liberating the country from the invaders and liberating the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke. Considerable attention was focused on matters connected with increasing vigilance, organization, discipline, and the instillation of hatred toward the enemy. The efforts of government agencies were reorganized in all areas of the nation's activities in order to accomplish these tasks.

In the economic area measures specified in military and economic mobilization plans were implemented on an accelerated basis as soon as hostilities

were initiated. This applied first and foremost to the assembly and transfer of requisite supplies and equipment in order to supply and equip new large units being deployed following the outbreak of hostilities. Simultaneously a large part of industry was converted for the manufacture of military goods: arms, munitions and other materiel requisite for waging war. As soon as war broke out, financial, material and manpower resources were redistributed among the various branches of the economy. The operations of all modes of transportation, communications facilities, etc were substantially reorganized.

The foreign policy activities of governments in the initial period of the war were also of a special character. Genuine allies and potential new adversaries were determined, and steps were taken to establish and enlarge coalitions. The foreign policy programs of the nations which had entered the war and their political aims were more precisely determined in the early stages of hostilities, and the genuine attitude of allies toward obligations stipulated in prewar treaties was verified.

Thus the entry of nations into war constituted a complex process linked with accomplishment of a great many tasks of state significance. This process, during the course of which the belligerent nations resolved primary military, political and economic tasks, also comprised as a whole the content of the initial period of war.

A number of characteristic trends in manners of entry by nations into war were observed in World War II. In some of them, particularly aggressive ones, there was clearly manifested a tendency to carry out all or most preparatory measures for the waging of war, including strategic deployment, in peacetime. Initial forces for mounting the initial operations were established prior to hostilities under the cover of an extensive system of camouflaging measures. This tendency was most fully manifested in Germany and Japan -- they initiated war, having specified an aggression timetable in advance. The victims of attack usually were slow in strategic deployment. This created an inequality of conditions for entry into war and gave the aggressor a substantial advantage. But this advantage was not of an insurmountable, fatal character. The experience of the war indicated that if one carefully analyzes the situation and correctly assesses steps taken by the aggressor to initiate hostilities, it is possible to deprive him of these advantages by prompt execution of measures to repulse the forthcoming attack.

Wars began to be initiated with the mounting of large-scale strategic operations at the very outset, with the participation of the main forces of the aggressor, who would initiate hostilities with a large-scale air attack and the commitment of large forces of tank and mechanized troops, as well as the landing of airborne and large amphibious assault forces. The

aggressor attached special importance to establishing air supremacy. By means of massive air attack and deep penetration by mobile forces, the attacker would endeavor to capture military bases and weapons stockpiles intact, to frustrate mobilization and completion of strategic deployment by the adversary's forces.

In connection with this the role of surprise in achieving stated objectives became extremely important. The element of surprise gave the attacking force an advantage for the delivery of a powerful first strike and exerted a powerful morale and psychological effect on the troops and civilian population. In countries subjected to attack, armed forces stationed in frontier areas were usually not on a full combat-ready status. They would be compelled, not having completed concentration and deployment in initial positions, to engage hastily and unit by unit. It is also incorrect to specify as a rigid pattern or rule this pattern of troop actions at the outbreak of hostilities for countries which are the victims of aggression. The experience of the war teaches us that the effect of the factor of surprise can be neutralized or greatly diminished. This is achieved by systematic and purposeful reconnaissance of and intelligence-gathering on the enemy, by an objective assessment of the developing situation, and by prompt placement of armed forces in a state of full combat readiness.

A characteristic feature of the conduct of initial operations was the employment by both sides of more sophisticated combat equipment, particularly aircraft and tanks, which resulted in an increase in firepower, depth of attack and increased maneuverability of attacking forces. The highly-maneuverable and dynamic character of combat operations in turn imposed new demands on defense. The experience of initial defensive operations indicated that the stubborn holding of important positions should be combined with extensive maneuver actions and the mounting of effective counterthrusts. Strategic reserves as well as efficient anti-aircraft and antitank defense acquired particular importance.

The experience of the initial operations in World War II also demonstrated the sharp increase in scale of military operations. Military operations with the participation of large forces developed from the very first hours of the war simultaneously over immense land, sea and ocean theaters, involving the deep rear areas of the belligerent nations. This greatly complicated the conditions of troop control, imposing particularly high demands on strategic and operational control of armed forces from the very first hours of hostilities.

* * *

Assessing the importance of the lessons of the last war for present-day conditions in respect to methods and manner of entry by nations into war, it

is essential to take into consideration those enormous changes which have occurred in the balance of forces in the world arena, as well as in the development of weapons, combat equipment and military affairs as a whole during the quarter century which has passed since the end of World War II.

Analysis of these changes indicates that a great diversity of forms and methods of initiating war by aggressors is possible today as never before.

The character and trends in training the armed forces of the major imperialist nations, and the United States in particular, indicate that the aggressor may initiate war against the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact member nations with a sneak attack, employing the entire arsenal of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. With this objective in mind, the United States maintains strategic offensive nuclear forces in a continuous state of high combat readiness: intercontinental ballistic missiles, missile-carrying nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers. Very little time is required to ready them to deliver nuclear strikes. These forces can engage instantly, upon receiving a predetermined signal. Under certain conditions initial combat operations may be conducted with nonnuclear weapons. For this purpose the United States maintains in various parts of the world, and in Europe in particular, large ground forces and considerable air power, ready to initiate vigorous military operations without any lengthy preparatory measures.

Thus under present-day conditions the most probable and dangerous method of initiation of war by the aggressor is the sneak attack with the employment of various types of weapons. This dictates the necessity of maintaining a high degree of vigilance in regard to the intrigues of the instigators of a new war. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations are compelled to take all necessary steps to strengthen their defensive might.

Our party has drawn precisely such a conclusion, proceeding from the present situation, the experience and lessons of the last war. This is attested by the party's multifaceted practical activities directed toward an all-out strengthening of our country's defensive capability and at further increasing the might and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, guaranteeing our security and the prevention of military adventures on the part of the imperialists. "Measures taken in recent years," stated L. I. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress, "have enabled us substantially to strengthen the might and combat efficiency of the Armed Forces. Soviet citizens can be confident that our glorious Armed Forces are prepared to repulse an enemy attack, from whatever quarter, at any time, day or night. Every potential aggressor knows full well that in the case of an attempted nuclear missile attack on our country he will receive a devastating response."

In conclusion we should emphasize that this article does not come close to exhausting this subject; it has discussed only its most important aspects. The subject demands further investigation and study. In this area there is definitely work to be done, "things to ponder," to quote Defense Minister Mar SU A. A. Grechko.

FOOTNOTES

1. Programma Kommunisticheskoy parti i Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Politizdat, 1968, page 13.
2. See Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voyennykh trudakh (1917-1940 gg.) (Problems of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet military Writings [1917-1940]), Voyenizdat, 1965.
3. Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 10, 1963, page 35.
4. Voprosy strategii..., op.cit., page 501.
5. G. K. Zhukov: Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya (Reminiscences and Musings), Izd. APN, 1970, page 216.
6. Vsemirnaya istoriya (World History), Volume 10, Izd-vo Mysl', 1965, page 532.
7. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. Concise History), Voyenizdat, 1970, page 35.
8. 50 let Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Tezisy TsK KPSS (Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of the Central Committee CPSU), Politizdat, 1967, page 19.
9. Porazheniye germanskogo imperializma vo vtoroy mirovoy voynie. Stat'i i dokumenty (The Defeat of German Imperialism in World War II. Articles and Documents), Voyenizdat, 1960, pp 200-206.
10. Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!. Documenty i materialy (Top Secret! For Command Only! Documents and Materials), Izd-vo Nauka, 1967.
11. This view of the time frame of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War is not new. It is reflected in official Soviet military historical studies: Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1941-1945 (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945),

Volume 2, Voyenizdat, 1961; Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе 1941-1945. Voyenno-istoricheski ocherk (Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. Military historical sketch), Volume 1, Voyenizdat, 1958; Vsemirnaya istoriya, op.cit., Volume 10, Izd-vo Mysl', 1965; Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva. Uchebnik dlya slushateley-ofitserov vysshikh voyenno-uchebnykh zavedeniy Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (History of Wars and the Art of Warfare. Textbook for Officers Enrolled at Soviet Armed Forces Higher Training Institutions), Voyenizdat, 1970, and elsewhere. In this article we wish merely to confirm its correctness on the basis of additional studies.

12. 50 let..., op. cit., page 19.

LENINIST THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

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Vladimir Il'ich Lenin is one those great persons whose life and career profoundly influence the course and development of the history of mankind. His name, creative and leadership activities as well as teachings are linked with the most significant events of our times. One of these events was the armed struggle by the young Soviet state against the united forces of White Guards and interventionists during the Civil War.

To the ingenious theorist of Marxism and founder of our party and the Soviet state goes the greatest credit for the creation and strengthening of our army and navy, for elaboration of the principles of armed forces organizational development, root problems of Soviet military science and its principal component -- the art of war. Proceeding from the urgent tasks of the class struggle and the necessity of preparing for the socialist revolution, the seizure of power by the proletariat and the armed defense of the socialist state, Lenin deeply examined the problems of military theory and practical organization of the armed forces of the Soviet Republic.

V. I. Lenin, just as Friedrich Engels, was an expert on matters pertaining to war and army. A tireless worker, he constantly worked on his military education, thoroughly studying the writings of Friedrich Engels, [Mering, Klyuzer], Clausewitz and other military historians and theorists. He also devoted considerable attention to the writings of Russian military leaders. General Bonch-Bruyevich recalls that Lenin thoroughly read the three-volume major study by Leyer, professor of strategy and commandant of the Russian General Staff Academy, entitled Strategiya (Strategy), which was published at the end of the 19th century, as well as a number of studies by other Russian military theorists.

Characterizing Lenin's extremely important role in the development of Soviet military science, M. I. Kalinin wrote: "Lenin left a great legacy, including in the area of military organization, strategy and tactics. Lenin was the greatest general in the history of wars by the toiler masses for their liberation from the oppressors; he founded the Soviet regular army, based on principles of modern science and technology."¹

Leading the party and revolutionary masses in the struggle for a power takeover by the proletariat, Lenin elaborated the philosophical substantiation of the general laws of warfare. He demonstrated that the most important of these laws are the laws of relationship between the character of a war and its political aims, the relationship between the methods and

forms of armed struggle on the one hand and the properties of weapons and combat equipment on the other, and the relationship between the course and outcome of war on the one hand and the correlation of military strength of the belligerent sides on the other.

Major contributions by Lenin to theory of the art of warfare are his elaboration of the theoretical foundations of Soviet military strategy as its principal component, organically linked with politics. This is natural, for in the area of military strategy the great leader of the proletariat is first and foremost a strategist, the political and military leader of the entire defense of the Soviet state.

We are correct in calling Vladimir Il'ich Lenin the founder of Soviet military science, stated Defense Minister Mar SU A. A. Grechko at a jubilee military scientific conference. He elaborated the fundamental aspects of military science: on the leadership role of the Communist Party in strengthening the defense capability of the state, on ways of readying the state for defense, on the nature and laws of wars, on organizational development of the Armed Forces, and on the principles of Armed Forces control. Soviet military science and art of war were formed on the basis of Lenin's ideas, their further development and synthesis of the lessons of the past.²

Our military cadres thoroughly study the Leninist military theory legacy. In the last 5 years alone several major studies have been published, plus a number of scholarly articles, revealing the enormous wealth of Leninist ideas pertaining to the general problems of war, problems of organizational development of the armed forces of the socialist state and the waging of war in defense of revolutionary conquests against imperialist aggression.

In this article we shall endeavor to shed some light upon major Leninist theses pertaining to Soviet military strategy, which have been reflected in various studies and in the periodical press³ during the Lenin centennial year and which are continuing to be discussed at the present time. We should like to draw attention to such important Leninist theses of Soviet military strategy as the dependence of the character and methods of waging war on political goals, selection of methods of waging war and direction of the main thrust, the role of strategic reserves and the influence of the correlation of forces of the warring sides on the course and outcome of war, as well as noting characteristic features of the Leninist style of directing armed forces in war.

* * *

Lenin pointed out time and again that war is first and foremost a social, sociohistorical phenomenon, which occurs at a specific stage in the development of a class society as a result of aggravation of antagonistic conflicts between classes, states, groups of states, and nations. Speaking of the demands of Marxian theory of knowledge for the study of war, he stated that "dialectics demands comprehensive investigation of a given societal phenomenon in its development and reduction of the external, the apparent to root motive forces, to the development of productive forces and to class struggle" (Poln. Sibr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 26, page 223).

Relationship Between Methods of Waging War and Political Goals⁴

Marxist-Leninist theory teaches that war (even the largest-scale war -- world war) comprises only one aspect of societal development, an aspect which is totally dependent on the course of this development, on the political interrelationships between classes and states. War, stated Lenin, is a part of a whole, and politics is this whole. When war arises, that is, such a means of politics as military force arrives on the scene, all other means of politics continue to be employed for the sake of achieving fundamental political goals. Lenin noted that "war per se does not alter that direction in which policy had been developing prior to the war, but rather accelerates its development" (Poln. Sibr. Soch., Volume 27, page 269).

The entire process of war has become considerably more complex under present-day conditions. Today this is a particularly specific type of activity by the multi-million masses, employing a vast quantity of powerful and long-range weapons. If a world war is initiated, it may encompass immense areas: not only zones of military operations but essentially the entire deep rear areas of the warring sides; the territory of any country participating in the war will be transformed into a theater of military operations. The objective of such a war is not only defeat of the enemy's armed forces but also disruption and destruction of the enemy's administrative-political and military-industrial centers, total disorganization of the enemy's rear areas. As a result of a colossal increase in the destructive capabilities of weapons, and particularly nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, during the course of war decisive strategic results are attained, which can very quickly and directly determine the outcome of the war and consequently the attainment of its main political goal.

It is to the immense credit of V. I. Lenin that he discovered precisely this deep-lying dialectical relationship between politics and war, between politics and strategy. In his comments on Clausewitz's book On War, he notes that "the character of the political goal exerts decisive influence on the conduct of war..." Politics, Lenin stressed time and again, "is

inevitably reflected in the conduct of war," in the methods and forms of military operations.

In recent years more and more frequent attempts have been made in the foreign bourgeois press to separate politics from war, to demonstrate that political leadership is allegedly losing its function. Logic rejects such views, and there is every reason to believe that if a nuclear war becomes fact, the importance of political leadership in such a war will increase to an exceptional degree.⁵

The relationship between the character and methods of conduct of war and political objectives is complex and multifaceted. It is manifested through the link between politics and strategy, the content of strategic concepts and plans, as well as directly through the economic system, the morale-political state of society and external political ties. An indirect link is seen primarily as the ability of politics to mobilize and expediently utilize these capabilities for the conduct of war, their transformation into a real force.

The unity of politics and strategy and the subordinate status of strategy in respect to policy constitute, as Lenin pointed out, major demands in examining all fundamental points of military strategy. Policy guides its development via strategic aims. It directs the preparation of all the nation's economic resources applicable to the presumed general course of the war and determines the tasks of government agencies in regard to gearing the economy to meet the needs of the war effort, taking into account the demands and requirements of strategy.

The political objective of war determines the major intermediate tasks of military operations, the procedure of entry into war, the timetable and sequence of attacks in a given theater of military operations, the composition of armed forces requisite at the beginning of and during the course of a war, the grouping of forces and general missions proceeding from the enemy's composition of forces. It is the job of strategy to achieve that goal assigned the armed forces. It elaborates a war plan, taking into account the concrete assessment of the enemy forces, determines the composition of the armed forces and the procedure of their deployment, implements their forming, training, and concentration. Strategy specifies the manner of entry into war, the aims and missions of strategic operations, forms and methods of their conduct, as well as effecting control and planning an uninterrupted flow of supplies.⁶

Success in war can be achieved only when politics and strategy are in total conformity with one another. Policy, which guides strategy, should specify for strategy reasonable tasks and in the course of military operations should take into account strategic results, which in turn can

influence policy, that is increase or limit its capabilities. Herein lies the essence of the Leninist thesis of the dependence of methods of conducting war on the political goals and military capabilities of the state.

Lenin never constructed his ideas on illusions. In 1918 he resolutely opposed the adventuristic policy and strategy of Trotsky, Bukharin and their supporters, who were attempting for the sake of revolutionary slogan to place in jeopardy the fate of the revolution and the Soviet Republic, in the absence of a realistic possibility of victory. "War," stated Lenin, "must be waged right or not at all. There can be no middle ground" (Poln. Sобр. Soch., Volume 35, page 408).

Lenin, a political leader and military strategist, knew how to reveal and skillfully utilize for political and strategic goals the enemy's weak points, the inner conflicts and contradictions in the enemy camp. Time and again ways were found on this basis to frustrate the strategic plans of our numerous enemies and to break up their fragile alliance. In May 1918 Lenin wrote in a letter to S. Shaumyan, who was in the Caucasus: "At the present time we are being saved solely by contradictions and conflicts as well as struggle among the imperialists. Learn how to take advantage of these conflicts: for the present we must learn diplomacy" (Poln. Sобр. Soch., Volume 50, page 74). Skillfully utilizing the sharpest conflicts in the enemy camp, the party was able not only to frustrate all attempts by world reaction to apply a general and coordinated pressure on starving Soviet Russia but also to organize the decisive, sequential, piecemeal defeat of the White Guards and interventionists.

The Soviet art of war developed and gained strength in close coordination with the political strategy and tactics of the Communist Party. Leninist theses perceived by the party on the relationships between politics and strategy are now being utilized by the art of warfare as guiding principles in the theory and practice of warfare. A Leninist understanding of the interrelationship between politics and military strategy is also fundamental in defining the character of the war which imperialism may yet unleash, the enemy's strong and weak points, and dictates elaboration of a military strategy corresponding to the concrete conditions and demands of policy, the tasks and capabilities of the armed forces.

Methods and Forms of Waging War⁷

The question of methods and forms of waging war and the armed struggle of the proletariat in the takeover of power and the defense of that power occupies a central position in the scientific writings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. An inestimable contribution toward the investigation of this problem was made by Friedrich Engels, an expert in military affairs and a comrade in arms of Karl Marx. Armed struggle, just as any societal

phenomenon, he stated, continuously changes, subordinated to general objective laws of development. This applies first and foremost to the methods and forms of its conduct. Their changes occur either gradually or by leaps. Qualitatively new phenomena arise in the content of armed struggle as a result of the latter. The most substantial and direct changes occur in connection with changes in quantity and quality of weapons and other hardware. Engels stated that advances in technology almost force changes and even revolutionary changes in methods of conducting warfare.

Lenin not only defended the views of Marx and Engels on military matters but also further developed them as applied to the new historical period. He armed the party and worker class with revolutionary methods of conducting war in defense of the conquests of socialism. Characteristic features of this method were resoluteness of political and strategic aims, highly-vigorous offensive operations, a firm intention of total destruction of the enemy, mobilization of the nation's entire resources to gain victory, a monolithic unity of army and people, and undivided political and strategic direction of the war by the Communist Party.

This Leninist thesis is of inestimable methodological importance for development of the theory and practice of the art of war. It follows from this thesis that only under conditions of a socialist state are the greatest opportunities presented for elaboration and tactical assimilation of the most effective forms and methods of waging war in defense against imperialist aggressors.

Soviet military science always proceeds from the necessity of applying those methods and forms of conduct of military operations which most correspond to situation conditions, from the importance of elaboration of and the search for new means of waging war, which are in conformity with the character of the war, taking into account all useful elements offered by the art of warfare practiced by other countries.

Lenin was in favor of the most decisive military operations and therefore always assigned a decisive role to the attack, recommended that it be executed in the most vigorous manner. "Resoluteness and pressure," he wrote, "comprise 75 percent of success." In connection with this he attached great importance to seizing and holding the initiative, which makes it possible to dictate one's will on the enemy, to select the most favorable methods of military operations which ensure success. "...Hegemony in war," he wrote, "goes to him who fights more vigorously than all the others, who exploits every opportunity to attack the enemy..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 9, page 186).

All-out development of incipient success is a very important factor. An incipient attack, stated Lenin, should be conducted exceptionally vigorously; it is necessary to gain initial success, without halting the advance on the enemy, taking advantage of the enemy's confusion and gaining victory. "It is necessary not to dislodge but rather to destroy the enemy," wrote Vladimir Il'ich on 8 June 1919 to the Defense Council's Representative on the Southern Front. This same demand is contained in a letter by the party Central Committee entitled "Everything for the Struggle Against Denikin!": "We shall perish if the advance on the Urals and Siberia slackens; we must step up this advance with the forces of the workers who are revolting in the Urals, with the forces of the Ural peasants..." The following fact indicates how persistently he implemented his decisive offensive strategy. In the summer of 1920 the Red Army began an offensive in the Southern Ukraine. Thoroughly analyzing the situation at the front, Lenin stated in a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry Army: "Wrangel is obviously pulling back his units. It is possible that he is even now attempting to take refuge in the Crimea. It would constitute the greatest crime to allow him to escape. The success of the forthcoming attack depends to a large degree on the First Cavalry Army" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 51, page 315).

Lenin's strategy attached exceptional importance to the element of surprise in achieving offensive success. One must endeavor to take the enemy by surprise, Vladimir Il'ich reminded the military leaders time and again, at the same time being vigilant and not allowing the enemy to prepare to repulse the attack. Experience had taught him to value the time factor, for delay and sluggishness in war had the most serious consequences.

Lenin devoted much attention to the necessity of careful, thorough preparation for an offensive operation. He noted that "every battle contains the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no other means of reducing this possibility than organized preparation for the battle" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 6, page 137).

A champion of vigorous offensive operations, Lenin admitted the possibility of shift to defense. "Never in the history of the world have there been wars," he stated, "which began and ended with a single victorious offensive, or if such wars occurred, they were an exception to the rule" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 44, page 209). Recognizing in principle the possibility of a strategic withdrawal as an extreme measure in order to avoid defeat, Lenin emphasized the great importance of preserving during such an operation the strictest order, self-control, organization and discipline. Withdrawal is a means of establishing a favorable situation for preparing to shift to a subsequent vigorous counteroffensive or offensive, as in fact occurred on the Eastern, Southern and later on the Western Front during the Civil War. The main thing demanded of defense is vigorous actions.

Theses elaborated by Lenin on methods of waging war, pertaining to the area of strategy, as well as to operational art and tactics, are just as important today, in spite of radical changes in weapons, organization and methods of military operations generated by the scientific and technological revolution. His ideas about attack as the principal, decisive means of defeating the enemy constitute the basis of Soviet military strategy. "The Soviet nation is strengthening its army not for attack," stated Defense Minister Mar SU A. A. Grechko in his address at the 24th CPSU Congress, "but rather for defense of the Soviet state and the other nations of the socialist community. But our Armed Forces are always ready to punish the aggressor even on that territory whence he dares cross by force the borders of our homeland."

Selection of Direction of Main Attack⁸

Lenin's deep penetration into the patterns and relationships of military operations is attested by his solution to such important problems of strategy as selection of direction of main attack and decisive massing of manpower and weapons.

Our party's strategy in determining the principal threat and selection of time and direction of main thrust was and is constructed on the basis of a rigorous consideration of our country's economic, morale-political and military potential as well as the potential of our enemies. Class conflicts in the enemy camp and the weak points of the enemy's strategy are skillfully utilized thereby.

Flexible utilization of conflicts between interventionists constituted one of the reasons for the failure of the strategic plans of the White Guards and the nations of the Entente. A correct strategy for the sequential defeat of Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin, the White Poles, Wrangel and the interventionists in the North, South, and Far East was elaborated at the initiative of Lenin, who always coordinated his strategic proposals and plans in the Central Committee Politburo.

In his "Letter to Russian Communist Party Organizations on Preparations for the Party Congress" in 1920, Lenin noted, summarizing party efforts during the Civil War: "We have been able to win because we have correctly determined the most urgent, the most vital, the most essential task and have genuinely concentrated on this task all the efforts of all toilers, of the entire people." "The entire art of management and politics," stated Vladimir Il'ich that same year in an address at a conference of chairmen of guberniya and uyezd executive committees, "consists in promptly determining and knowing where to concentrate one's main forces and attention."

Lenin's thesis on selection of main axis of attack and establishment of the requisite superiority of forces on this axis formed the basis of Soviet military strategy. The lessons of the Civil War were extensively utilized by the Soviet Supreme Command during the Great Patriotic War. Examples of this are the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, the Belorussian, Jassy-Kishinev and other operations. This experience is also of great importance under present-day conditions.

One of the fundamental principles of Soviet military strategy, based on the Leninist thesis of selection of main axis of attack, emphasized Army Gen S. P. Ivanov, Commandant of the General Staff Academy, in an article entitled "Leninist Principles of Soviet Military Strategy,"⁹ is recognition of the importance of correct choice of areas and objectives where the main efforts of the armed forces should be concentrated, and the necessity of establishing at the decisive place and time a superiority in manpower and weapons. The forces and means for repelling aggression and crushing the enemy are today established for the most part in peacetime. Today war may begin simultaneously in several or even in all theaters. The significance of each, however, may vary substantially. Therefore distribution of armed forces among theaters should be effected in conformity with the military and political situation, with the composition of the enemy's armed forces deployed in the given theater, and the character of political and strategic missions facing the armed forces.

Strategic Reserves and the Effect of Correlation of Forces on the Course and Outcome of War¹⁰

Lenin attached great importance in development of the principles of Soviet military strategy to elaboration of the problems of preparing strategic reserves. "The victor in war," he stated, "is the one with greater reserves, greater sources of strength, and greater staying power within the masses." He noted that "we have more of all this than the Whites, more than the 'world-omnipotent' Anglo-French imperialists... We have more of this because we are able to draw and shall long be able to draw more and more deeply from the workers and toiling peasants, from those classes which were oppressed by capitalism and which everywhere comprise the overwhelming bulk of the population" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 39, page 237).

Lenin's military correspondence in the period 1917-1920 shows that he dealt to a great deal and in a very concrete manner with the problems of preparing and establishing reserves. Reserves were sent to the decisive front for utilization on the main axis. The following is one of many examples of maneuver of reserves between fronts. During the course of the Red Army counteroffensive on the Southern Front, V. I. Lenin, receiving a telegram from the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, ordered the following: "1) Furnish clothing for 30,000 men; 2) Move the entire Fifth Army south

immediately, and not after Ishim...; 3) Turn the attack on Ishim into a feint and withdraw (preparing for this withdrawal as quickly as possible) to the Tobol River.

"Instruct the Commander in Chief to discuss my instructions 1-3" (Leninskiy Sbornik [Lenin Collection], XXXIV, 1942, pp 229-230). We might also quote the following Central Committee Directive: "Strip all fronts for the benefit of the Southern Front... The situation there is perilous" (Leninskiy Sbornik, XXXVI, 1959, page 81).

During the course of the Civil War Lenin skillfully created these reserves and swiftly mobilized them for the war effort, intelligently utilizing them to achieve success. The Reserve Army of the Republic was established at his instructions in July 1919. Subsequently the fronts began assembling such armies, which constituted an important source for replenishing the troops in the field. This outstanding experience was extensively employed by our Supreme Command during the Great Patriotic War. As is well known, extensive maneuver of reserves substantially accelerated our victory over Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan.

Guided by Lenin's instructions on the importance of strategic reserves, Soviet military strategy at the present stage proceeds from the necessity of establishing in advance those state and strategic reserves (material and manpower) essential for conducting a war if it is initiated by aggressive imperialist circles.¹¹

Extremely important for development of the principles of Soviet military strategy are Lenin's instructions or correct assessment of the correlation of forces of the warring sides in each war and its influence on the course and outcome of that war. Particularly critical was the question of thorough assessment of the enemy's resources and capabilities. The most dangerous thing in war, stated Lenin in 1920, "is an underrating of the enemy and the lulling belief that we are stronger. This is the most dangerous thing which can cause defeat in war..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 41, page 144). At the same time he warned that while under-assessment of the enemy can lead to complacency, a discrepancy between plans and actuality, and in the final analysis to military adventurism, overestimation of the enemy can engender indecisiveness and can undermine faith in one's capabilities, without which it is impossible to win.

Thorough consideration of the state of all elements of army and navy, economy and ideology, material and spiritual forces of the warring sides -- such is the Leninist principle of assessing the correlation of forces in war. Guided by these conclusions, the Communist Party and Soviet government fully exploited the weaknesses of imperialism and the advantages of the Soviet socialist state.

Leninist theses assume particular importance at the present stage in the struggle against the aggressive policies of imperialism. With the existing threat of outbreak of a nuclear war, the slightest error in assessing the strength of the enemy and one's own potential is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. The Central Committee CPSU and Soviet government sacredly carry out the leader's behests calling for unabating military vigilance in regard to the intrigues of the imperialists and their henchmen and on all-out strengthening of the military might of the Soviet state. "...Today's defensive might of our country and the nations of the socialist community," stated Defense Minister Mar SU A. A. Grechko, "give us reason to state firmly that we possess armed forces with such immense firepower that it is fully adequate totally to destroy any aggressor."¹²

Leninist Principles and Style of Strategic Leadership¹³

The exceptional energy, enormous military-theoretical and truly titanic organizational activity of V. I. Lenin exerted inestimable influence on the successful outcome of the armed struggle waged by the Soviet state during the Civil War. It revealed Lenin's genius not only as a political leader but also as the greatest theorist and organizer of the military defense of the socialist homeland.

Exercising strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, Lenin proceeded first and foremost from the principle of absolute observance of the unity of political and military leadership. Only with the existence of this unity is it possible to ensure maximum mobilization of the state's entire material and spiritual resources for the attainment of victory and efficient utilization of the armed forces. During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war this principle was rigidly observed. The newly-established Labor and Defense Council concentrated the totality of government authority and directed the military operations of the Red Army.

This principle received vivid embodiment during the Great Patriotic War, when military operations on the battle front and efforts in the rear areas were guided by a unified body -- the State Defense Committee, through General Headquarters of the Supreme Command, which was subordinate to it. Direct military leadership was rigidly centralized, with personal responsibility for assigned areas and the granting of reasonable local initiative. Organically deriving from this principle is the Leninist strategic principle of centralization of military leadership.

A skillful combining of the collegial principle and personal responsibility, comprehensiveness and thoroughness with a high degree of flexibility and precision constitute a most important feature of Leninist strategic leadership. Directing the armed conflict, Lenin never made one-man decisions on major items. He conferred with the members of the Central Committee,

People's Commissars, listened to the opinion of local party and soviet officials, Red Army military and political leaders. All fundamental matters were brought up by him for discussion at party congresses, Central Committee plenary sessions, meetings of the party Central Committee Politburo or Orgburo, as well as joint sessions of the Central Committee Politburo and Orgburo.

Demonstrating an example of execution of collective decisions by the Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo, Lenin nevertheless always resolutely spoke out against an oversimplified interpretation of the principle of collective leadership and one-man command. He sharply opposed attempts to evade responsibility on the excuse of collective decision-making, and in his definition of one-man command he emphasized not personal authority but rather the personal responsibility of officials of every level for their assigned areas of activity. He stressed time and again that as regards practical supervision over the performance of specific tasks constituting the result of an elaborated collective plan of action, it must be assigned to individuals who are responsible for accomplishment of these tasks, ensuring unity of the will of thousands and tens of thousands of persons for achievement of the stated goal, subordinating their will to the will of one person.

A most important principle of Leninist strategic leadership is comprehensive consideration and utilization of the objective laws of war, the nation's political, economic and military potential. Of course one cannot limit oneself to an evaluation of one's own potential and that of the enemy. It is also necessary to secure a change in potential in one's own favor, to predict the development of events, to make decisions promptly and to implement them unswervingly.

Not only multimillion-man armies, but entire nations participate in modern wars. Lines of demarcation between front and rear are effaced. Therefore a thorough understanding of the decisive role of the masses in war and the direct relationship between victory and morale of army and people is also an important fundamental point. Lenin constantly reminded Red Army commanders and political workers of the necessity of more extensively utilizing the productive activity of fighting men, maintaining their morale at the highest level. He stated that success in war is impossible without a conscious soldier and sailor of initiative.

The Communist Party always attached great importance to observance of this principle. A high morale of army and nation was the source of mass heroism by military personnel during the Great Patriotic War and successful efforts to defeat the enemy.

One of the most important Leninist principles of strategic leadership is intelligent employment of the basic demands of the art of war. We have already discussed in this article elaboration of the principles of Soviet art of war, particularly strategy, and how Lenin skillfully utilized its fundamental principles in directing the rout of the interventionists and White Guards. Therefore we should like to direct the reader's attention to the following.

Lenin considered organization of verification of execution of adopted decisions and plans a most important condition for successful leadership. Absence of verification in military affairs, he stated in a letter to S. I. Gusev in September 1919, is fatal. He vigorously fought inefficiency and irresponsibility, sluggishness and laxity. In addition, he emphasized time and again in his speeches that to guide and direct means not only seeing a specific situation but also its strategic prospects. He patiently and persistently taught administrative and executive cadres the ability to determine the most important items, not to set about a great many tasks simultaneously, but to determine the most important of the tasks and firmly execute that task to the end, utilizing all available resources and supported by the masses.

Military leaders who worked for years with Vladimir Il'ich stated that during the Civil War years the Leninist style of armed forces direction and guidance contained all elements essential for success: amazing swiftness of situation orientation, precision of instructions, careful stock-taking of the enemy's forces, resources and character of operations. At the same time he did not omit a single detail which could affect the outcome of an operation. It was quite obvious that Lenin was the center of direction of all our operations at the battle front; he mobilized the worker masses, assigned men to the fronts and gave exhaustive instructions to the command echelon pertaining to the immediate and subsequent tasks of each given front.

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The military theory legacy and the practical activities of V. I. Lenin during the civil war years comprise that foundation on which Soviet military strategy rests. It has gone through half a century of development and in the course of savage struggle with our homeland's enemies on the battlefields of war has demonstrated its superiority over the strategy of the imperialist aggressors.

V. I. Lenin's theses are just as significant today, and they continue to comprise the foundation of Soviet military strategy and art of war as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. I. Kalinin: Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva (Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland), Gospolitizdat, 1945, page 15.
2. V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka. Sbornik materialov yubileynoy voyenno-nauchnoy konferentsii (V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science. Collected Materials of the Jubilee Military Scientific Conference), Voyenizdat, 1970, page 107.
3. We are referring primarily to the following titles: L. I. Brezhnev: Leninskym kursem (Following a Leninist Course), Volume 2, Politizdat, 1970; A. Grechko: "Devotion to Lenin's Behests on Defense of the Homeland," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sил, No 7, 1970; A. Yepishev: "Leninist Principles of Party Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces," Voyennaya Mysl', No 4, 1970; S. Ivanov: "V. I. Lenin -- Ingenious Military Thinker and Military Commander" (same as above); V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka..., op.cit.; K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik trudov Akademii GSh (In Honor of the Lenin Birth Centennial. Collection of Studies by the General Staff Academy), 1970; V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily (V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces), Second Edition, Voyenizdat, 1969; Voyenno-teoreticheskiye problemy v trudakh V. I. Lenina i ikh znachenije dla ukrepleniya oboronospособности sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva (Problems of Military Theory in the Writings of V. I. Lenin and Their Significance for Strengthening the Defense Capability of the Socialist State), Izd. VIA im. F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, 1970; V. I. Lenin i voyennaya istoriya (V. I. Lenin and Military History), Voyenizdat, 1970; Pod rukovodstvom Lenina, pod znamenem yego idey (Under Lenin's Guidance, under the Banner of His Ideas), Izd. VVITKU, 1970; Yu. I. Korablev: V. I. Lenin i sozdaniye Krasnoy Armii (V. I. Lenin and Establishment of the Red Army), Izd-vo Nauka, 1970; V. I. Lenin i sovremennyye voyenno-ekonomicheskiye i ekonomicheskiy problemy (V. I. Lenin and Contemporary Military-Economic and Economic Problems), Izd. VIA im. F. E. Dzerzhinskogo, 1970.
4. This problem is discussed in the following articles: M. Zakharov: "Soviet Military Science During the Great Patriotic War," Voyennaya Mysl', No 5, 1970; S. Ivanov: "V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Strategy," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sил, No 8, 1970; N. Lomov: "V. I. Lenin, Founder of Soviet Military Strategy," in: V. I. Lenin i voyennaya istoriya; M. Povaliy: "Politics and Military Strategy," Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1970; V. Zemskov: "Wars of the Modern Era," Voyennaya Mysl', No 5, 1969; N. Ponomarev: "Leninist Principles of Classification of Wars and the Present Day," in: Sbornik Trudov Akademii im. M. V. Frunze (Collected Papers of the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze), No 114, 1970.

5. Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1970, page 19.
6. Ibid., page 11.
7. In addition to the specified items, this problem is also discussed in the following articles: V. Zemskov: "Characteristic Features of Contemporary Wars and Possible Methods of Waging Them," Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1969; I. Pavlovskiy: "Maneuver of Men and Equipment in the Strategic Offensive," Voyennaya Mysl', No 12, 1969; M. Kir'yan: "V. I. Lenin on the Innovative Approach to Forms and Methods of Combat Operations," in: Sb. Trudov Akademii im. M. V. Frunze, No 114, 1970; V. Reznichenko: "V. I. Lenin on Means and Methods of Warfare" (same as above).
8. This problem was examined to one degree or another in the previously-listed studies and articles. We might add the following articles to this list: B. Ryabukhin and M. Radugin: "V. I. Lenin Leads the Defense of the Soviet State," Voyennyy Vestnik, No 5, 1970; V. Petrenko: "V. I. Lenin and Soviet Art of War," in Sb. Trudov Akademii im. M. V. Frunze, No 114, 1970; I. Glebov: "Soviet Operational Art During the Great Patriotic War," in: Sb. Trudov Akademii GSh 25 Let Velikoy pobedy 1945-1970 (Collection of Papers of the General Staff Academy, 25th Anniversary of the Great Victory, 1945-1970), 1970.
9. K 100-letiyu so dnya..., op.cit., page 40.
10. This problem was not examined in 1970 as a separate, independent topic. Its individual aspects were discussed in the following articles: S. P. Ivanov: "Leninist Foundations of Soviet Military Strategy," in: Sb. Trudov Akademii GSh..., op.cit.; K. Dzelauskov: "Manpower Resources in Today's War," Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1969.
11. S. P. Ivanov: "Leninist Foundations of Soviet Military Strategy," in: Sb. Trudov Akademii GSh..., op.cit.
12. Kommunist, No 3, 1969. page 22.
13. For a more detailed investigation of this problem we can recommend the following materials. M. Zakharov: "Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces," Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 5, 1970; A. Iovlev: V. I. Lenin o voyennykh i rakh armii novogo tipa (V. I. Lenin on Military Cadres in the Army of the New Type), Izd. TsDSA, 1970; A. Il'in: "V. I. Lenin and the Troops of the Petrograd Garrison During the Struggle for the Socialist Revolution," in: Pod rukovodstvom Lenina, pod znamenem yego idey, op.cit.; P. Ivanov: "V. I. Lenin's Scientific Elaboration of Theory of Armed Forces Control," in: Sb. Trudov Akademii im. M. V. Frunze, op.cit., No 114, 1970; V. Kondrashov: "Leninist Style

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THE SCIENTIFICALLY SUBSTANTIATED STYLE FOR THE
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY OF MILITARY CADRES

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The necessity of improving the style of leadership of social processes in general and troop control in particular is dictated primarily by the growing scale and complexity of the tasks involved in creating a new society, as well as by the rapid development of scientific and technical progress and, as a consequence, weapons. This is also necessitated by a rise in the political activeness of the masses, by the development of socialist democracy, by the rise in the cultural level of all the population and the men of the Soviet Army and Navy, by involving constantly new masses of workers in managing the affairs of society, and by the growing social responsibility of each person for the cause of defending the victories of socialism. It is also essential to consider the exacerbation of international tension, the growth of the aggressiveness of imperialism, and the necessity of sharply raising the combat readiness of all the branches and arms of the Soviet Armed Forces. Finally, it is also essential to consider the most acute ideological struggle surrounding the problems of management and managerial activity itself between the supporters of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the representatives of the various schools and currents of both bourgeois philosophy and sociology as well as of rightist and "leftist" opportunism.

Great attention was given to management questions at the 24th CPSU Congress.

The Essence and Content of the Style of Managerial Activity

The science of social management, in playing a most important role in raising the effectiveness of the entire leadership process, cannot, however, provide a ready-made solution or formula for every instance of life. It serves as the basic initial principle in concrete managerial activities. It is possible to embody the various provisions, principles and recommendations elaborated by it only in using the corresponding procedures, methods and means in practice. With reason F. Engels emphasized that the individual is judged not only in terms of what he does, but also in terms of how he does it. In the process of the most complex types of practical activities both by individuals and by social collectives there is formed an entire aggregate of regularly linked procedures, methods and means of activity.

The control of various spheres of social life as well as the military and daily activities of the troops is an extremely complex process. In the course of managerial activities one or another style is formed, and this

operates as an instrument or as the most important factor in the entire control process. This is the active side of control theory, that is, the unique "managerial style" of an individual leader or the entire managerial body. The principles for managing various social systems and subsystems as well as the entire control process are manifested and concretized precisely in this.

In social life it is sometimes possible to observe that the most rational management principles are embodied in the process of managerial activities using obsolete procedures, methods and means. And this leads to a disruption of the unity, and to a discrepancy between progressive management principles and the developing style of managerial activity. This is why, in our view, it is essential to consider the presence of a dialectical tie between control theory and style, and to constantly improve both these aspects of the single control process.

By a scientifically sound style of managerial activity for Soviet military personnel, one understands an integrated and naturally related system of the most efficient procedures, methods and means which make it possible to achieve optimum results in the process of controlling the daily and combat activities of the troops.

The essence of a scientifically sound style of managerial activity for Soviet cadres is determined by the historical universal role of the working class and its party in the social transformation of human society, and by the rise in the party's role in the course of building communism in our nation. The Marxist dialectical method and its revolutionary critical spirit lie at the basis of a scientific style of managerial activity.

In a class society any leader, including a military one, is viewed as the representative and expresser of the interests of the ruling class. Under the conditions of the complete and final victory of socialism, of the established sociopolitical and ideological unity of society, the leader expresses the interests of the entire people.

In managing one or another sphere of society's life, the leader, thus, cannot help but express the ideological and political line of his class. Hence, concrete ideological and political traits are above all inherent to the style of his managerial activities.

The leader is an organizer. He is involved with collectives of people, and with different types of machinery, equipment, and control technology. This imposes a specific impression on his activities and requires from him professional knowledge, skills, and the ability to unite, unify and lead people.

This aspect of a management style can be characterized by definite professional and organizing traits.

One of the basic objects of control are the people unified into collectives with their ideas, views, interests, goals, moral standards, and psychological and moral qualities. In turn, the leader himself possesses completely definite qualities and properties. Hence, in the process of control it is impossible to avoid using various moral and psychological means of action.

Thus, inherent to the style of managerial activities are three most important groups of traits: ideological-political, professional-organizational, and moral-psychological.

Among the ideological-political traits, one would put: the profound mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory by the leaders, their communist ideological loyalty, their organic tie with the masses, and reliance on their experience and knowledge. The professional-organizational features include: a scientific approach, perspicacity and efficiency in work, the selection and placement of personnel in terms of their professional and political qualities, effective control and checks on execution, efficiency and purposefulness. Such moral and volitional qualities as responsiveness, simplicity, humility, accessibility, justness, independence, executive ability, decisiveness, firmness and flexibility, exactingness and others comprise the content of the third group.

Certainly, style is not merely the arithmetical total of the listed traits, but rather their naturally related system. In the process of leading one or another sphere of society's vital activities, they (the traits) are manifested not individually, but rather in a dialectical unity, as a single whole. In the course of controlling the daily and combat training life of the troops, the concrete embodiment of these traits has its specific features and peculiarities.

The style of managerial activity must be viewed not as permanently fixed, unchanging procedures, forms and methods of control, but rather as a dialectically developing process which depends upon the effect of new objective and subjective conditions. The development of various types of weapons and military equipment, and particularly the arming of the Soviet Army and Navy with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, various types of missiles and automatic control equipment have had a decisive effect upon changing the style of military leadership.

The major revolutionary changes which have occurred in the development of weapons, military equipment and combat support technology have led to the development of new methods and forms for conducting armed combat. The dynamic nature and speed of combat have also risen. There is a modern

ring to the words of F. Engels: "... when the waves of a technical revolution are crashing around one ... fresher, bolder heads are needed..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol 22, p 395).

In our Armed Forces there has been a qualitative change in the personnel contingent, the cultural and educational level of the soldiers and officers has risen and initiative and creativity are more widely manifested in their service activities. At present there has been a sharp rise in the role of the organizational capabilities of military leaders. As never before there must be the ability to work with people, to unite them in a strong military collective and to achieve a high level of organization, unfailing efficiency and aware discipline. All of this objectively confronts the officer personnel with the task of elaborating new, more rational procedures, forms and methods of managerial activity based on the recent achievements of scientific thought and to purposefully introduce them into the practices of troop leadership. "...In our century of the greatest technical progress and the rapid development of military affairs," said L. I. Brezhnev, "military personnel should not stand still in their growth. Anyone who thinks he can live by the old knowledge and experience of the past may end up unable to solve the problems of troop control in a modern manner."¹

The Embodiment of the Basic Traits of a Leadership Style in the Managerial Activities of Military Personnel

The Soviet military leader is not only a good military specialist who knows military science and is able to control equipment skillfully, but also a sociopolitical leader who is armed with progressive Marxist-Leninist ideology and culture, the creator and defender of the new socialist and communist way of life, and the champion of party and government policy in the armed forces.

The fundamental qualitative difference between the officers of a socialist army and the officer corps of bourgeois armies is found in their communist ideological loyalty and close tie with the masses of men and in serving the ideals of communism. "Communist ideological content," the Accountability Report to the 23d CPSU Congress stressed, "is the source of strength for our cadres and of their steadfastness in carrying out party policy."² This provision applies totally to military personnel.

Communist ideological content as a style trait includes avowed loyalty to Marxist-Leninist ideas, faithfulness to the cause of communism and the socialist motherland, unceasing practical activities to carry out the great ideals of the Communist Party and the working class, and a readiness to devote one's life to their interests and goals.

Communist ideological content presupposes a profound understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory, a critical attitude toward one's own activities and the activities of subordinates, a unity of word and deed, loyalty to party principles, and the ability firmly and consistently to defend the Marxist-Leninist ideology and party policy.

We live in a dynamic revolutionary age of the collapse of the capitalist world and under the conditions of an acute struggle between two world sociopolitical systems. Without mastering Marxist-Leninist theory it is impossible to analyze the complex phenomena of social life, to correctly explain what is happening, and to predict the future.

But a study of Marxist-Leninist theory is not an end in itself and cannot be reduced to studying only theoretical formulas and theses. Only when communist ideological content takes hold of a person and merges with his feelings and will does it become the superior regulator of the ebullient energy of the leader. Marxist-Leninist ideological content evokes optimism, courage, tenacity, purposefulness and decisiveness which are so essential for a military leader.

The high ideological content of a commander presupposes a unity of word and deed, of thought and action. V. I. Lenin stressed that when one's word differs from one's action, this is already quite bad. The Resolution of the 23d CPSU Congress pointed out that a unity of word and deed should be a law in the activities of each communist and each leading worker.

Certainly this demand applies fully to the activities of any military leader. This demand is manifested primarily in the attitude of the leader to the assigned job, to performing his immediate service duties, and to improving his military-technical and special knowledge. It is manifested in his conduct, in all the cultural and moral makeup of the commander, in his dignity and honor, and in his ability not only to work with enthusiasm, but also to inspire and spark others. In the daily life of a commander his ideological loyalty is also tested by his actual effectiveness in carrying out the plans for military and political training, in organizing the training and indoctrination activities of his subordinates, and in supervising the execution of the requirements of the military regulations.

Loyalty to party principles is another important element of ideological content and is the nucleus or core of it. This is a quality of a leader which requires the approach to solving any question or to carrying out any matter from a standpoint of the interests of the state, the people, and the party.

To be principled means to be able openly and directly to give a correct political assessment of the facts and events of military life and to wage a merciless struggle against complacency and conceit as well as against weaknesses and oversimplification in training the personnel. A truly

principled officer would never allow a distortion of the facts or compromise with his conscience. He clearly appraises what is beneficial for the military training of the personnel and what causes harm.

The attitude of a leader toward criticism is the barometer of communist principles. There is no such thing as an infallible person, and a military leader, no matter how wise and experienced he might be, can also make a mistake. True wisdom is found in the ability to understand one's mistakes and to correct them. No commander can be immune to criticism. "The leaders of the workers are not angels," said V. I. Lenin, "they are not saints or heroes, but are people like everyone else. They make mistakes. The party corrects them" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 21, p 409).

Principledness means a consistent struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist ideas and a struggle against bourgeois ideology. This is particularly important under modern conditions when a rabid offensive is being waged against the USSR and the socialist community by bourgeois ideology in all its forms.

Among the traits which characterize the professional-organizational activities of military personnel, particular attention should be given to a scientific approach and efficiency.

Our age, an age of the greatest scientific discoveries and technical progress, moves the mental activities of people to the forefront. In comparison with all the previous periods of human history the role and significance of scientific knowledge of all levels of leaders, as well as their general educational and cultural viewpoint, have risen immeasurably high. Without science, V. I. Lenin taught, it is impossible to organize a modern army. At present this demand has grown immeasurably.

A scientific approach to troop control under present conditions is possible, in the first place, only on the basis of a profound knowledge of the basic provisions of Marxist-Leninist theory and a clear understanding of the laws of social development and the principles of armed combat. Marxist-Leninist theory makes it possible for the military leader not only to understand the events and phenomena of the present correctly, but also to foresee their development in the future and to understand and analyze the problems of modern war and the methods and forms of conducting it. It also helps to determine the shortest ways for achieving victory over the enemy.

A scientific approach to solving the most important problems of troop control means, secondly, a thorough and objective assessment of the situation in the combined units, units, subunits, and the possession of accurate and true information. "...In not closing one's eyes to the truth," said V. I. Lenin, "the most accurate reading of the situation can be achieved" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 36, p 366).

In speaking about the truthfulness of information, it is essential to stress the particular importance of the accuracy of service reports and documents on the situation in the units, as well as on conducted exercises or cruises. It often happens that the reports of the inferior chiefs to the superior staffs and military elements are sufficiently objective and complete if it is a question of positive advances in military training and service, but they suffer from omissions and inaccuracies when it is a question of failures, shortcomings and oversights.

There are many channels for obtaining complete and objective information. These include service reports, documents, meetings, seminars, conferences, personal contact with leaders, and so forth. In recent years applied military psychological research has developed widely for obtaining various types of information.

For troop control not only objectivity but also timeliness of information is very important. Of great help in this regard are the widely introduced office equipment, modern communications, radar, television, automatic data collecting, processing and storage systems, and particularly computers. "The use of electronic computers," pointed out A. N. Kosygin in his report at the 24th CPSU Congress, "will make it possible to accelerate the receiving and processing of data, to work out various plan versions and to find the optimum planning solutions."

A scientific approach, thirdly, is inconceivable without relying on the conclusions and recommendations of the social and natural sciences, the knowledge of various specialists, and the experience of practical workers. There can be no question of a scientific approach if the people engaged in directing a certain aspect of social life are incompetent in this and do not have sufficient special education and practical experience. The report of A. N. Kosygin emphasized the necessity "...to consistently broaden and improve the system of training and retraining managerial personnel on all levels, including the highest leadership ... to learn how to manage in a modern way on the basis of a profound mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory, the theory and practice of control, the scientific organization of labor..."

The officers, generals and admirals who understand the significance of a scientific approach to solving practical tasks do not try to take over for the specialists or show disrespect for their knowledge and recommendations. V. I. Lenin repeatedly said: "It is essential to learn humility and respect for the professionals' work of the 'scientific and technical specialists' and for this we must learn to make an efficient and careful analysis of our numerous practical stakes as well as the correcting of them..." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 42, p 347).

The military leader should be able to unite, combine, spark and attract the best prepared specialist officers by a specific idea or general goal and be able to develop their energy and endeavor in work. He should adhere to the rules so that all his deputies, assistants and staff officers have an opportunity to make independent decisions on questions relating to their duties, and this means to decide and not merely to report.

Fourthly, a scientific approach entails the ability to promptly spot, support and introduce all that is new and advanced into the practices of troop control. A feeling for the new in the work of the military cadres assumes particularly important significance under the conditions of the occurring military and technical revolution. And here it is not a question of the outright negation or discarding of old generally accepted methods of troop leadership which have been tested out by combat and practical experience. Here a feeling of moderation is particularly essential. Certainly it is only possible to introduce something new and to progress with its aid, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "...after the completely proven benefit of a particular method, a particular control system, a particular proportion, a particular selection of people, and so forth" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 42, pp 285-226). This Leninist thesis strikes directly at those who still are fond of proclaiming any proposal or initiative as "valuable," in hiding behind loud proclamations about introducing something new, and without being concerned with a careful study of its utility and necessity.

A scientific approach presupposes, finally, a profound knowledge and strict observance of the requirements of the military regulations, instructions, orders and directives in organizing the entire process of troop training and indoctrination. These documents generalize the very rich experience of the last war and they give scientifically based ways and methods for making the most rational use of the combat capabilities of modern equipment and weapons.

Of course, it is very important to apply a scientific approach to examining all questions, compiling plans and making decisions, but it is equally important to be able to implement them. Without this, Leninist efficiency in work is impossible.

Leninist efficiency presupposes effective and creative organizational activities in carrying out the decisions and plans approved by the party and the government, the conscientious and precise fulfillment of party duty, the overcoming of any obstacles on the way to the goal, and the completion of the started undertaking. It is the ability to give orders, to unite people, to allocate one's time thoughtfully and efficiently to concentrate on the main thing without overlooking details, to seek out

effective ways and means for implementing the designated plans, to select and place people and to organize an actual check on their work. True efficiency has nothing in common with subjectivism or voluntarism, or with sheer practicalism or utility. It is in a close dialectical tie with the prospective aims and the ability to scientifically forecast the activities of the combined units and units.

Efficiency envisages precision and a cultural bearing in work. Management, V. I. Lenin wrote, should proceed from an achieving of the greatest economy of forces and the most productive use of the people's labor. At present all branches of our armed forces are equipped with various types of computers making it possible to raise significantly the efficiency of the entire control process. For this reason the effectiveness of managerial activities depends substantially upon how intelligently the military leader is able to employ the office equipment and other control devices. A scientifically based use of the most modern technical control devices greatly accelerates the carrying out of operational and tactical calculations, it increases their accuracy, and substantially raises the quality of the commander's work. However, regardless of the truly enormous possibilities of the automated systems, computers, and other advanced control devices, discussion of them can be entirely pointless if the labor of the men engaged in this control is not effectively organized.

Correct relations between the commander and the staff or another military organization are of great significance for effectiveness in the work of the military leader. It is very important that relations of full confidence, mutual aid and cooperation are established between the personnel of the military control element and the commander (superior).

At present, as never before, the question of improving the work of the staffs, political departments, and individuals are being given the most serious attention. And here much that is useful has already been done. A strict schedule for working time has been established on the staffs, and a strict functional control has been introduced for the personnel of the management elements. The work areas of the specialist officers have been better equipped, network planning methods are widely used on the staffs and other bodies, the most efficient ways for training and indoctrinating the personnel are being sought out everywhere, and so forth. And the most important principle of scientific organization of labor is being carried out in practice: no higher skilled worker should perform a job which can be performed by a specialist of lower skills.

However, it must be pointed out that this rule is not always completely carried out everywhere. There still are instances of excessive paper work, and certain generals and officers still cannot refrain from constant interference in carrying out simple technical measures and endeavoring to

do everything themselves. As a result, in wasting time on secondary matters they overlook important ones which no one else can resolve. In certain units there still is the practice of taking over for the junior commanders, as well as elements of interference and overcautiousness by superiors.

The efficiency of a military leader is also expressed in the ability to isolate the main and basic thing in work, and to determine the decisive element. For this it is essential to have a good knowledge of the nature of the tasks to be carried out by the unit or subunit in each stage of training, the actual state of the level of combat and special training, the quality of the maintenance and readiness of the equipment, weapons and materiel, the level of organization and discipline of the personnel, as well as the degree of coordination and training of each subunit. And it is only after profound and thorough analysis of the situation in the subunits, on a ship, or in a unit that it is essential to focus all one's efforts and the efforts of the staff and the political body on carrying out the most important tasks which determine the successful execution of all the rest.

The ability to see the main and basic thing and to focus the maximum of one's efforts on carrying it out in no way means the neglect of secondary matters. In this area it is essential to observe a feeling of balance, otherwise the so-called "details" become an impediment for successful development. Talented leaders always keep an eye both on the whole and its parts.

The ability to give orders to subordinates and state one's aim briefly, simply, clearly and accurately has a substantial effect upon efficiency in the work of military personnel. Complexity, ambiguity of wording, and the possibility of a varying interpretation of individual parts of orders and instructions often lead to confusion and harm. The clarity of expressing one's thoughts is of inestimable significance in troop control.

To a significant degree efficiency also depends upon a correctly organized system of control over the activities of the personnel.

V. I. Lenin saw the key to the entire matter in the selection of personnel and in checking and supervising their work. In studying Lenin's works and his numerous letters and telegrams to military leaders and military councils during the years of the Civil War, one constantly encounters the demand to strengthen control over the activities of the military organizations and individual persons. Lenin wrote, that along with decrees and organization, the selection of personnel and the establishing of individual responsibility for what was to be done, there had to be a careful "check on the actual

work. Otherwise we cannot escape from the bureaucracy and red tape which is stifling us" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 44, p 370).

Lenin's instructions on the continuity of control and checks on execution are important for the entire process of troop leadership. Only in the course of supervising the activities of people engaged in troop control is it possible to establish with sufficient accuracy the strong and weak points of their work, to quickly find ways for eliminating shortcomings, and to create conditions for the development of each military leader.

In such work control is not an end in itself, but rather a means for correctly using people. For this reason it should not be sporadic or a mere campaign, but rather a constant element of leadership. Here the check should be carried out not only on the weak, inexperienced or negligent persons, but also on the capable and industrious leaders, in order to more fully utilize their positive experience and to spread it among others, thereby providing help to the lagging persons. In the reports and the speeches of the delegates to the 24th CPSU Congress, a great deal of attention was paid to the necessity of strengthening control and checks on execution. Comrade A. N. Kosygin stressed that an important role "in raising the responsibility of each worker for the assigned job should be played by well-organized checks on execution."

Thus, the efficiency of a military leader is expressed in all-round and profound knowledge of the assigned job, in the ability to locate the main and basic thing, in a high cultural level, precision and efficiency in work. It has nothing in common with sheer practicalism.

Closely related to the professional-organizational group of traits are the moral and volitional traits in the work style of military personnel. They have always played an important role; under modern conditions these traits have assumed particular significance.

The volitional activities of a commander are manifested by his personal volitional qualities which represent an involved complex. Among these qualities, adequately reflected in the work style of military personnel, one can include: independence and initiative decisiveness, tenacity, stubbornness, and firmness, exactingness and responsiveness, control and self-possession.

The conditions of modern war are such that in the course of combat a situation may develop where an individual unit or even a combined unit, ship, or airplane crew may become separated and lose contact with the superior command and adjacent units. Knowing the overall situation and the aim of the combat operations, the commander will be required to make an independent decision without instructions from above, since waiting and

passivity in modern combat are tantamount to defeat. For this reason at present independence and initiative on the part of all commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians, without exception, assume decisive significance.⁴

At the same time the manifestation of independence and initiative in no way means that it is possible to act contrary to the instructions and orders of superior chiefs. Unwarranted willfulness and nonexecution of duty are completely intolerable. Under modern conditions Lenin's instruction that it is impossible to be victorious over the enemy and increase the defense capability of our state without extreme efficiency has acquired particular timeliness.

In viewing independence and execution as traits in the work style of a commander in the process of troop control we should see their dialectical unity, their interpenetration, interaction and reciprocal causality.

Although the independence of a commander is manifested within the limits of carrying out the received order or instructions, at the same time it allows a creative approach to their very execution. Thus, independence, as an attribute of style, leads to creative execution. In turn, efficient execution mobilizes the knowledge and experience of the commander and causes him to choose the optimum decision from all possible variations. Ultimately this leads to independent, creative and enterprising execution. Independence and initiative without execution become their opposite, that is, petty bourgeois anarchy and arbitrariness.

Independence and initiative are equally essential in the daily activities of the commander in the area of leading the combat training of the troops. They are most clearly manifested in his elaboration of new and original methods, procedures and forms for conducting combat on land, in the air, and at sea. Undoubtedly, in the independent actions of commanders in the course of leading the daily activities of the troops, failures are also possible, but "it is easier to correct the mistake now," stressed Mar SU A. A. Grechko, "than later on to pay the price of helplessness in war."⁵

Independence is always closely related to decisiveness, risk, and daring. Decisiveness is the ability to come up with and make scientifically based decisions without excessive delay and to carry them out quickly and confidently in the practical actions of the troops.

The very specifics of armed combat are such that no matter how well a military leader is able to foresee and no matter how accurately he has figured everything out, unforeseen situations and unpredicted circumstances can always arise requiring decisive actions from him. For this reason today's commanders should be doubly and triply more decisive than was the case even in the recent past.

Decisiveness, like independence, is based upon profound and sound military knowledge. It is the result of the mobility and rapidity of the commander's thinking and is more often observed when he has experience in leading the troops. Decisiveness has nothing in common with rashness, precipitancy, or adventurism. The regulations of the USSR Armed Forces require our commanders to act decisively. They directly state that a commander should be reprimanded if he shows indecisiveness, if he is idle and does not use every opportunity for achieving success in combat. A commander of the Soviet Army should be daring, he should be decisive and bold, and take a risk for the sake of achieving victory over the enemy. A commander's exactingness is organically related to the decisiveness and tenacity in the style of his work.

The constant combat readiness of the troops presupposes effective use of the modern military equipment and weapons. For this, precise and strictly coordinated efforts are required by a large number of persons. Under these conditions the role of a commander's exactingness grows immeasurably as the organizing principle for leadership activities. The exactingness of a commander is objectively conditioned by the requirements of controlling people in such a specific sphere of activity as the military.

In and of itself the exactingness of a commander toward his subordinates is simultaneously concern for their becoming real masters of military affairs as well as strong, steadfast and courageous soldiers able to achieve victory over the enemy under any conditions. Exactingness is an obligation of each commander. "The interests of defending the motherland oblige a superior decisively and firmly to require the observance of military discipline and order," state the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Exactingness is based upon the regulations. It should be constant, just, and extend to all subordinates. Here it is essential that exactingness directed toward subordinates be combined with exactingness toward oneself and with a sympathetic attitude toward the men. Exactingness presupposes confidence which encourages the development of a person's capabilities and his creative activeness.

A military leader who possesses such traits as independence, decisiveness, exactingness and tenacity in achieving the set aims is capable of overcoming the most difficult obstacles on the path to victory. "Once we prepare any army for decisive combat against major and serious enemies," said M. V. Frunze, "our units should be headed by persons who possess sufficient independence, firmness, initiative and responsibility. We should have commanders who would not become lost in any situation, who could quickly make the appropriate decision, bearing responsibility for all its consequences, and firmly carry it out."⁶

Ways for Improving the Style of Managerial Activity of Military Cadres

Analysis of the content of the basic traits in the style of management activities for military personnel convincingly shows their effect on the efficiency of the entire process of controlling the daily and combat activities of troops.

What are the ways for improving the work style of the commanders and chiefs?

First of all, it must be emphasized that a profound and complete study of Marxist-Leninist theory by military personnel and their indoctrination in a spirit of communist conviction are the main condition for developing and improving a truly scientific style of work. High communist ideological content and conviction are developed in Soviet military personnel primarily by socialist reality in itself, by the unstinting and creative labor of our people in building a new society, as well as by the intense combat training, tactical exercises, sea cruises, and the entire Army and Navy way of life. And this in no way excludes, but on the contrary, presupposes purposeful and creative work by the commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations in making each commander aware of all forms of socialist ideology.

The basic method for mastering Marxist-Leninist theory is independent work on the writings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and sociopolitical literature. "Without a certain amount of independent work," V. I. Lenin taught, "it is impossible to find the truth for any major question, and anyone who is afraid of work deprives himself of the opportunity to find the truth" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 23, p 68). Without knowledge of the truth, it is impossible to develop firm and stable convictions.

Of important significance for improving the work style of the officers is a systematic rise in their military and special knowledge and in military pedagogical and psychological skills. Sound knowledge develops a commander's conviction, bearing, decisiveness, independence and initiative. A knowledgeable officer can better foresee the results of his activities and more precisely determine the type of actions under various specific conditions.

Mar SU P. K. Koshevoy very clearly and aptly said about the role of knowledge for a commander's activities: "Knowledge multiplied by experience can serve as a source of initiative and daring. This is precisely what distinguishes all talented artists from hacks, and makes it possible for the commander in the course of combat to create an impressive canvas of victory."⁷

Carefully prepared and regularly held exercises on the terrain, tactical quizzes, practical training in driving vehicles and tanks or in steering a ship, as well as practical work on tactical and strategic calculations have a beneficial effect upon developing a scientifically sound style of management activities. In the process of combat training and during the conduct of group exercises and command post exercises it is essential to make wider use of simple office equipment, sound recording equipment, loud-speaker systems, as well as stationary and portable computer equipment.

It is impossible to become a real commander without developing the necessary qualities by constant exercise. Self indoctrination plays a major role here. To be concerned with self indoctrination means to analyze one's work systematically and critically honestly and sincerely to disclose the causes of failures, shortcomings and mistakes, and to assess correctly the activities of the directed collective. It is essential to develop in oneself the habits of precision, organization, mobility and tenacity, and to get rid of such failings as verbosity, rashness, and short-temperedness..

An important factor for improving the work style of command personnel is a rise in their overall cultural level and erudition. Inherent to a majority of our officers is a constant desire to improve their cultural viewpoint, to become familiar with the most recent literature, movies, theater productions, and so forth. A constant and systematic reading of military philosophical articles and artistic literature, attending the theater and movies, and an interest in music and poetry are a sort of gymnastics and training helping to develop the dialectics of the mind, as well as flexibility and breadth of thinking. In this regard of interest is the statement by the great natural scientist C. Darwin. "...If I had to live my life again," he wrote at the end of his life, "I would set for myself the rule to read a certain amount of poetry and listen to a certain amount of music at least once a week; possibly, by such (constant) exercise, I would be able to maintain the activity of those parts of my brain which have now atrophied. The loss of these tastes is tantamount to the loss of happiness, and, possibly, reflects harmfully on mental capabilities and, even more probably, on moral qualities."⁸

A remarkable school for improving the work style of command personnel is their active involvement in the life of the party and Komsomol organizations. Under modern conditions the forms for the participation of command personnel in political indoctrination have become much more diverse and richer in content. The leading officers give lectures and hold theoretical colloquiums, seminars for the officer personnel, and political classes.

The achieving of a unity of organizational and ideological work, reliance on the initiative and creative forces of the party and Komsomol organization and the entire military collective, as well as the propagandizing

and creative assimilation of advanced experience are very important conditions for working out a scientific style of work.

A profound study of the work style of and associates such as Ya. M. Sverdlov, M. V. Frunze and others is also an important managerial activity. Officers, generals that is instructive on the theoretical & practical level in studying the activities of the outstanding military leaders of the past and, in particular, the style of troop leadership shown by the Soviet military leaders during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

nin and his closest pupils Dzerzhinskiy, M. I. Kalinin, le source for improving admirals can also gain much

FOOTNOTES

1. Pravda, 2 July 1966.
2. Materialy XXIII s"yezda KPSS (Materials of the 23d CPSU Congress), Politizdat, 1966, p 90.
3. Omitted in source.
4. M. V. Zakharov, O nauchnom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskami (On the Scientific Approach to Troop Leadership), Voyenizdat, 1967, p 15.
5. Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 April 1966.
6. M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Voyenizdat, 1965, p 480.
7. Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 January 1967.
8. Charles Darwin, Vospominaniya o razvitiu moyego umia i kharaktera. Avtobiografiya (Memoirs on the Development of My Mind and Character. An Autobiography), Izd. AN ASSR, 1957, p 148.

THE IMPORTANT TASK OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENTS¹

Col Gen I. Shkadov, Chief, Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense USSR

The 24th CPSU Congress emphasized the growing role of science in building communism and the importance of training and indoctrinating skilled scientific cadres as a task of nationwide importance.

Army and navy scientists are making their contribution to Soviet science, promoting the development of military science, helping increase our nation's military strength and assisting in improving arms and methods of conducting combat operations.

Training and indoctrination of a qualified younger generation of scientists is a vital task of military educational institutions and scientific research establishments. It is therefore not surprising that discussion of the problems of training scientific and scientific-education cadres has developed into a broad and lively debate on the pages of the journal Voyennaya Mysl' since an article by Maj Gen P. Yegorov was published in the July issue of last year, entitled "On Graduate Study, Academic Degrees and Rank." The limited scope of this article permits us to discuss only a few fundamental items contained within the debate.

In recent years problems of training scientific and science-teaching cadres have been thoroughly studied and analyzed. The majority of military educational institutions and scientific research establishments have taken part in this effort. On the basis of obtained data the "Statute on Training Scientific and Science-Teaching Cadres in the Ministry of Defense USSR" was drafted and adopted in 1969. Military educational institutions and scientific research establishments are presently guided by this statute.

The Statute also reflects the role of graduate study as one of the basic forms of training scientific cadres for educational institutions and scientific research establishments of the Ministry of Defense. It is therefore natural that participants in the debate have described various aspects of the functioning of graduate study: admission to graduate study, scientific supervision of graduate research, content of graduate training, duty assignment following completion of studies, etc. The opinions expressed are dictated by the times. They will be considered, and acceptable ones will be adopted. One thing is clear: no instructions or guidelines can cover all situations which arise. Graduate study has been developing and is developing, performing its tasks as dictated by

today's demands. It is the duty and obligation of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense as well as that of administrators of military educational institutions and scientific research establishments to keep these demands constantly in mind.

Planning occupies an important place in scientist training. In 1970 5-year plans for training scientific and science-teaching cadres were drafted at all higher educational institutions and scientific research establishments of the Ministry of Defense, which made it possible to determine the scientific personnel requirements of these educational institutions and scientific research establishments and to estimate potential for their training. Planning is conducted not only on the basis of forms of training (military-school graduate study, graduate study, degree candidacy), but also on the basis of branches of science and scientific specialization. Such planning is particularly expedient for enrollment in military graduate programs. Educational institutions and scientific research establishments plan enrollment several years in advance by total number and scientific specialization. The departments and sections are informed in advance how many graduate students are to be selected in each year and in what scientific disciplines. In this way they have time to determine in advance the subject matter of dissertations and to select dissertation advisers. Consequently success is determined now by quality of planning and organization of plan execution.

The graduate study enrollment process is an important aspect of this problem. Experience indicates that graduate study enrollment produces the best results where careful preparatory work is done in the selection of potential candidates.

Three enrollment procedures have now been established.

The first procedure is acceptance to graduate study of officers who have shown a proclivity for scientific research at the undergraduate level and who have done a good job in line units. This matter was discussed in detail by the participants in the debate, and we must agree with their suggestions, including an assessment of the role of the departments, which should follow the development of their students and maintain effective contact with them.

The second procedure is the determination of officers who are capable of and worthy of graduate study. The most serious attention should be focused on this aspect of admissions determination.

In certain cases (on the recommendation of higher educational institution councils) officers who have shown outstanding ability in their studies and an aptitude for scientific research can be accepted to a graduate program immediately upon completing their undergraduate studies.

Thus there is a real possibility of selecting for admission to graduate programs the most capable, promising and morally-politically worthy individuals, with elimination of difficulties in the admissions process.

Selection of officers for graduate study pertains not only to educational institutions and scientific research establishments. Commanders and political officials should also work in this area, determining potential candidates and assisting them in every way to continue their studies.

The graduate study selection process culminates with the competitive entrance examinations, which determine the actual level of preparation of incoming graduate students.

The purpose of candidate examinations in turn is to determine a graduate student's preparedness for scientific research in general and for his dissertation topic in particular. Therefore we cannot agree with those individuals who suggest that entrance examinations and candidate examinations be combined.

The process of fulfilling the minimum requirements for the candidate degree includes a number of elements which must be borne in mind. Competence in a foreign language, study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and advanced study in one's area of specialization constitute a component part of graduate study. A considerable number of even very capable officers in line units (as participants in the debate correctly noted) do not always have an opportunity to prepare for the candidate examinations.

For the same reason the demand that applicants pass candidate examinations before entering a military graduate program is also wrong. The overall results of recent years indicate that each year approximately 35 percent of incoming graduate students are accepted with partially-completed candidate examinations, only 15 percent with completed examinations, while the remaining students pass these examinations during their graduate study.

Of course every encouragement should be given to prior completion of these examinations, since this enables the graduate students to spend more time on scientific research and to acquire teaching experience.

As regards research supervision of service school graduate students, we should like to draw attention to the following: each graduate student is assigned an adviser -- a doctor or professor -- upon admission to a graduate program. Only in a few cases (as an exception) are the most experienced and qualified candidates of science, who have scientific achievements to their credit and teaching experience, assigned as research advisers.

Some individuals have suggested that candidates of science be more extensively utilized as research advisers for military graduate students. In order to train science-teaching and scientific cadres, however, it is advisable primarily to use the most experienced and qualified scientists -- doctors and professors. This is the case in practice, as indicated by the experience of a number of service academies and higher educational institutions.

It was noted in the debate materials that the role of research adviser is an honorable and responsible one. One should approach adviser selection and assignment precisely from this standpoint. Correct procedure is followed by the commandants of military educational institutions and directors of scientific research establishments in commending those research advisers who provide quality training of young scientists.

A careful graduate school enrollment process is the first stage. The second and most important stage is correct organization of graduate study. A guarantee of success in this area is prompt department determination of dissertation topics and selection of research advisers. It is necessary to make sure that military educational institution and scientific research establishment councils approve research topics no later than 2 or 3 months after graduate students begin their studies. There is no justification for delay in settling this matter.

The content of the graduate student's study program is determined by his individual plan; special attention is focused on the level of theoretical training. In addition to candidate examinations, one would recommend examinations on various areas of mathematics, computer technology, and related sciences.

The rapid development of science demands a higher level of theoretical knowledge on the part of future scientists. Well-founded comments were made in this connection, pertaining to negative elements in this area. They apply first and foremost to inadequate utilization of mathematical methods of investigating the modern engagement and operation. But this offers no basis for such generalizations as are contained in the response article by G. Zakharov. He writes that "theoretical training of military graduate students in their area of specialization has deteriorated in recent years."²

Quite the contrary, in recent years dissertations have solved major scientific and technological problems, utilizing modern research methods. This is indicated by many candidate dissertations written by graduate students at the Higher Engineer Academy imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy, the Naval Academy, and a number of other educational institutions and scientific research establishments.

Much attention has been devoted in this debate to training of graduate students in the area of education.

This is indeed an important matter, one of the most important in graduate study. The graduate student (in addition to research) should also be prepared for teaching. The Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions studied this problem, drew up and sent out last year to educational institutions curriculum programs on the fundamentals of education, science and psychology for graduate students and faculty of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense USSR. Mastery of the fundamentals of education science and psychology by graduate students and enlistment of the services of leading scientists to work with these students will make it possible to raise the level of knowledge of future teachers in the area of education theory and will enable them to acquire practical skills. Positive experience has been amassed in this area by a number of graduate programs, including that at the Military Engineer Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. At this institution theoretical seminars are organized on various problems of education science; graduate students listen to lectures by top methods specialists; demonstration classes are carefully prepared and conducted in a methodologically correct manner. Acquired theoretical knowledge is reinforced in the process of practice teaching.

Of course a finished teacher does not come out of a graduate program. Teacher maturity, as is well known, is preceded by many years of hard work at school and in line units; teaching skills are acquired bit by bit, and are constantly improved. A method of teacher training for graduate students, well-conceived and elaborated on the basis of scientific organization of labor, makes it possible to speed up the process of teacher training. Having solidly mastered the fundamentals of teaching skills, an officer should continuously improve these skills throughout his entire future activity.

During the course of the debate there was considerable discussion about training higher scientific qualification specialists -- doctors of sciences; the difficulties of these complex tasks were noted. The Ministry of Defense makes high demands on training this category of scientist. Topics and detailed outlines of doctoral dissertations must be approved by the appropriate command official upon submission by military educational institution and scientific research establishment councils, with the comments of the organizations in whose interests the research has been planned. This corresponds to the tasks specified in the Directives for the 1971-1975 Five-Year Plan for Development of the Soviet Economy, which state: "Improve planning of scientific research and experimental design projects, specifying in plans all the stages of these projects, including practical adoption of project results... Strengthen the link between science and production."³

The link between dissertation topics and troop routine tasks, armed forces development prospects and adoption of scientific results in practical training and indoctrination should be viewed as an absolute demand dictated by the interests of increasing our national defense capability. The training of scientific cadres by the degree acquisition system is examined from this point of view. An increase in the number of degree candidates presents additional problems connected with organization of their efforts. The scientific council should approve a dissertation topic for each degree candidate and assign a research adviser. We must discuss this matter because there are some problems noted in handling degree candidates; they are not always given the attention they deserve. This form of training scientists has fully proven itself.

The authors of materials published and received after termination of the debate analyze various questions pertaining to the defense of dissertations. The fundamental demands on dissertations are specified in the regulations of the Higher Degree Commission entitled "Procedure for Awarding Academic Degrees and Academic Rank." These regulations specify that doctoral dissertations shall constitute independent research containing theoretical syntheses and solutions to major scientific problems, which make a significant contribution to science and practical needs. Candidate dissertations shall contain new scientific and practical conclusions and recommendations and shall demonstrate the candidate's ability to engage in independent scholarly research as well as his profound theoretical knowledge in the selected area of specialization.

The majority of doctoral and candidate dissertations meet these requirements. At the same time some dissertations contain no new scientific information and are of no practical use. "It is no secret," states the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, "that some scientists are still working on projects which are substantially removed both from the nation's immediate practical needs and from the genuine interests of development of fundamental branches of science. This is wasted effort and should not be tolerated."

Competent and high-principled dissertation evaluation is mandatory for degree-awarding councils. These councils determine the theoretical and practical significance of submitted dissertations and whether or not they meet the specified requirements. Scientific councils must solidly guard the interests of science and be guided by the interests of the state, party and people. The greater the number of council members who are active in the given area of science, the more highly qualified the council's opinion will be.

In all fairness we must say that the councils of educational institutions and scientific research establishments are doing an excellent, useful job of preparing scientific cadres and are being very demanding on those who

submit dissertations, as is attested by the fact that very rarely are their recommendations turned down by the Higher Degree Commission. Every year more and more doctoral and candidate dissertations focus on solving current theoretical and practical problems pertaining to strengthening the armed forces.

It is also gratifying that the research performed by graduate students and degree candidates is carefully analyzed and rigorously but objectively evaluated in departments, at scientific seminars and conferences, that is before they are submitted for defense (the debate failed to cover this important facet of organization of preliminary discussion of degree candidate research and research results).

Statement of the problem of improving the activities of scientific councils is certainly timely and justified: unfortunately some still fail to do everything they could in this area. For example, one scientific council had on its agenda for a single session the question of acceptance of 10 different dissertations. What kind of scientific discussion could there be under these circumstances?

At a number of military higher educational institutions and scientific research establishments, as was noted by the participants in the debate, councils fail to devote suitable attention to the inclusion of representatives of other organizations, and yet the inclusion of such individuals on a council is dictated by the resulting greater objectivity in evaluating dissertations. Therefore representatives of these organizations should always be present during a dissertation defense. A high-quality assessment of a dissertation requires the specified quorum not only of regular council members but of members from outside as well.

An important role in evaluating a dissertation is played by the official opponents. They are appointed by the council and assist it in determining the theoretical and practical significance of problems elaborated in a dissertation. The so-called leading organization determines the usefulness of the research. As a rule qualified authorities and conscientious efforts are designated as official opponents. It is true that there have been occasions when the candidacies of official opponents were not adequately discussed at council meetings (this job is entrusted to the departments and sometimes to the degree candidates), as a result of which persons whose scientific specialization is relatively far from the dissertation topic are appointed as opponents.

An extensive exchange of views also took place in regard to dissertation defense. Defense should be conducted in an atmosphere of productive debate and friendly exactingness. This can be achieved only if all council

members are briefed in advance on the basic research results. The defense procedure takes place in a businesslike and vigorous manner on the councils of the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and others. This cannot be said about the councils of the Military Medical Academy, where frequently debate is lacking even during the defense of doctoral dissertations.

Of course the activities of scientific councils are not limited to dissertation defense. Councils examine dissertation topics, receive reports by research advisers and department chairmen on work with scientific cadres, monitor the activities of degree candidates during the writing of the dissertation, etc.

Elimination of existing shortcomings in the work of the councils will make it possible to improve the training of scientific and science-teaching cadres in the Ministry of Defense USSR.

Efficient placement of scientists is a no less important matter. It is the duty of all those involved in this process to train the scientist and to assign him wherever he will produce maximum benefit. Unfortunately one still encounters cases where after completing graduate study officers are assigned to teach disciplines far from their dissertation topic. Such officers must study the new subject, which naturally places them in a difficult position and slows their development as a teacher. Consequently in planning it is necessary not only to provide for selection of graduate students and area of training specialization, but also their subsequent job assignment.

Specific-area graduate training is extremely promising; this makes it possible to provide military higher educational institutions (lacking their own graduate programs) with excellent scientific-teaching cadres and to concentrate the training of graduate students at establishments possessing qualified scientific manpower and modern research facilities. We shall emphasize that capabilities for specific-purpose training of graduate students are not always fully and efficiently utilized.

The debate included the matter of conferring academic rank. The current procedure of conferring academic rank is specified by Higher Degree Commission regulations and must be strictly followed. Elimination of various shortcomings depends entirely on the activities of the scientific councils.

The party and government are devoting considerable attention to problems of increasing the effectiveness of scientific labor. At the 24th CPSU Congress A. N. Kosygin stated that "future improvement of the effectiveness of scientific research depends on the productive activity of scientific workers. There should also evidently be an improvement in the scientist wage system, which would more substantially reflect the actual contribution

of each scientific worker to the cause of scientific and technological progress. This will promote improvement in the composition of scientific cadres and will help improve research results."⁴

Participants in the debate proposed that the present material incentive system be extended to scientists serving in the troops, headquarters, and the central edifice. These and other suggestions demand careful study.

* * *

The Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress emphasizes that "in an era when the role of science as a direct productive force is being increasingly manifested, not separate scientific achievements, no matter how brilliant they may be, but rather a high scientific and technological level of production as a whole assume primary importance. This imposes increasingly critical tasks upon our science and demands increased effectiveness of science, further development of fundamental research, and concentration of the efforts and attention of scientists on the most important and promising areas..."

The scientists of our Armed Forces must also be guided by these points. Problems addressed in dissertations should be more goal-oriented, of current significance, reflecting the latest achievements of science and technology. Research results must be more rapidly utilized in the interests of strengthening army and navy combat might. This task is being resolved by the entire detachment of military scientists, officers serving in line units, at headquarters and scientific research establishments. One can hardly exaggerate the contribution to science made by efficiency innovators and inventors -- all persons of bold scientific thought.

Life moves ahead; a new generation of scientists is being trained to replace the old guard. In stepping up the efforts of military educational institutions and scientific research establishments involving the selection of the best officers for graduate study and improving the quality of research supervision, it is essential to ensure that all graduate research is up to the level of modern demands, is completed on schedule, and the results implemented.

In conclusion we should note that the system of training scientific and scientific-teaching cadres which presently exists in the Ministry of Defense essentially meets the demands of military higher educational institutions and scientific research establishments. Of course this system cannot be considered rigid and incapable of improvement. Certain suggestions presented by participants in the debate in this connection are of definite interest and will be considered by the higher educational institutions and scientific research establishments in the training of scientific and scientific-teaching cadres.

Problems of training scientists and improving the teaching skills of faculty should in the future remain in the center of attention of military educational institutions and scientific research establishments, the administration of military educational institutions and party organizations. Successful solution to the problems of training scientific and scientific-teaching cadres depends in large measure on precise execution of corresponding party and government decrees, and orders of the Minister of Defense USSR.

FROM THE EDITORS

With publication of this article by Col Gen I. Shkadov, this journal terminates debate on the article "On Graduate Study, Academic Degrees and Rank."

The editors would like to express their thanks to all officers and general officers who took active part in the discussion of this problem.

The editors would like to inform all contributors whose responses have not been published that their materials have been forwarded to the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense, for study and implementation of suggestions and proposals.

FOOTNOTES

1. Summary of debate on the article "On Graduate Study, Academic Degrees and Rank," Voyennaya Mysl', Nos 7, 12, 1970; No 1, 1971.
2. Voyennaya Mysl', No 12, 1970, page 53.
3. Pravda, 11 April 1971.
4. Pravda, 7 April 1971.

PROGRAMMED LEARNING AT MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The article "More Extensively Incorporating Programmed Learning"** examines problems of extremely current interest.

First of all we should like to note that we are in full agreement with Lt Gen P. Vashurin on the role, place and prospects of programmed learning in the overall schooling system.

In the article the author states that in order to increase the practical value of programmed learning it would be advisable in the first place to improve course curricula, textbooks, forms and methods of teaching and, secondly, to elaborate in greater detail appropriate means, methods and forms of programmed learning proper (page 58). We do not deny the correctness of this statement as a whole, but we feel that one should begin with the elaboration of course plans, since course material overload (inevitable to a certain degree as a result of the rapid growth of science and technology) has in our opinion become a basic inhibiting factor in the improvement of the entire learning process.

It is advisable to elaborate standardized course curriculum for related military higher educational institutions (identical specialization profiles) of the corresponding armed forces branch (arm). This will make it possible in the first place to involve in the preparation of course curriculum a fairly broad group of the most highly-qualified department of studies personnel and teaching faculty (prominent scholars, top methods specialists, officers and general officers with considerable service experience in line units); secondly, elaboration of course curriculum should be effected under the immediate supervision and with the participation of command representatives from the corresponding service (arm); third, effectiveness of the training process should be more thoroughly evaluated and the quality of training of command and command-engineer officer cadres should be more comprehensively analyzed; fourth, there should be more extensive utilization of advanced operations know-how of some of our military higher educational institutions in the training of military specialists of a given specialization profile.

Standardized course curricula should be drawn up on the basis of an analysis of the state of and immediate future prospects for weapons development (5-8 years), and a scientifically-substantiated character of combat operations taking into account the practical activities of service academy (higher schools) graduates in line units.

* Voyennaya Mysl', No 12, 1970 (Responses are published in the order in which they are received by the editors).

It is advisable thereby to direct principal attention toward determining the knowledge, skills and abilities of which graduates should have a mastery, an enumeration and scope of training disciplines; determination of logical sequence of covering disciplines, types of verification and examination by semester and over the entire period of training; preparation of an efficient timetable for organization of the training process, ensuring optimal working conditions for departments and students (officer candidates), as well as efficient utilization of training and laboratory facilities; determination of correlation of time spent between theory and practical study, between various types of classes, between student (cadet) independent study and study under faculty supervision. A more vigorous effort must be made to eliminate disciplines which are obsolete or which do not possess substantial significance for a given area of specialization; the total number of subjects studied should not be excessively high, and duplication of curricular material should be totally eliminated.

The author understandably devotes considerable attention to lectures as one of the most important forms of the learning process. Lectures build the foundation of student (cadet) scientific knowledge, form their communist ideological outlook and promote the development of creative skills.

Presentation of lectures on operational-tactical disciplines contains certain difficulties and demands of the instructor particularly excellent preparation and methods skills.

Successful presentation and effectiveness of lectures depend to a great extent on the availability of visual aids.

Bearing in mind the principles of programmed learning, we have reached the conclusion (and this conclusion has been practically confirmed) that filmstrips should constitute the basic means of illustrating lecture materials. It is believed that a lecture is not ready for delivery unless an appropriate filmstrip has been prepared. The effectiveness of filmstrips is substantially greater if color film is used.

We should note that late-model filmstrip projectors of Soviet manufacture (LETI-60 and others) offer remote control, accomodate both horizontal and vertical frame sequence, and do not require that the classroom be darkened during projection.

Making a few minor design modifications, we have begun employing paired filmstrip projectors, with the controls comprising a single pointer panel. One projector can be used, for example, to show an overall structural diagram of troop control, while the second can be used for simultaneously projecting individual elements of the diagram. This employment of filmstrip projectors is in full conformity with the principles of programmed learning.

It takes less time and laboratory assistants' labor to make filmstrips than it does to fashion unwieldy charts, and the complex chart inventory can be greatly reduced.

While focusing considerable attention on the use of filmstrips, we nevertheless believe that at the present stage of development of technical teaching devices, charts should not be totally eliminated.

A fundamental way to improve practical exercises in our view consists in making them as close as possible to actual work conditions for the commander, staff officers and services in a combat situation.

Experience convincingly demonstrates that such exercises should be conducted for the most part in specialized classrooms equipped with working models, display stands and various apparatus, as well as at training command posts equipped with all requisite technical control devices. Training command posts should be set up for each control echelon and should be linked to lower-echelon, higher-echelon and cooperating command posts, and when necessary with the basic means of combat. They should be equipped with means permitting objective verification of trainee performance, in particular video and audio monitoring equipment (TV monitors, loudspeaker communications gear and sound recording equipment).

The holding of practical classes in specialized classrooms and at training command posts is in full conformity with the idea and principles of programmed learning, which stipulate sequential study of the material in separate doses (portions). The availability of specialized classrooms and training command posts makes it possible to work out all matters pertaining to organization of combat operations and troop control sequentially, operation by operation, in their logical interrelationship.

It is appropriate at this point to mention the importance of means of objective verification and monitoring of trainee performance. Experience indicates that the employment of such devices during practical exercises and command-staff games produces exceptionally good results and is in full conformity with the essence of programmed learning, which calls for continuous direct and feedback linkage between trainee and instructor, which invigorates and individualizes the entire learning process and makes it more effective.

The on-switching of objective monitoring devices during trainee performance (when issuing orders, submitting reports, standing duty) exerts a strong psychological effect on them. Aware that they are being continuously monitored, trainees endeavor to perform in a calm and precise manner, expressing their thoughts clearly and concisely in issuing orders and

submitting reports. At the same time objective monitoring means substantially facilitate the job of the instructor and make it possible promptly to direct the attention of each trainee to specific deficiencies and to indicate how they should be corrected.

The Vashurin article quite reasonably states that with programmed learning existing forms of current verification of a student's progress are insufficiently effective and require improvement. The following forms are employed for the purpose of activating and intensifying routine verification in our practical activities: one or two test questions prior to each lecture, with 3 to 5 minutes spent on the answers and marking down grades on the answers; questioning students before and during practical exercises, with grades marked down; grading on the preparation of working maps on problems; solving and grading of problems on a competition basis; grading of homework; testing and grading of student performance at command-staff games, practical troop exercises and tour of duty in units. All this greatly assists instructors in determining the extent to which students have mastered the course material. Under conditions of programmed learning, however, the above-enumerated forms of daily verification are insufficient. Other, more flexible forms are also needed. These would include brief tactical problems and quizzes on the most important topics. We feel that this will involve an insignificant portion of the total time allocated for the study of a given discipline.

Training films can be very helpful in revealing the character of modern combat operations and demonstrating the scope and sequence of measures involved in their organization and conduct. Much has been written on the role of the training film in the process of training and indoctrination of officer cadres. Experience confirms that good films (in scope and content) promote development of professional thinking and creative imagination in trainees. They make it possible to impart to students, very quickly and with a high degree of realism, a large volume of information and to ensure a close link between military theory and practical troop combat operations. The task consists in continuing in the future to improve the quality of centrally-produced films and in improving the method of utilizing films in the training process.

Col I. Kulikov, Candidate of Military
Science, Docent

* * *

Due to incomprehension of the substance of programmed learning, it has been viewed as nothing but machine teaching with mandatory formalization of the teaching materials, with the misapprehension until recently that it is not applicable in the operational-tactical and social science disciplines.

Personal teaching experience and a number of pedagogic experiments conducted at our school on improving the qualifications of officer personnel enable us to seriously address the possibility of adopting programmed learning in the social sciences.

Of course formalization of materials of the social sciences is impermissible even for purposes of teaching. One cannot explain the laws governing societal affairs and the various societal phenomena by solely employing electronic computers. One cannot replace present education science with logical-mathematical theory of learning.

Programmed learning, however, is possible even without formalization, without machines, without multiple-choice problems and those patterns of arrangement of teaching matter (programming) which have been called "linear," "branching" and "combined" and which are employed in programming teaching matter in the technical disciplines.

If we define programmed learning as it is viewed in the article by Lt Gen P. Vashurin, that is, as a radical improvement of course material, the development of special programmed textbooks, and utilization of modern technical devices (motion pictures, radio, filmstrips, sound recordings, etc), its employment in studying the social sciences disciplines is not only possible but desirable as well, since programmed learning constitutes a means of scientific organization of the learning process. In order to become convinced of this it is sufficient to recall the fundamental principles of programmed learning. They are, as is well known, the following: breakdown of course material into specific doses convenient for assimilation, arrangement of the material in a logical sequence of learning acts; control of the learning process, achieved by the instructor on the basis of feedback; substantial activation of learning by increasing the student's independence of effort; a certain individualization of learning in combination with work in a group, and utilization of modern technical devices to increase the effectiveness of mastery of the material.

The objective will be reached if one innovatively applies these principles in teaching the social sciences, but this requires detailed elaboration of appropriate means, methods and forms of programmed learning in this area.

We carried out just such a project at our school. A number of social sciences disciplines (Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, history of the CPSU) at our school are studied on the basis of higher school course curriculum, but with the course material covered in a much shorter period of time; the lecture part of the course remains almost unchanged, but there is some reduction in the number of hours assigned to the subject, achieved by reducing the number of seminars held. As a result a number of new methodological forms have been developed which have

proven acceptable, forms which to one degree or another correspond to the principles of programmed learning. We shall briefly discuss some of them.

Classroom activities with our method constitute a new form of teaching. They constitute student independent work with the textbook under the supervision and with the assistance of instructors on the basis of a specially-designed program.

Dialectical materialism was studied with this method (in place of lectures). Special textbooks were prepared in advance on all topics of dialectical materialism; each student obtained copies in the library and brought them to classes.

For the conduct of classroom learning the instructor drew up a course plan in which a section sign followed by a sequence number indicated meaningful sections, doses, separated within the text material. One or several questions would be asked on each such section. The time required to read each section and for a subsequent verbal quiz was determined and specified in the schedule.

In the classroom the instructor would indicate to the students the section (pages) in the text which were to be studied as well as specifying the time allocated for this task; he would ask questions, the answers to which they were to find in the text. After the allotted time was up the instructor would test the students on the material: when called on by the instructor, the students would answer the questions given at the beginning of the exercise. The number of students questioned would be equal to or greater than the number of questions. Each answer would be graded in a special grade book. If the covered material was comprehended by all, following a brief résumé the instructor would proceed with the next dose. If answers were incorrect, he would give additional explanation. If after this any of the students had failed to master the material, that student would be told to come for consultation at a specified time, and the class would continue with the same procedure. During a 2-hour class almost every student (18-20 men) would be tested to determine whether the material had been mastered. If any of the program (class plan) items remained uncompleted, the students would be given questions and would complete these items during hours of independent study. They would be tested at the beginning of the next class meeting.

Questions would be given by the instructor verbally, would be written on the board or projected on a screen.

Assignments would not always be given in the form of questions; sometimes they would be in the form of a request that an example be given from military routine which would demonstrate an understanding of the core of the problem, or the students would be asked to assess some international event on the basis of the material being studied, etc.

If a student had any question while working on the material, he would raise his hand. The instructor would approach him and give an explanation in a low voice.

Experience indicates that if a textbook has been well done the instructor, proceeding in the above-described manner, is able to answer all questions, since few arise. When several students are unable to comprehend a given item (this very quickly becomes obvious), all students stop their work and the instructor gives the correct answer, subsequently testing in the normal manner. Some sections of material are not tested in view of their simplicity.

Frequently the following situation arises during a class: students complete the assignment before time is up and, if the item is of interest to them, they begin discussing it in groups of 2 to 4. There is a low sound of voices in the classroom, but this bothers nobody, since they have completed the assignment. In such an instance we do not interrupt such spontaneous discussions prior to the time limit, because these things invigorate the group, generate interest in the item under discussion, in the subject as a whole, and assist in mastering the material better.

How are the requirements of programmed learning met in the classroom?

The material is studied in stages, in doses. This facilitates assimilation and gives a certain guarantee that all the principal sections of the topic will be comprehended during the course of the class session itself.

The questions direct the students' independent search in working with their text, while systematic verification produces feedback, from student to instructor, on this basis making it possible to guide the study process.

The learning process is activated by the fact that the students spend a considerable time working independently. The instructor's constant monitoring by observing their performance, and particularly by questioning, also serves as a means of activation, since it increases the responsibility of each for his efforts in the classroom. The class meeting also is activated by means of brief discussions which develop after completion of each program segment in case of a difference of opinion on any given item or simply for self-verification. Such discussions are possible in groups

of strong students, where study of the material proceeds faster, as a result of which a time reserve is accumulated.

Individualization of study is also achieved to a certain degree under conditions whereby study as a whole continues as a group exercise. This is expressed in the fact that practically every student in the group, during independent classroom performance of the assignment, can ask the instructor a question and receive an immediate answer.

Preparation of text materials for classroom exercises obliges the author to select material more carefully, to present it with maximum precision, logically and sequentially. Such a text, since it constitutes the main source of information in the classroom, will promote good assimilation of the course material. Learning time is more efficiently expended.

One enormous advantage was the fact that we made the programmed texts the property of the student. He could make notes and write comments in them; lesson texts processed in this manner would become excellent summaries and would be treated by the students as their own lecture notes.

At the end of the course of study, following an examination, the students were given a questionnaire to fill out. The described method met with almost unanimous approval. It is interesting that nobody expressed regret about the lectures, which were replaced by classroom exercises on dialectical materialism. The following were typical responses to the question "How would you assess the new method?": "Finally we have a two-way process," "Now we know something when we leave the classroom," etc.

The above-described new methodological form of classroom exercise is not something random or fortuitous for study of the social sciences. We have also developed and practically verified other methods. For example, the method of independent study of primary source material on the basis of a special program put together by the instructor.

We shall briefly discuss this method, in order to help overcome that barrier which was erected in the recent past between programmed learning and the social sciences. By retaining this barrier we are losing the opportunity to make methods of teaching the social sciences disciplines more varied and learning more effective.

Independent effort promotes thorough and productive assimilation of Marxist-Leninist theory by students.

The outline or summary notes should constitute the principal form and result of a student's work with primary source materials. Preparation of such an outline invigorates the thinking process, compels one to dig more deeply into the content of a text and to penetrate the logic and meaning of the author's reasoning process.

The summary or outline is a useful form of study only if students are taught this technique and have acquired a certain skill of independent work on the writings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Unfortunately the majority are unable to cope successfully with this type of learning exercise, which nullifies its value; frequently students, without any deep comprehension, mechanically copy down sometimes extensive excerpts from the text they are reading, wasting considerable time on this.

Insufficiently careful and thoughtful study of a source text engenders rote learning and dogmatism, which dulls rather than sharpens the student's thought process. In order to avoid this, it is essential to assist the student in writing the outline throughout the entire exercise, indicating the main points, focusing attention on the logic and meaning of the author's statements, compelling one to think during the process of working on a text. This can be done if the student is equipped with a special program prepared by the instructor. We have put together a special program for studying each work. It includes a number of assignments which the students would be instructed to perform. The sequence of assignments would ensure systematized presentation of the author's ideas in the resulting outline, in a sequence which would help achieve a deeper, more thorough study of the topic. Each assignment focused the student on studying a specific part of several small portions of the original source text, "would lead" to the main idea contained therein. This main content could be certain facts, historical events, relationships or laws discovered and proclaimed by the author, etc.

The assignments contained in the primary text material study program would vary. One would pose a direct question, which would focus the student's attention on the main points in the textual excerpt (specific pages would be designated). Another assignment would contain a hint which would assist the student in seeking, comprehending, as well as in correctly formulating the author's ideas (on the indicated pages) to be summary outlined. The third assignment would contain an example of how covered material should be concisely presented. There should be more of such assignments in the study programs at the beginning of the learning period, in order that the student learn how to make an outline summary in his independent work.

The content of class assignments is determined by many factors: degree of text penetration necessary for a given category of students; the topic for

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which the given text is recommended; student general preparation level, amount of time available for studying the topic and subject as a whole, etc. Depending on this, the program may omit entirely some sections (pages) of a work, such as a polemic which was important for the contemporary reader but is not of current interest, or else a very concise presentation of certain sections can be given, in order to preserve the sequence while focusing the student's attention on the main points.

The study of primary source materials would be handled in the classroom under the instructor's supervision if the schedule specified, or more frequently the material would be covered during scheduled evening study hours or during unscheduled free time.

Upon completing all assignments, the student would have an outline summary of the work, the quality of which would in large measure depend on the program.

We have also developed other methodological forms of study in the social sciences disciplines based on the principles of programming, but we have described only two, in order to demonstrate the possibility and even the necessity of employing programmed learning in the social sciences.

Lt Col G. Ionov

* * *

Programmed learning and programmed verification of learning constitute an aggregate of methods and means of scientific organization of learning, directed toward raising the level of the curricular process. Programming of the learning process is winning more and more supporters every year. In recent years various methods of teaching and verification have been proposed -- both with and without the involvement of teaching machines.

For 3 years now we have been employing a programmed machine method of teaching and verification, for which the department has set up a special classroom.

For teaching and consultation we utilize an automatic information unit which is extensively employed at railroad stations and airports. It contains 50 keys and 200 sheets. A test question is contained on each key, which the student can use to check his knowledge or to receive consultation. Pressure on the key opens four sheets, which contain a typed brief answer to the questions, accompanied by requisite diagrams and photographs. Recommended readings on the question are also specified.

We are also successfully employing a nonmachine method of testing students-- multiple-choice test questions with the aid of cards and masters. The master is fashioned of rubber in the form of a stamp, which is placed on a sheet of paper given to the student.

A complex and laborious task for the instructor is the preparation of a programmed textbook, and for verification -- the preparation of test cards with incomplete or incorrect answers. Each card contains 10 questions, with up to 5 answers for each question; one answer is correct, complete, while the rest are incorrect or incomplete. They also must be put together in an intelligent manner. The text materials and test questions should be brief, clear, and pursue a specific goal.

The test process in a group consisting of 20-25 men (each of which is given 10 questions) takes 4 to 5 hours under normal test conditions and if the student will only take 1 minute to answer each question.

The programmed test method makes it possible systematically to check the level of knowledge of all students with a minimum time expenditure, simultaneously, in a number of classrooms and study groups. For example, it takes no more than 10-15 minutes to test 20-25 persons. The main advantage of this type of verification lies in the fact that it increases student activeness and encourages independent study of the required and optional literature as well as improved assimilation of the course material and improves the quality of the teaching process, since it quickly reveals weak points.

Three years experience in using programmed learning and verification indicates that learning effectiveness has noticeably improved due to adoption of these techniques.

Programmed learning and verification not only exert favorable influence on the teaching process but also promote the creative growth of instructors.

We totally support Lt Gen P. Vashurin's statement that the extensive dissemination and adoption of the new and progressive method of programmed learning and testing dictates the necessity of centralized supervision, which requires the establishment of special programmed learning centers.

Col Med Serv P. Litvinenko

* * *

The question of programmed learning raised by the journal Voyennaya Mysl' in our opinion merits the closest attention. The fact is that in recent years interest in programmed learning has dropped off sharply at a number

of military higher educational institutions. The opinion has been expressed that it is not acceptable for operational-tactical training, since it does not promote development of operational-tactical thinking and indoctrination of commander qualities. It is true that programmed learning in its "pure" form, with the present level of development and facilities, fails to achieve these goals. But does that mean that programmed learning should not be incorporated in the curricular process at command schools? What are the limits and potential of this type of teaching in the overall system of operational-tactical training and indoctrination of future military commanders? On what points is General Vashurin correct, and on what points is he wrong?

In order to answer these questions we must first examine the substance of programmed learning.

The author has attempted to define programmed learning, rejecting thereby the role and significance of electronic and other modern equipment (page 57). We cannot go along with his definition. General Vashurin's formulation fails to indicate the role of new teaching techniques and devices (which he subsequently recommends) and the necessity of adopting programmed learning.

We believe that programmed learning can solve one of the problems presently facing us: that of ensuring that each student acquires individual knowledge under conditions of mass teaching, with a steady increase in the flow of information and retaining previous semester-hour loads for the subjects involved.

Ideal results are obtained when student and instructor are on a one-to-one relationship. Under these conditions the principle of individual learning with consideration of the features of the individual student is fully met; sufficient activeness is maintained, the most efficient dose of knowledge is assimilated by the student, and the process of assimilation is continuously tested (new material is not presented until previous material has been assimilated). We cannot permit ourselves such a luxury. It is known, however, that learning is easier and results as a rule are better at those military higher educational institutions with a low student-instructor ratio.

What takes place under normal, typical teaching conditions, particularly at our military higher educational institutions?

First of all we plan course material for a nonexistent "average" student, not for a specific individual with his specific learning capacity; we emphasize "average." As a result of this some (the best-prepared students) experience "information starvation," while others (less well prepared)

experience an information overload. Verification of assimilation of material is effected with substantial breaks in the learning process and frequently with considerable delay, and not at the moment difficulties are being experienced in assimilating new material.

We can devote attention to the slower student only at the expense of the faster one. The instructor constantly strives to maintain student activeness, but he is always limited in his capability, since even at group sessions he must from time to time work with some individual students.

In order to eliminate these "pedagogic flaws" it is necessary to ensure continuous, full feedback (from student to instructor), that is, a portion of the instructor's duties must be shifted to assistants. How can this be done without utilizing advances in electronics and cybernetics? We feel that the problem cannot be solved without this. Therefore we believe that programmed learning should be defined as learning whereby the student receives knowledge in strictly-determined portions and in a predetermined sequence, as a rule without the assistance of the instructor, but under his strict personal verification or verification by teaching machines (devices). Programmed learning is based on electronic equipment or various electrical circuitry.

Programmed material is carefully selected, well-substantiated teaching material which is presented in an understandable manner and in specified doses (portions). These doses (portions) are arranged in a strict logical relationship.

Each dose, in addition to new learning information, should contain an assignment which must be performed during study of the material, with the aim of reinforcing knowledge and verifying assimilation. Upon completing the assignment, the student can receive access to the following segment of new material. Who can give permission to proceed? Under normal conditions it is the instructor, and under conditions of programmed learning -- a teaching machine.

Programmed learning is based on the independent effort of the student and ensures individuality of learning. If a teaching machine is compelled to time the study of a given item (which is essentially easy to do), we can increase responsibility and intensiveness of learning.

Summarizing our evaluation of the potential of programmed learning, we should bear in mind that learning is a very complex area of cybernetics, and we are dealing here not with the automatic transfer to education science of the concepts of cybernetics but rather the elaboration of new concepts. While we do agree with the above, we cannot agree with the author of the article that "programmed learning does not replace the existing (traditional) learning process system" (page 58). It does indeed

replace it. But immediately? Completely? Of course not. Not immediately and not completely, but rather in combination with existing forms and methods of learning.

For example, one specific feature of the tactical training of missile and artillery officers is the fact that the end result of their activities is usually expressed in terse, rigidly-formulated orders, commands and reports, presented in a strict sequence. They can be easily encoded with a digital code, can be entered onto a standard blank, a formalized document, a control card or placed in a monitoring machine. Therefore monitoring of a student's decisions and actions can be effected by means of programmed learning methods.

In addition, the elements of such monitoring are also applicable in studying other areas of tactics, such as troop organization, performance specifications on various types of weapons and combat equipment, and tactical standards, where unequivocal responses are required, or answers in the form of quantitative descriptions within certain limits. Such types of monitoring can also find application in the performance of operational-tactical computations for the employment of missile and artillery units and subunits.

What are the prospects of learning with the use of programmed methods?

In the future employment of computers with a natural algorithmic language in combination with teaching machines will make it possible successfully to solve not only problems of routine monitoring and testing but also teaching and learning in the full sense of the word.

One of the principal tasks of programmed learning at the present time is that of activating student independent effort.

We know that training and indoctrination are effective only when they are based on active effort by the trainees themselves. The experience of numerous training establishments, including the Military Artillery Academy, indicates that the presently-existing system of teaching by explanation and illustration is becoming increasingly less effective under conditions of a steadily accelerating growth in the volume and complexity of knowledge.

The instructor's effort to present everything verbally to the student, from beginning to end, leaving for the student only conscious memorization of data, facts and conclusions, does not promote development of a student's cognitive and creative capabilities, and particularly operational-tactical thinking. The less than solid store of knowledge acquired by this method is exhausted in 8 to 10 years and loses its importance.

Therefore students should acquire knowledge in the course of their own active learning effort. Such knowledge is more solid, more reliable. Thinking is developed more intensively during the course of persistent independent study of a theory course than by means of lectures, and habits of independent preparation and training are formed.

Programmed textbooks and manuals should come to the assistance of students in their independent learning effort. In existing textbooks the material is presented by the same method of explanation and illustration as in a lecture. Precisely for this reason independent work in operational-tactical disciplines constitutes an uninteresting and tiring exercise. In addition, extremely limited time for self-training makes it impossible thoroughly to assimilate the information imparted by lectures.

Under these conditions one possible way to increase the effectiveness of the teaching or learning process is replacement of some lectures with independent work during class sessions with programmed training materials.

In response one might object that the preparation of such materials requires too much time. We agree, but this occurs because we lack a theory of elaboration of programmed textbooks and training manuals, and we lack sufficient experience. Everything is being done by the trial and error method.

Therefore the first step on the way toward mastering programmed learning should be the development of special textbooks designed for independent work. Such texts could be prepared on the basis of existing textbooks. The material they contain should be broken down into smaller sections and subsections (doses), logically interlinked. In order to reduce unproductive expenditure of time spent looking for essential information, the main point should either be underlined or framed.

In order to activate the cognitive activity of trainees and their thought process, questions (problems) which they are capable of answering should be presented parallel with the material.

At the end of each section or subsection it is useful to place self-test questions, as well as examples and problems, in order to reinforce new knowledge and to form initial skills and abilities. At the end of the textbook there should be provided answers to the examples and problems, as well as a detailed solution procedure when necessary.

Initial elaboration of such textbooks would make it possible to adopt programmed learning more surely and confidently.

Now a few words on the role of the instructor in the overall system of programmed learning. We feel that it will become immeasurably greater, since personal contact between instructor and student is the best road to knowledge. Therefore we cannot agree with the author in his statement that "planned consultations do not comprise an effective method or guide to the learning process; they do not aid in testing knowledge nor in assisting students" (page 61). In a consultation session the instructor does not assume a passive role as the author claims, but rather the role of a living source of information and knowledge.

We are in full agreement with Lt Gen Vashurin's ideas on the training of cadres for programmed teaching.

Col B. Strel'chenko, Doctor of Military Science, Professor;
Col P. Smirnov

THE DEFEAT OF THE FASCIST TROOPS ON THE
SOUTHWEST AXIS IN 1944-1945

Army Gen V. Kurasov

Soviet military historical literature has been enriched by another major work. The book Osvobozhdeniye Yugo-Vostochnoy i Tsentral'noy Evropy¹ has been published. A noteworthy feature of this work is the fact that many of its authors were active participants in the described events, while some of them were organizers and leaders of the operations. Their personal recollections have made it possible to substantially supplement the documentary basis of the work and to provide a more interesting and lively treatment of the facts which occurred.

This work combines the previously published studies by the same authors' collective: Yassko-Kishinevskiye Kanny and Budapest--Vena--Praga.² As for the name of the book, it more accurately reflects its basic content, since it is a single monographic study taking up the political and military events which occurred during the period of the liberation of six European states (Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia) from the Nazi yoke by the Soviet Army.

While in the two previously published books the liberation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was treated in the chain of events related to operations on the territory of other adjacent nations, in this book the liberation of the designated states has been described in independent chapters and on a broader scale showing the historical, political and military aspects of the events.

In relying on rich documentary materials and in supplementing them with the remembrances of the participants in the events, the authors have skillfully brought out the course of armed combat in close relation to the political situation in those nations on whose territory the liberation struggle of the Soviet Army unfolded. The work has vividly shown the decisive effect of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on the course and outcome of the political and military events. A significant place has been given to describing the activities of the Communist parties in the Southeastern and Central European nations in the area of organizing and developing a nationwide struggle against fascism and for thwarting the plans of internal reaction.

From the standpoint of the art of warfare the value of the book is in the fact that in it the reader will find numerous instructive examples which have not lost their importance even now and which reflect the interaction of political and military decisions. The examples also show the

organization and conduct of operations in encircling large enemy groupings, the use of all branches of the armed forces and combat arms as well as their coordinated actions in operations, engagements and battles; the actions of troops in different types of operations and combat and under diverse natural and climatic conditions; the work of the staffs and the organization of troop control; the forms and methods of party political work in a complex situation; the indoctrination of military personnel in a spirit of internationalism and Soviet patriotism.

Moreover, the book on a documentary basis has clarified and strengthened a number of theses which reflect important political and military decisions. The appendices give very valuable factual and statistical information, and in particular:

-- a list of the leadership from the command of the fronts and the Black Sea Fleet to the commanders of the combined units of Soviet forces, as well as of the formations and combined units of Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslavian troops which participated in the battles against Nazi Germany along with the Soviet Army;

-- the combat composition of the fronts in the most important operations conducted by the Soviet Army on the Southwestern axis in 1944-1945;

-- a chronology of events from 26 March 1944 through 15 May 1945, depicting the political and military decisions as well as the noteworthy dates in the liberation of the designated nations;

-- a list of the cities of Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia liberated by the Soviet Army indicating the date, the formations, combined units, units and their commanders. The given list also reflects the orders pertaining to the awarding of honorary designations to around 1,500 units and combined units in honor of the European cities liberated by them;

-- around 1,500 names of military personnel as well as state and political leaders entered in a name index, making it possible to find rapidly not only the individual of interest to the readers, but also to a certain degree to establish his activities at a certain stage.

The reviewed work also reflects the participation of Romanian and Bulgarian troops (after going over to the side of the anti-Nazi coalition) and the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the joint operations with the Soviet Army, as well as the organization of coordinated actions between them. The fight against the common enemy as well as the blood shed in joint engagements formed a sound basis for the military collaboration of the Soviet Armed Forces with the armies of the socialist states. This collaboration was further developed in the post-war period within the system of the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact.

In terms of the content and style of exposition, the reviewed book is in the form of an historical memoir, while in many instances the description of events in it is by prominent military leaders. The preparation of the front operations, as a rule, is examined against a background of the military political situation as well as on the strategic level, while in the description of the dynamics of the operations, the basic questions of operational arts and tactics are taken up, and there is extensive illustration of the skill and initiative of our commanders and staffs as well as of the heroism of the Soviet soldiers.

The scientific objectivity of the research on the events described in the book is substantiated by the authors' extensive use of archival materials as well as by profound analysis of them and a demonstration of both the positive aspects as well as certain shortcomings in troops leadership in preparing and conducting the operations. Using concrete facts, the authors have soundly and convincingly unmasked the bourgeois falsifiers of history, and in particular show the unsoundness of the concepts of the former Nazi generals Guderian and Friesner on the issue of the causes of the severe defeats for the Nazi troops on the Southwestern axis.

The basic content of the work is a detailed study of the operations which the Soviet Army conducted on the Southwestern axis in 1944-1945. These include: The Iasi-Kishinev Operation of the troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts, the operation of the 2d Ukrainian Front in the central and western regions of Romania, the operation of invading Bulgaria by the forces of the 3d Ukrainian Front, the Debrecen Operation of the 2d Ukrainian Front conducted in strategic cooperation with the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Belgrade Operation of the 3d Ukrainian Front in cooperation with a portion of the forces of the 2d Ukrainian Front and the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the Budapest Operation of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts, the Balaton Defensive Operation of the Forces of the 3d Ukrainian Front, the Vienna Operation of the 3d and 2d Ukrainian fronts, the Bratislava-Brno Operation of the 2d and 4th Ukrainian fronts, and the Prague Operation of the 1st, 4th, and 2d Ukrainian fronts.

Such operations as the Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen, Belgrade, Budapest, Vienna, and Prague, in terms of their significance were strategic ones, since in terms of the military and political results, they went beyond the operational level. Each of them led to a sharp change in the situation in the theater of combat, or had a great effect on the course of the war in Europe as a whole, or achieved all the aims simultaneously. The actions of the Soviet troops in Bulgaria must also be considered strategic in terms of their significance and results.

Also instructive in the study of the operations is the fact that in examining each of them the book states the situation, the plans of the warring sides, the directives of the staff of the Supreme High Command

(Stavka), and the decisions of the front commanders. It also provides an operational and strategic review of combat, and analyzes the most characteristic traits of the art of warfare of the Soviet Army.

Also among the merits of the authors' collective is the fact that in the book, using concrete examples, the role of the Soviet Supreme High Command has been shown in achieving the military and political goals of the operations. The staff of the Supreme High Command, having defined the political goals and tasks of the strategic operations, supported their fulfillment with the appropriate forces and means. This support depended upon the place which the operation held in one or another campaign. Thus, in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, the degree of support was the greatest in comparison with the other operations of the 1944 summer-autumn campaign. This made it possible to create here significant densities of rifle troops and artillery. The 2d Ukrainian Front, having received the mission of entering the regions of Ploesti and Bucharest, had a deep operational formation and had at its disposal powerful armored forces.

The book has convincingly shown that the staff of the Supreme High Command and the command of the fronts, in all the offensive operations conducted on the Southwestern axis in 1944-1945, provided overall superiority over the enemy in forces and means. Certainly this superiority was even more significant on the axes of the main thrusts by the Soviet troops.

The experience of the operations studied in the book, along with the other operations of the Great Patriotic War, convincingly shows that the bold and decisive massing of forces and means for achieving significant superiority over the enemy, as a rule, led to success. Where this principle was violated the combat actions of the troops often ended in failure.

In the book the most attention and space have been given to studying the Iasi-Kishinev Operation as well as the operations related to the liberation of Hungary, since they first opened up the way for the liberation of Romania and Bulgaria, while the liberation of Hungary created favorable preconditions for making crushing strikes against the Nazi forces in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation, which was strategic in its scale and very decisive in terms of the methods and the results of its execution, is considered to be one of the most important in the Great Patriotic War. Four chapters are devoted to a description and examination of it. It was prepared for and conducted in a military political situation which was both difficult and also favorable for us.

The strategic offensive by the Soviet Army which commenced on 23 June 1944 in Belorussia forced the Nazi command to hurriedly shift its forces here from other areas of the Soviet-German Front, including from the Southern

Ukraine Group of Armies which was fighting the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts. This helped to create favorable preconditions here for dealing a crushing blow to the enemy. The book thoroughly analyzes the enormous organizational work carried out by the military councils, the commanders and the staffs of the fronts in the complete and careful operation and support of the operation. The questions of material-technical and medical support for the troops are analyzed in detail, as well as those of party political work.

The course of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation (the third and fourth chapters) is described in a very interesting and intelligent manner. It took just four days for the Soviet forces to break the enemy defenses and to surround the main forces of the German Southern Ukraine Group of Armies in the region to the southwest of Kishinev. This was like "a devastating tornado cutting across the interfluve of the Prut and Seret" (p 140). The book examines dynamically the combat of our forces in eliminating the surrounded enemy grouping and the rapid development of the success in depth.

The instructiveness and objectivity of the description of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation are achieved by the fact that along with expounding the successful combat of our forces, the authors have also thoroughly analyzed their individual failures which at times led to the inability to carry out the missions set for troops.

The defeat of the Nazi forces in the region of Iasi and Kishinev and the rapid advance of the Soviet Army on the Bucharest axis sharply altered the situation. On the southern flank of the Soviet-German Front a real opportunity appeared for the liberation of Romania and Bulgaria. All the attempts by the enemy to create a new defensive front on the path of the advancing Soviet troops were defeated. The southern grouping of the enemy front which previously had rested on the Black Sea collapsed completely.

In the pages of the book devoted to the political and military results of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, a number of its characteristic traits are pointed out. These include: the decisiveness of the military-political goals, the great scope, the efficient organization of coordinated actions between the fronts and the naval forces, the stability of control, as well as the major political and strategic results. The instructiveness of this operation consists in the simultaneous breaking through of a strongly reinforced and deeply echeloned enemy defense using the assault groupings of the fronts, which were 200 kilometers apart, in the selection of the moment of the strike and in determining the weakest points in the enemy defenses, in the excellent organization of operational camouflaging as well as in the allocation of forces and means between the inner and external encirclement fronts.

The fifth and sixth chapters examine the operations of the Soviet forces in completing the liberation of Romania and the liberation of Bulgaria. In this section of particular interest are the activities of the commands and the staffs to organize the offensive under the mountainous conditions of the Eastern Carpathian and the Transylvanian Alps. Using concrete examples the authors have been able to clearly show the initiative, resourcefulness and mass heroism of our forces in crossing the mountain passes and gorges, as well as the skillful organization of coordinated actions between the Soviet and Romanian troops. The situation of the entry of the Soviet Army onto Bulgarian territory has been analyzed in a very lively and apt manner.

The Belgrade Operation was of important significance in the general course of combat during the autumn of 1944 on the Southwestern axis. The battle for the Yugoslavian capital has gone down in history as a marvel of combat cooperation between the Soviet and Yugoslavian peoples as well as of unstinting bravery in the battles against the common enemy. The seventh chapter is dedicated to this event. The liberation of Belgrade occurred under an extremely difficult situation. The combat in the city was conducted simultaneously with eliminating a major enemy grouping which was surrounded to the southeast and south of it. The book shows the enormous and difficult work done by our command in organizing the assault on the vast city by the joint efforts of the troops from two nations, as well as by providing the closest cooperation between them. Here also the high skills and the mass heroism of the Soviet, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian forces are described. For courage and valor the Yugoslavian Government awarded orders and medals to more than 2,000 Soviet soldiers, while 13 of them received the title of People's Hero of Yugoslavia (p 261).

In the reviewed work a large place (the 6th tollth chapters) has been given over to operations of the Soviet Army in liberating Hungary, since the struggle which developed there was of a particularly fierce and protracted character, while its results were of important military-political significance. The Nazi command understood that the loss of Hungary would open up a path for the Soviet forces into Austria and Southern Germany. "The retention of Hungarian territory has such vitally important significance for us," said Hitler, "that it cannot be overestimated" (pp 284-285). All of these and certain other conditions in the situation as outlined in the eighth chapter predetermined the stubborn resistance of the enemy. The chapter also clearly shows the futility of Hitler, the Nazi command, and the pro-Nazi Hungarian Government, as well as the adventurism of their policy, strategy, aims and plans.

The main events in the battle for liberating Hungary were the fight for Budapest and the combat around Lake Balaton. They have been described very thoroughly and instructively in the book, where the work of the commanders, the staffs and the political bodies in leading the troops has been shown, as well as the mastery and heroism of the personnel.

The strict order by Hitler, who demanded that the Hungarian capital be defended "by a struggle for each house" (p 317), predetermined its stubborn character. For 108 days the forces of the 2d and 3d Hungarian fronts fought fierce and intense battles for the city. Three times the enemy endeavored to relieve its groupings surrounded in Budapest with powerful counterstrikes. The city itself was carefully prepared for defense which included 110 centers of resistance and more than 200 strong points (p 382). The 10th chapter of the book shows the art of our commanders and staffs in capturing such a major and heavily reinforced city as was Budapest.

In the battles for Budapest the Soviet forces acquired the richest experience in using assault troops. Their bold and enterprising actions played an exceptionally important role in the successful outcome of the street battles. This experience subsequently proved of value in the struggle for the cities of Eastern Prussia as well as in the battles for Vienna and the battle for Berlin.

On the pages of the book devoted to the battle for Budapest, the reader will find much that is of interest on the questions of the battle formations of the combined units, units and subunits in conducting an offensive in a large fortified city, as well as on the particular features of using various types of weapons and military equipment. For example, the setting of a maximum number of guns of all calibers for direct laying was a characteristic feature in the use of the artillery. Where the terrain allowed it and where there were straight broad streets, up to 80 percent of all the artillery was assigned for direct laying (p 297).

The battles around Lake Balaton by the 3d Ukrainian Front were the last major defensive operation conducted by the troops of the Soviet Army in the course of the Great Patriotic War. This operation substantiated the thesis that large strategic formations and combined-armed combined units are able to successfully resist the massed strikes of enemy tank groupings under the condition of clearly organizing the maneuvering of the antitank forces and means to the threatened axes. The creative work of the command and the staffs in preparing this operation and the combat of the troops (the 11th chapter) are analyzed with great intelligence. Also clearly expounded are the questions of the engineer, artillery, aviation, and material-technical support, the operational formation of the forces of the front and the antitank defenses. Of great interest is the experience of party political work in the troops, particularly in the course of the operation.

The last two chapters (the 12th and 13th) analyze in detail the Vienna and Bratislava-Brno operations, as well as the concluding Prague operation. The authors have been able to show the increased skill of our commanders and staffs as well as the particular features of the operations conducted in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

In this regard, we would like to say a few words about the Vienna Operation. In its planning, of great interest is the form of the strategic maneuvers which consisted in making a strong frontal assault by the adjacent flanks of two fronts for the purpose of splitting the opposing enemy grouping and defeating it piecemeal. Here, one part of this grouping was pressed up against the Danube, while the other was to be encircled by cutting its escape routes to the north of Lake Balaton.

With such a form of maneuvering a great deal depended upon the flexibility of the strategic thinking of the command. And here proper due must be paid to this level of control of the Soviet troops. It was up to its tasks. The book has shown that the actions of our armies excelled in the efficient and prompt execution of combat orders, in a high rate of advance, and in skillful coordination with the mobile troops.

The Bratislava-Brno Operation by the troops of the 2d Ukrainian Front was carried out in coordination with the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and lasted around 6 weeks. Not long before the end of this operation, on 2 May, on the day that Berlin fell, the 2d Ukrainian Front received orders from the SHC staff to make the main thrust on the region of Brno in the direction of Jihlava and Prague, with another strike at Olomouc, and no later than 12-14 May, to seize the line of Jihlava, Prague, and Gorn, to reach the Vltava [Moldau] River and liberate Prague.

Thus began the last operation of the Great Patriotic War. This operation was brief but sweeping in its scope. This was the Prague Offensive Operation conducted by the troops of the 1st, 4th, and 2d Ukrainian fronts, and involved more than 1 million Soviet soldiers, more than 25,000 guns and mortars, around 1,800 tanks and over 4,000 aircraft.

The Bratislava-Brno and the Prague operations conducted in mountainous forested terrain were very instructive.

In conclusion, the authors have stressed that the successful strategic offensive by the Soviet Army on the Southwestern axis was of exceptionally important military political significance. It thwarted the aims and plans of the Western reactionary circles to capture the Balkans.

As a whole the work, in comparison with the previously published ones, provides the most complete and clearest understanding of the objectives, the content and character of the armed struggle of Soviet troops in liberating the Southeastern and Central European nations from fascism.

Of course, the reader would like to find in the book a fuller analysis of the role and significance of the combat by the forces of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts in the overall course of the armed struggle of the Soviet

Army, as well as the work of the army and combined arms command in leading the troops in preparing and conducting the operations. But in the form in which this interesting and useful work has been published, it will play its role in the military history training of our officer personnel as well as in the military patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet youth.

The book has been well illustrated, comes with original diagrams, which help to analyze more fully the course of combat, and is on a high scientific level.

The new work dealing with the liberation of Southeastern and Central Europe is a worthy monument to those glorious combat actions of Soviet soldiers and the men of the liberated fraternal nations who, without sparing their forces or lives, carried out these deeds during the unforgettable days of the last war. It will be read with great interest and benefit by a broad spectrum of readers.

FOOTNOTES

1. Osvobozhdeniye Yugo-Vostochnoy i Tsentral'noy Evropy voyskami 2-go i 3-go Ukrainskikh frontov. 1944-1945 (The Liberation of Southeastern and Central Europe by the Troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian Fronts. 1944-1945), by an authors' collective under the overall editorship of Mar SU M. V. Zakharov, Moscow, Izd-vo Nauka, 1970, 676 pages.
2. Yassko-Kishinevskiye Kanny (The Iasi-Kishinev Cannae), by an authors' collective under the overall editorship of Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Izd-vo Nauka, 1964, 280 pages; Budapesht--Vena--Praga. Istoriko-memuarnyy trud (Budapest--Vienna-Prague. An Historical Memoir Work), by an authors' collective under the overall editorship of Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Izd-vo Nauka, 1965, 384 pages.

THE MILITARY ESSENCE OF CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM

A characteristic feature of contemporary international life is the acute clash between the forces of progress and reaction, socialism and imperialism. All the basic areas of social life -- the economy, politics, ideology and culture -- have become the area of this clash.

Historical experience convincingly shows that for achieving its purpose imperialism has not abandoned the use of armed force. Militarism, particularly American, having been increased to an enormous scale, represents an evil force as well as an outright and secret threat to the peace and security of all the peoples in the world.

On the general level of the ideological and political struggle against world imperialism, one of the most urgent tasks is to unmask the militaristic essence of the modern capitalist system. The two reviewed works have made a definite contribution to solving this problem.¹

* * *

[Review of book by A. A. Migolat'yev: "The Escalation of Militarism"]

Col G. Arzumanov, Col V. Kadykov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, and Col I. Gorshechnikov, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Docent

The book by A. A. Migolat'yev is a scientific popular essay which attempts to trace the escalation of militarism in all the basic directions of the aggressive strategy of imperialism. In it the reader will find an exposition of Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning militarism, its forms and basic manifestations, as well as vivid and convincing examples and conclusions concerning the dangerous consequences of the aggressive policy of imperialism and the necessity of strengthening the defense might of the socialist nations.

In the first chapter of the book, militarism is viewed as an inevitable failing of an exploiting system and an inseparable trait of modern imperialism. From specific historical facts, the author shows that militarism arose long before the capitalist method of production. Its formation was related to the appearance of private ownership and the establishing of the economic relations of dominance and subordination. In serving various exploiting orders, militarism has carried the traits of its era, and at the same time, in terms of its class nature, has been a specific weapon to which the exploiting classes have resorted each time their rule has been threatened. The scale of militarism has grown particularly under capitalism.

Certainly, the bourgeois apologists during all times and particularly in the era of imperialism, being unable to conceal the growth of militarism, have endeavored to depict it either as an eternal feature of mankind and to elevate it to the rank of a biological law, or, at least, to depict it as a social good. The designated work notes the baselessness and reactionary bent of certain bourgeois concepts of militarism and wars. Here also the definitions of militarism given by thinkers of the past are found.

A truly scientific definition of militarism as a social phenomenon and its basic tie to capitalism was given by K. Marx and F. Engels for the first time and subsequently developed by V. I. Lenin.

In the reviewed book a significant place has been given to examining the Leninist heritage in the area of studying militarism in the new historical stage of development for the capitalist method of production.

Having disclosed the fundamental tie between the growth of militarism and the entry of capitalism into the imperialist phase of development. V. I. Lenin emphasized that it was possible to put an end to militarism and wars only by overthrowing the rule of capital. V. I. Lenin not only taught revolutionary theory to the proletariat, but also headed its revolt during the October days of 1917. Armed by the Leninist science for victory, the Russian proletariat with weapons in hand carried out the most just violence in history -- it destroyed the capitalist structure and thereby eliminated the socioeconomic roots of militarism in its own country.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, the most important feature of imperialist militarism became its new function -- the preparation for and conduct of wars, provocations and subversive activities against the socialist nations. In analyzing this question, the author gives examples showing the monstrous crimes of Anglo-American imperialism, which was the chief organizer of military intervention against the young Soviet republic. The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union was the most vivid manifestation of the new function of modern militarism.

In analyzing historical facts and in accompanying them with the frank admissions of military and state leaders in the bourgeois nations, the author forces the readers to give serious thought to the events occurring in our days and to draw correct political conclusions. The book gives attention to a comparatively little studied but important theoretical question concerning the scientific definition of modern militarism and its most important traits and characteristics. In examining certain definitions found in Soviet literature the author notes their strong and weak points and rightly points out that in our times militarism has permeated all spheres of social life in the imperialist nations (pp 42-43). However, we feel that some of the particular features listed by him for modern

militarism require clarification. For example, we cannot agree that the powerful antimilitaristic movement in the contemporary world is a characteristic feature of imperialist militarism. More correctly, this is a phenomenon which characterizes the exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism at the present stage. It would also be very important to bring out the influence of the scientific and technical revolution on the development and particular features of modern militarism.

The second chapter of the book examines in detail the questions of imperialism's preparation for wars against the socialist nations in the period after 1945. The unmasking of the antisocialist focus of modern militarism is particularly urgent in our times when the imperialists are cloaking themselves in the togas of peacemakers. For many years the propaganda apparatus of the NATO nations, this main aggressive military alliance of the imperialist powers, has asserted the "peaceful orientation" of the bloc and its "defensive" goals. In 1969, within NATO, upon the proposal of U.S. President Nixon, a special committee was even set up on the problems of modern society. The goal of this committee was "to study the questions of road traffic safety, the pollution of air, seas, and inland waters," and so forth, that is, it is being proclaimed as the progressive "third dimension of NATO."

The strictly documented facts which are abundantly presented in the book serve as a striking counter to such demagoguery. Thus, during the existence of NATO the member nations of this aggressive bloc have instigated more than 100 armed conflicts, wars, and military provocations in different areas of the world. Just from 1958 through 1966 the United States alone intervened openly into the internal affairs of sovereign states 157 times, threatening military force (p 77). Since then the bloody count of imperialism has increased with new aggressive wars and military provocations against the UAR, Syria, Jordan, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. According to plans and with NATO aid, a military fascist coup was carried out in Greece and an attempt was made to deflect Czechoslovakia from the path of socialist development.

In our view certain summary data given by the author (tables and charts) on the growth dynamics of the size of the armed forces of the United States, West Germany and the other NATO nations are of significant interest for the military reader.

At present the NATO nations keep more than 6.5 million men under arms, that is, 2.5 million more than 20 years ago, with another 300,000 in the border troops, the military police, and the civilian police. Moreover, more than 45 million persons are employed in the direct or indirect running of the enormous military machine. They are employed in military institutions, at defense industry enterprises, in arsenals, bases, and so

forth. Thus, militarization directly involves one out of every 10 inhabitants of the NATO nations as a whole, including one out of every nine Americans. Almost 10 percent of the U.S. national product each year is sacrificed to the insatiable Moloch of war.

Of equal interest and persuasiveness in the book is the analysis of materials and facts showing the motivating "incentives" of militarization, that is, the enormous profits of monopolistic capital as a result of the arms race and wars. In quoting the words of V. I. Lenin that "internationally connected capital does great business in arms and wars," the author illustrates them by a number of statistical calculations made in the imperialist nations themselves. The U.S. monopolies have become fabulously wealthy on the blood shed on the battlefields in Vietnam. During the first three years of the aggression started by the U.S. Armed Forces against the Vietnamese people (1964-1966), the profits of the seven leading U.S. aerospace concerns increased by 50 percent, reaching 2 billion dollars. In 1970 in the United States there were 399 multi-millionaires, the personal wealth of whom was estimated as several hundreds of millions of dollars. The 30 richest U.S. families owned personal property totaling 43 billion dollars.

Under the conditions of the sharp exacerbation of the ideological struggle which is characteristic for our times, the reader's attention, undoubtedly, will be drawn to those sections which take up the questions of the pernicious influence of militarism on the economy and social life of the peoples in the capitalist nations, their political institutions, ideology, psychology and culture. The many examples and facts given in the book convincingly show the forms and methods which are used by the militarists for establishing their absolute dominance over the thinking of peoples and also show how, by using the mass information media, they impose their class viewpoint on the masses and develop a "public opinion" which is favorable to the imperialists.

The author quite validly concludes that under modern conditions, when socialism is broadly advancing, imperialist militarism as a whole is living through a profound crisis. The social basis on which militarism rests is being narrowed. The forces resisting militarism are growing and becoming stronger. Using concrete facts the author has shown the degeneration and inevitable doom of capitalism as a socioeconomic system as well as the complete baselessness of its claims to a historical future.

In the third chapter the author, drawing on extensive factual materials, has shown the place and role of modern militarism in the defense of colonialism and its perpetuation in new forms. The author has endeavored to isolate the basic directions by which imperialism has developed its activities for the purposes of colonial enslavement.

The question of the essence of neocolonialism and the ways open for imperialism to modernize the methods of colonial exploitation of the developing nations is of great interest. As is known, the development of the world socialist system, the rapid growth of the national liberation movement, which has been supported by the class struggle within the capitalist nations, as well as other factors have led to a situation where imperialism has been forced to abandon the old, overtly colonialist methods vis-a-vis the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The colonialists, in a number of instances, have legally granted political independence to the colonies. Such actions by imperialism, in marking, on the one hand, a retreat by the colonial powers to save positions, at the same time have pursued far-reaching goals. In terms of the purpose of its organizers, this policy should justify the former colonial policy of imperialism, having represented it as the preparation of the colonies for future independence and at the same time it demonstrates the "abandonment" of colonial systems by imperialism.

In actual fact the imperialists, having been forced to give formal independence to a number of colonies, have left a grievous heritage there, and this is used by them as a means for putting constant pressure on the young national states. Here we should mention first of all the maintaining of the dominance of the large imperialist monopolies in the economy of the former colonies. In using this, the former parent states put constant economic and financial pressure on the economically underdeveloped nations. For example, the non-equivalent trade alone each year gives the imperialist monopolies profits which exceed 10 billion dollars.

For putting pressure on the young national states, imperialism has participated actively in stirring up territorial and border disputes. In recent years alone the neocolonialists have instigated a whole series of such conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, Somalia and Ethiopia, Pakistan and India, and so forth. The mutual claims of the liberated states in these disputes and conflicts, as a rule, have as their causes the arbitrary setting of boundaries by the "liberators" for the nations which arose on the map of the world without considering the economic and geographic conditions, and the interests of the various tribes and nationalities.

In the plans of neocolonialism an important place is occupied by the military agreements of the imperialist powers with certain developing states. These treaties have made it possible for the colonialists to strengthen their influence in the former possessions using extraeconomic methods, although in word these agreements are depicted as equal ones. In delivering weapons and military equipment and in sending in military specialists, the imperialists thereby endeavor to maintain and even enlarge their bases, to involve the young states in military adventures, and to draw them into aggressive wars.

In using the new concept of "ultricolonialism" and "colonial militarism" (which are scarcely necessary), the author writes that in those instances when ordinary methods of pressuring the developing nations do not achieve their goal, the imperialists resort to the use of armed force. This substantiates the well-known thesis that the imperialist powers more and more often resort to instigating local wars against the national liberation movement of the peoples and the new independent states. This has been eloquently stated by the American theoretician of limited war, R. Osgood: "Since an ever greater number of small powers get the aspiration and acquire forces in order to act in accord with their own intentions, the United States, possibly, will have to envisage interference into wars,² which occur without the direct participation of the communist powers."

By using local wars the imperialists want to obstruct the liberation of peoples from colonial oppression as well as the strengthening and development of the young national states. By waging local wars imperialism hopes step by step to restore its positions in the Third World and thereby deprive the socialist camp of its natural ally in the form of the national liberation movement.

In the reviewed work it is correctly pointed out that even V. I. Lenin disclosed the essence of local wars and their tie to the overall aggressive policy of imperialism. In examining this question in more detail, it is advisable to stress that the Leninist definition of the essence of local wars is based upon strict class analysis of the plundering policy of imperialism, which starts these wars, as well as disclosing the just character of the policy of the colonial and dependent peoples and nations which have become the victims of imperialist aggression.

Lenin's analysis at present has assumed even more timely significance. This is caused by the fact that, in terms of their essence, modern local wars are one of the very dangerous forms for imperialism to continue its aggressive policy by violent means. However, bourgeois ideologists in every possible way have endeavored to conceal the class nature of limited wars and their political content; they have resorted to objectivistic evaluations and by using such methods endeavor to gloss over the difference between just and unjust wars. The decisive unmasking of this invalid position makes it possible to understand more profoundly that local wars represent a serious threat not only to the national liberation movement, but to the entire world, since a real danger remains of their growing into a general world war.

The fourth chapter is devoted to disclosing the reactionary essence of modern "domestic militarism." The author shows that the development of capitalist society in our times is characterized by an ever greater deepening of the crisis of bourgeois democracy and by an intensification of reaction in all areas. He also analyzes the basic directions by which

the escalation of "domestic militarism" is carried out. In the reviewed book such directions are the following: the intensification of the struggle by the imperialist bourgeoisie against democracy in all its manifestations; the greater influence of the military-industrial complex on the domestic policy of the capitalist states; the ever more frequent use of armed force against the working masses. His analysis makes it possible to conclude that capitalist reality clearly substantiates the validity of Lenin's description of militarism as a weapon which is used by the exploiters for suppressing any sort (economic and political) of movement by the proletariat.

However, in examining the problem of the escalation of "domestic militarism," the author limits himself to merely showing the ways and forms of the struggle of the imperialist bourgeoisie against the proletariat and all workers. Such a one-sided approach to the problem does not provide an analysis of the reasons for the escalation and does not properly disclose the complex clashes in the fierce class struggle in the modern capitalist world.

A more detailed study of the question of the role of state monopoly capitalism and its strike force, the military-industrial complex, in the further hardening of the bourgeois dictatorship in the capitalist nations indicates that state monopoly capitalism represents an internally contradictory phenomenon. On the one hand, it is characterized by an enormous strengthening of the economic and political power of the monopolies, by their further collusion with the military in the state apparatus, and by a system of measures aimed at developing foreign policy adventures and strengthening the reaction within the capitalist nations. On the other hand, the consolidation of the monopolistic forces, the development of state monopoly methods of economic management, the scientific and technical revolution, which leads to a further strengthening of exploitation and to the growth of the army of unemployed, and other factors cause a response of solidarity among the worker forces; they broaden the front of the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie and strengthen the social base of the workers' movement.

The revolutionariness of the international working class is objectively determined by its position in the system of production relations in a capitalist society and by the degree of awareness of the historical tasks confronting it. The internal contradictions of capitalism, the exacerbation of which are furthered by the entire course of capitalist development, operate as a source for the increasing revolutionariness of the working class in the developed capitalist nations. The working class in these nations is becoming more and more aware that precisely it is the main motivating force of production and for this reason struggles decisively to bring its rights into accord with its actual place in society.

In relying on numerous figures and facts; the author soundly shows how the enormous apparatus of force in the hands of imperialism is used by the exploiters against the workers and serves the interests of the reactionary domestic and aggressive foreign policies of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. The realization of this policy is carried out by a further curtailment of democratic rights and freedoms, by a fierce suppression of the class actions of the workers, by improving the procedures and methods for buying off individual groups, by the complete militarization of the economy, science and all sociopolitical life in the imperialist nations. For these purposes the imperialist circles use the most diverse methods from social demagoguery and double-dealing to militaristic methods of suppressing the actions of the working class and other strata of workers.

Naturally, under such conditions the proletariat cannot remain impartial to the policy of the monopolies and to the antidemocratic manifestations of militarism, or to its anticommunist focus, aggressiveness, and adventurism. The broad masses of the people are becoming more and more aware that modern militarism is the greatest enemy of the world revolutionary movement and, in the hands of the exploiting classes, serves as a weapon for further enslaving the workers. For this reason the working class constantly increases the pressure on the positions of international capital.

An important feature in the present stage of the revolutionary workers' movement is the closer and closer tie between the basic socioeconomic and political demands of the proletariat and the urgent tasks of the struggle of the peoples in defense of peace, against the aggressive plans and actions of the imperialists, and against the threat of a new world war.

The rise of the anti-imperialist trend in the course of the class struggles of the proletariat at the present stage can be explained to a significant degree by the existence of the world socialist system and by its influence on the entire course of historical development. The working masses of the entire world see that the main force in the struggle against the imperialist policy of war is the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. In relying on the world socialist system and in increasing its forces, the working class is playing an ever more active role in solving the fundamental problems of the modern terms, as well as in the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress.

In the fifth chapter, using numerous examples and facts the author shows the picture of the social consequences of militarism and its effect on the various aspects of the life of a capitalist society.

As is known the material basis of militarism is arms production, and this inevitably leads to the militarization of the economy. Unfortunately, the book does not examine the mechanism of the effect of militarism on

the process of capitalist reproduction. The author merely limits himself to a description of the external manifestations of this effect.

There are a number of bourgeois economists who have endeavored to show that the development of military production has a beneficial effect on the economy of the capitalist nations since it provides a broadening of the market, it raises employment and accelerates the economic growth rate. However, reality refutes these assertions which serve as an apology for defense industry business. Militarization and the related inflationary mechanism are able to create only a temporary additional demand and cause a certain growth of production. A protracted and systematic diverting of resources into the production of military products which are taken out of reproduction leads ultimately to a reduction of aggregate demand for civilian-end products. Militarization ultimately ceases to serve as a stimulator of economic growth, and the contradictions of capitalist reproduction are manifested with new strength.

This conclusion is convincingly and clearly substantiated by the development of the U.S. economy which, regardless of the high level of militarization after the war, has undergone four economic declines. For a majority of the leading capitalist nations, 1970 was a year of rapid growth of new economic difficulties. This has been expressed in a drop in the production growth rates, by an increase in the instability of the monetary system and by the growth of unemployment. In 1970, in the United States industrial production declined by two percent in comparison with the 1969 level. In one year around 9,000 firms went bankrupt. By the end of 1970 the number of unemployed reached a record level for the last 9 years, and was 4.6 million persons. Analogous phenomena have been observed in the other bourgeois nations as well.

The book analyzes in detail the concrete manifestations of the exacerbation of the basic contradiction in capitalism, that is, between the social character of production and the private capitalist form of acquisition.

The arms race inevitably leads to the creation of large military-industrial complexes, it accelerates the concentration of production, and gives it a more and more social character. However, this social production more and more markedly acquires distorted features since it is specialized in producing not material goods but rather the means of destruction. The private capitalist form of acquiring the results of the labor of millions of people makes it possible for the large monopolies to live off of military deliveries. Concretely, this is manifested in a further deepening of social inequality in bourgeois society. On the one hand there is the growth of wealth and the parasitism of the bourgeoisie, and on the other, deterioration of the workers' position and a decline in their standard of living.

Drawing upon extensive factual material, the author, in pointed political language, unmasks the real face of imperialist militarism which brings the workers intensified exploitation, political and social oppression, an increase in poverty and lack of rights, uncertainty and fear for the future.

As a whole, the work done by the author certainly merits approbation. However, the book is somewhat uneven. A number of questions could have been examined more profoundly. For example, there is no strict delimitation of the concepts of war, militarism, military force, aggression, and so forth. In describing modern militarism the author makes virtually no mention of the tendencies for its rebirth in Japan and does not analyze the varieties of it in England, Spain, Portugal, the Republic of South Africa, Greece, and other capitalist nations. Absolutely no mention is made of the close tie between militarism and modern Zionism.

In stressing the "inexorable antagonism of monopolistic capital" (p 36), the author at the same time says nothing about the tendency toward an international unification of capital. This tendency is inherent to capitalism and has sharply risen in recent years. Particularly under modern conditions, this increases the danger for the outbreak of war.

It is a pity that the author has limited himself to just certain comments on the bourgeois definitions and theories of militarism, and has not thoroughly criticized them.

Certain concepts proposed in the book require clarification or need a more profound explanation. For example, on pp 40-41, in analyzing the definitions of militarism, the author refers to the well-known Leninist thesis on the relationship of the economy and politics. However, without analyzing it as a whole, he accentuates only the thesis of the primary of politics over the economy. This can lead to an incorrect understanding of the examined question, about which V. I. Lenin himself wrote very concisely and clearly: "Politics is a concentrated expression of economics... To argue otherwise means to forget the rudiments of Marxism" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 42, p 278).

In our view we cannot accept as sufficiently valid the thesis that each era produces its own criteria for judging social phenomena (p 216). In such a positing of the question, the Leninist demand of a class, concrete-historical approach to evaluating various phenomena of social life is obscured.

However, the mentioned shortcomings do not detract from the value of the book. Its merits are indubitable. It will be of significant help for a broad circle of our party and Komsomol activists in their noble work of indoctrinating the men of the Soviet Army and Navy in a spirit of high vigilance and an irreconcilable class hatred for the enemies of socialism.

[Review of book by R. A. Faramazyan: "The U.S.: Militarism and the Economy"]

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Among the vast literature devoted to analyzing the economic preparations of imperialist aggression and the problems of the U.S. military economy, the book by R. A. Faramazyan stands out primarily in the purposefulness of its theoretical intent and its corresponding structure. In the work basic attention has been given to describing those new aspects which determine the relationship of imperialism and the economy, and on this basis to disclosing the role of the United States as the motivating force in the present-day nuclear missile arms race.

Proceeding from general methodological principles, elaborated in the first two chapters, the following sections of the work examine the system for financing the military-economic preparations of American imperialism, the structure of direct military expenditures and the organization of military production in the United States. The great exactingness of the author in selecting the statistical data and the carefulness in compiling the scientific organization of the book are a second characteristic feature of the examined work as a whole.

Finally, we cannot help but mention those politically important conclusions which stem from the review in the book's concluding chapter of the socio-economic consequences of militarism in the United States. Many of these conclusions to a certain degree go beyond the limits of the research, and, strictly speaking, many of the concepts related to them are not found in the text. But, we feel, the more valuable the creative solution to the problems raised in any work, the more food it provides for the independent thinking of the reader.

What are the most essential aspects which characterize the role of a modern economy in a war? The answer to this question in the book operates as a necessary level in the process of elucidating the relationship between imperialism and the economy, and research on the most important elements of military economic potential. In following the instructions of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the author examines the historical pattern of increasing material expenditures in the preparations for and waging of wars in accord with the development of the productive forces and the complicating of military equipment.

The book examines the factors which have caused a sharp increase in the role of the economy in a modern war. Among the basic ones, the author mentions three. In the first place, the unprecedented scale in the development of militarism caused by the fact that the military preparations of

the imperialist nations are directed primarily against the world socialist system. Secondly, there has been the rapid growth of the labor intensiveness of production and, consequently, an increase in the cost of the technical means for waging war as a consequence of the extreme complexity in the design of modern weapons systems. This is particularly due to the carrying out of costly military scientific research and experimental design work. According to the official American data, 200,000 man-hours were spent on developing the B-17 bomber (the work was completed in 1937), 10 million man-hours were spent on the B-58 bomber (1957), and 15 million man-hours on the XB-70 bomber (1965) (p 56).

As the third factor, the author notes that the colossal destructive force of nuclear missile weapons has led to a transformation of the economy into an object of military actions, and that this, in turn, has made it necessary to have additional expenditures for defensive installations and the creation of stockpiles of strategic raw materials.

The opinion stated in the book on the necessity of a dual measurement of a nation's military might is very interesting and at the same time debatable. In the first place, there should be a measurement from the standpoint of the state of the armed forces without relationship to the enemy (this includes such indicators as the power of a simultaneous salvo, the number of the armed forces, the level of their material and technical supply, and so forth). Secondly, there should be a measurement from the standpoint of the possible end results of using the armed forces, that is, their ability to actually carry out the basic military and political missions in the course of the war.

In following such a dual approach, the author attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of military expenditures and reaches the conclusion of its increase from the standpoint of creating units of military strength taken independently, that is, without consideration of the enemy and the achieving of the end goals of the war. At the same time he asserts that the effectiveness of military outlays in achieving the end goals of a war is declining, since it depends upon the balance of forces of the opposing sides, which are improving not only the offensive types of weapons but also the defensive means. "Thus, the development of military technology has been accompanied by two opposing tendencies: by a growth in the effectiveness of military expenditures in creating the destructive capacity of the armed forces, and by a drop in this effectiveness from the standpoint of achieving the basic goals of the war" (p 61).

We feel that such an approach is not sufficiently sound from the scientific standpoint. According to Marxist-Leninist teachings, "the military might of a state, as a relative value, expresses its ability to wage war against other states with a stress on all the material and spiritual forces of society."³

For this reason, the military might cannot be measured regardless of the ability of the armed forces to carry out strategic missions. Here the most important thing is the character of the socioeconomic system and the ability to make maximum use of all the human and material resources under wartime conditions. This was clearly shown by the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War.

In the work the leading place is given to a description of the United States as a center of modern militarism. The author examines the historical roots of this phenomenon which consist in the enrichment of American monopolistic capital at the expense of the terrible suffering of peoples during the years of the world wars. Even World War I brought fabulous profits to the financial oligarchy of the United States. The gross national product of the United States rose from 39 billion dollars in 1913 to 77.1 billion dollars in 1918. The gold reserves of the United States rose from \$1,526,000,000 in 1914 to \$2,873,000,000 in 1918 (p 15).

V. I. Lenin in his "Letter to the American Workers" wrote that the American millionaires "gained more than anyone" from the military deliveries and loans. "They have made all, even the richest, nations their tributaries. They have pillaged hundreds of billions of dollars.... On each dollar is a lump of filth from the 'profitable' military deliveries which in each nation have enriched the wealthy and ruined the poor. On each dollar are traces of the blood from that sea of blood which has been shed by the 10 million killed and the 20 million maimed...." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 37, p 50).

This Leninist description is also fully applicable to World War II. The book points out that in being far from military action, the United States benefited from the military competition to obtain colossal profits and to strengthen its positions in the economy and politics of world capitalism. The proportional amount of the United States in total industrial production of the capitalist nations rose from 34.9 percent in 1938 to 53.9 percent in 1948. The gold reserves of the nation increased from \$12,790,000,000 in 1937 to \$24,399,000,000 in 1948, and this was 71.3 percent of the total gold reserves of the capitalist world (p 20).

One achievement of the author is the convincing demonstration of the significant growth of the scale of the U.S. military machine and the aggressive preparations of the NATO bloc in the second half of the 1960s. The military outlays of the nations comprising this bloc rose from 61.3 billion dollars in 1960 up to 104 billion dollars in 1968. The total direct military expenditures of the NATO nations from 1949 through 1968 comprised the astronomic total of 1.26 trillion dollars. Of this total, 940 billion dollars (around 75 percent) came from the United States 91.7 billion (7.3 percent) was from England, and 54.5 billion dollars (4.3 percent) came from West Germany (p 24). In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central

Committee to the 24th CPSU Congress data are given that in 1970 alone the NATO nations spent 103 billion dollars on war preparations.

Of great interest is the creative approach by the author to using the official data concerning military outlays, as well as his proposal on a new classification of them.

In our opinion the author has correctly proposed that military outlays be grouped not according to the departmental approach, but rather according to their functional purpose, and be divided into two basic groups: direct, or active, outlays on increasing military strength and the military economic potential of a nation, and the indirect, or passive, ones related to making up for the consequences of previous wars or military preparations for them. According to this classification, direct military outlays would include the expenditures on the support of personnel of the armed forces, their military-technical outfitting, the construction of various types of military installations, and the development of military production. The indirect military expenditures are the outlays on rebuilding destruction, paying military pensions, and payments for the state debt.

Such a division makes it possible to disclose more accurately the aggressive character of many concealed items in the U.S. state budget.

Such a division makes it possible to disclose more accurately the aggressive character of many concealed items in the U.S. state budget. For example, according to the old classification, expenditures on U.S. atomic energy were considered in the indirect outlays, while at the same time, according to their specific purpose, these undoubtedly were direct military expenditures.

The work emphasizes that the proposed classification does not eliminate the necessity of disclosing concealed military expenditures with which the budgets of the imperialist states abound. Thus, for one of the items in the U.S. federal budget, expenditures are provided for "international activities and international financing." In actuality a portion of these allocations for "aid" to foreign states has a military purpose. As an average the overall direct and indirect military outlays of the United States each year make up over 80 percent of the total outlays in the federal budget.

A feeling of legitimate alarm for the fate of the world will seize the reader when he becomes familiar with the calculations given in the book that in 1945-1968 alone, the direct military outlays of the United States were (in 1957-1959 prices) approximately 1.05 trillion dollars, and this is approximately double the analogous expenditures (in the same prices) since the formation of the United States through 1945, including the years of the First and Second World wars (p 45).

In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed that the process of militarization in the United States has assumed the most dangerous character. Over the last five years in that nation around 400 billion dollars have been spent for military purposes.

The book provides materials showing that the main cause for the rapid growth of U.S. military expenditures has been the aggression of American imperialism in Vietnam. According to official data the U.S. expenditures in Vietnam during the 1967-1968 fiscal year equaled 26.5 billion dollars, and in the 1968-1969 fiscal year, 28.8 billion dollars.

We feel that the convincingness of this material would be even greater if the book would have given data on the enormous losses of the American Armed Forces in Vietnam, with the necessity of replenishing them leading to increasing expenditures. In terms of the total volume of expenditures of the U.S. Defense Department, the expenditures on aggression in Vietnam in 1967 were 10.7 percent, 29 percent in 1968, and 30.3 percent in 1969.⁴

For the military reader those chapters of the book which give systemized materials based upon foreign sources concerning the principles for financing the military economic preparations of the United States and the structure of direct military outlays are of great cognitive value. The initial basis for defining these principles is the strategic concept of "flexible response," in accord with which the organizational development of the U.S. Armed Forces has been carried out since 1961. Since the strategy of a "flexible response" entails the creation of more balanced types of armed forces, a significant portion of the allocations under the U.S. state budget has gone for increasing nuclear missile weapons, and at the same time the pace for conventional armaments has been accelerated.

The present-day system of determining military requirements and elaborating the U.S. military budget is characterized by the use of economic analysis methods in the actual solving of military problems. The optimum variation for solving one or another specific problem is found as a result of comparing the necessary outlays with the effectiveness of the given program from the standpoint of the tasks confronting the armed forces. In using this method the U.S. Defense Department has stopped work on many weapons systems which are in the development stage, it has taken out of service a number of obsolete systems, and so forth.⁵

The fourth chapter of the book provides a general description of the expenditures of the U.S. Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, and it also analyzes the structure of the total direct military outlays. The author has proposed classifying them in a dual manner: as expenditures going to maintain military might on the existing level, and expenditures aimed at increasing it. Although this classification contains a certain amount of conditionality, it can be accepted, bearing in mind that although simple reproduction or the maintaining of military might is not

characteristic for modern armies, it is a component element in expanded reproduction of their combat capabilities.

A predominant share of U.S. military outlays is made by the Defense Department. The proportional amount of the Pentagon in military outlays in 1969-1970 was 91.8 percent, in comparison with 87.2 percent in 1962-1963. The total volume of budget expenditures in 1969-1970 totaled 78.5 billion dollars, of which around 25.4 billion dollars were allocated for the war in Vietnam. R. Faramazyan gives the data which illustrate well the dynamics and structure of U.S. Defense Department expenditures.

As is shown in the book, the expenditures under the item "purchases of military equipment" are the largest in the budget of the Defense Department. This is explained primarily by the increased cost of military equipment which has accompanied its rapid development and improvement. The work correctly points out that although the creation of a unit of military might (TNT equivalent) is becoming cheaper, an increase in the cost of modern weapons systems as a whole and an increase in their number and the growth of the equipment-to-personnel ratio have led to an excessive swelling of military expenditures. In the 1967-1968 fiscal year, the direct military expenditures of the United States calculated per serviceman rose by 180 percent in comparison with the prewar level, and reached \$11,919 in 1926 prices. If one takes current prices, then the direct military expenditures of the United States per serviceman in 1967-1968 were over \$24,000.

Of great interest is the analysis made by the author of the expenditures of the U.S. Defense Department on military scientific research and experimental design work, the growth of which for military purposes has been unprecedented. In 1949-1950 these expenditures were 1.6 billion dollars, and in 1968-1969, 7.5 billion dollars. Moreover, a significant portion of the military research is carried out under other budget items. This is explained, in the author's opinion, by the desire to equip the U.S. Armed Forces generally and in particular those in Vietnam with more efficient types of weapons considering the specific features of the theater of combat. While in 1965 the United States spent 70 million dollars on research and design for the needs of the Vietnamese War, in 1967 the figure was 900 percent more, approximately 700 million dollars (p 131).

An organic continuation of research on military expenditures is the examination in the work of the structure of U.S. military production and the level of militarization in the individual economic sectors. In terms of the latter, it has been pointed out that military production has become a permanent component in the present-day U.S. economy. Along with this, the following definition of military production is completely valid: "By military production, one has in mind the output of products earmarked for military consumption" (p 170).

We feel that such an interpretation of the concept of military production greatly narrows its limits, it restricts them merely to the end product of military purposes per se, and thereby helps to underestimate the actual military burden imposed on society. In military economic literature, at present, there is a wider understanding of the essence of military production as the process of producing all the intermediate and end use values earmarked for satisfying military requirements. From this standpoint, military production includes three different functional sectors:

the first sector -- military production per se, that is, the manufacturing of the end use values for the armed forces;

the second sector -- the production of consumer goods for the employees of military production;

the third sector -- the production of the means of production for military production, that is, the manufacturing of everything required for obtaining the products of all three sectors.⁶

According to the data of R. A. Faramazyan (p 174), at present the United States spends 10 percent of the gross national product on military purposes. But if one takes military production in the broad sense of this word, that is, as the aggregate of the three sectors, in 1969 it was 230 billion dollars, and the aggregate social product was 1.14 trillion dollars. Thus, the share of military production is more than 20 percent of the aggregate social product of the United States. All of this substantiates the conclusion drawn in the reviewed work that the United States holds first place not only in terms of the absolute amounts of military preparations, but also in terms of the level of militarizing the economy.

The author gives the following main causes for the high level of militarization in the U.S. Economy. In the first place, the enormous scale of outlays on the military machine aimed at achieving world hegemony; secondly, the use of state military orders as a good source for enriching the financial oligarchy; thirdly, the production of military products not only for its own armed forces, but also for exports. From the 1948-1949 fiscal year through the 1965-1966 year, the U.S. Government has exported 46.3 billion dollars worth of weapons and military equipment (p 176).

R. Faramazyan has paid proper attention to the geographic placement of military production and to the level of militarization in the individual economic regions of the United States. This part of the work assumes great interest due to the fact that such data are absent in the official American publications. The book has given interesting information on the shifts in the geography of the U.S. defense industry, and the reasons for them have been analyzed. The aggressive U.S. war in Vietnam is rightly pointed out as one of them. For precisely this reason "the share of the

South and Midwest has increased markedly, while the proportional amount of the West has declined in the total orders of the Defense Department" (p 206).

The author has compiled an interesting table on the geographic location for the production of individual types of the U.S. defense industry. These data are of significant scientific value (pp 209-210).

A drawback of the given section is, in our opinion, a certain infatuation on the author's part with generalizations and relative indicators. The military evaluation of the location of production requires a more concrete analysis of those sectors which comprise the basis of military economic potential. These are, above all, electric power, the atomic and missile industries, the production of POL and transportation.

The concluding chapters provide a complete description of the system for organizing military production and the socioeconomic consequences of militarism in the United States. The particular significance of the materials given here is that they make it possible to draw conclusions on those unavoidable contradictions which are characteristic for the military economy of the main capitalist nations.

The extensive specialization and cooperation in U.S. military production are based predominantly on the fulfilling of government orders by the private capitalist monopolies. Private American firms carry out more than 90 percent of the total value of the military orders. Each year the U.S. Defense Department concludes around 15 million business transactions in 850 specialized areas of deliveries. The suppliers of the Defense Department are more than 20,000 main contractors and 100,000 subcontractors (p 234).

Since the motivating incentive for the activities of the monopolies is a drive for superhigh profits, no state programing and control are capable of eliminating this competitive chaos which occurs in the struggle to obtain contracts, the artificial inflation of prices, and abuses by government officials. According to the estimates of the main U.S. financial control agency, the overruns of the Pentagon, as a consequence of paying for military orders at prices above cost, were around 77 billion dollars in 1951-1965. Here the lion's share of the military orders, and consequently the profits, was received by the largest monopolies which then passed on a portion of the orders received by them to subcontractors.

The book has an interesting table from which it can be seen that out of the 100 largest monopolies, over the last 20 years 50 have received from 60 to 56 percent of all the primary military orders, while the remaining 50 received from 7.9 to 9.2 percent. Thus, in the total amount, from three-quarters to two-thirds of all the military orders go to 100 of the

largest monopolies (p 235). The given analysis of the system for organizing military production in the United States shows the presence of significant weaknesses in it. These weaknesses derive from the subordination of military orders to the interests of private corporations, as well as from the artificial inflation of prices for military products for the purpose of obtaining fabulous profits. To this one should also add the socio-economic consequences of militarism which are expressed in the growth of prices, in increased tax burdens, and a drop in the standard of living of the workers. Ultimately this leads to an exacerbation of class contradictions.

An indisputed merit of the book is the description given in it of the negative effect of militarism on the development of the U.S. economy. This is manifested in the diverting of significant material, financial and human resources from productive use, in the allocation of more than one-half of all the funds going into scientific research for military purposes, in a chronic deficit of the state budget, the growth of the federal debt and inflation, in the enormous outlays on maintaining overseas military bases (the latter is one of the main reasons for the chronic U.S. balance of payments deficit and the decline in the gold reserves), and in the negative effect on the economy of not only the United States, but also its allies.

It goes without saying that the review is unable to report on the entire diverse contents of the work by R. Faramazyan. We would like to interest the military reader and to attract his attention to the necessity of reading this work, which has a great deal of valuable material characterizing the process of militarization in the United States, and of drawing the appropriate practical conclusions.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. A. Migolat'yev, Eskalatsiya militarizma (The Escalation of Militarism), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970, 222 pages; R. A. Faramazyan, SShA: militarizm i ekonomika (The United States: Militarism and the Economy), Moscow, Izd-vo Mysl', 1970, 334 pages.
2. R. Osgud, Ogranichennaya voyna (Limited War), Voyenizdat, 1960, p 313.
3. Marksizm-leninizm o voynе i armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), Voyenizdat, 1968, pp 246-247.
4. See G. S. Turskiy, Vliyaniye amerikanskoy agressii vo V'yetname na ekonomiku SShA (The Effect of American Aggression in Vietnam on the U.S. Economy), Izd. Voennoy Akademii PVO, 1969, p 26.

5. For this see Voyennaya Mysl', No 8, 1969, pp 84-90.
6. F. P. Avramchuk, Voyennoye proizvodstvo i voyenno-ekonomicheskiy potentsial (Military Production and Military Economic Potential), Izd. Voyennoy akademii svyazi, 1970, p 18.